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Physics

§7.3#2

States of the Soul and Virtues as Not Alterations

Aristotle argues that the virtues and vices of the soul, as well as the states (knowledge) of the intellectual part, are not themselves alterations but belong to relations. Although they arise along with alterations in the sensitive part or the settling of natural confusion, the acquisition or loss of these states is not an alteration in itself.

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§7.3#2

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἕξεων· ἄπασαι γὰρ καὶ αὗται τῷ πρός τι πὼς ἔχειν, καὶ αἱ μὲν ἀρεταὶ τελειώσεις, αἱ δὲ κακίαι ἐκστάσεις. ἔτι δὲ ἡ μὲν ἀρετὴ εὖ διατίθησι πρὸς τὰ οἰκεῖα πάθη, ἡ δὲ κακία κακῶς. ὥστʼ οὐδʼ αὔται ἔσονται ἀλλοιώσεις· οὐδὲ δὴ αἱ ἀποβολαὶ καὶ αἱ λήψεις αὐτῶν. γίγνεσθαι δʼ αὐτὰς ἀναγκαῖον ἀλλοιουμένου τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ μέρους.1 ἀλλοιωθήσεται δʼ ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν· ἅπασα γὰρ ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας τὰς σωματικάς, αὗται δὲ ἢ ἐν τῷ πράττειν ἢ ἐν τῷ μεμνῆσθαι ἢ ἐν τῷ ἐλπίζειν. αἱ μὲν οὖν ἐν τῇ πράξει κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησίν εἰσιν, ὥσθʼ ὑπʼ αἰσθητοῦ τινὸς κινεῖσθαι, αἱ δʼ ἐν τῇ μνήμῃ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐλπίδι ἀπὸ ταύτης εἰσίν· ἢ γὰρ οἷα ἔπαθον μεμνημένοι ήδονται, ἢ ἐλπίζοντες οἷα μέλλουσιν. ὥστʼ ἀνάγκη πᾶσαν τὴν τοιαύτην ἡδονὴν ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν γίγνεσθαι. ἐπεὶ δʼ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ἐγγιγνομένης καὶ ἡ κακία καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐγγίγνεται (περὶ ταύτας γάρ εἰσιν), αἱ δʼ ἡδοναὶ καὶ αἱ λῦπαι ἀλλοιώσεις τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ, φανερὸν ὅτι ἀλλοιουμένου τινὸς ἀνάγκη καὶ ταύτας ἀποβάλλειν καὶ λαμβάνειν. ὥσθʼ ἡ μὲν γένεσις αὐτῶν μετʼ ἀλλοιώσεως, αὐταὶ δʼ οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀλλοιώσεις. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδʼ αἱ τοῦ νοητικοῦ μέρους ἔξεις ἀλλοιώσεις, οὐδʼ ἔστιν αὐτῶν γένεσις. πολὺ γὰρ μάλιστα τὸ ἐπιστῆμον ἐν τῷ πρός τι πῶς ἔχειν λέγομεν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ φανερὸν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῶν γένεσις· τὸ γὰρ κατὰ δύναμιν ἐπιστῆμον οὐδὲν αὐτὸ κινηθὲν ἀλλὰ τῷ ἄλλο ὑπάρξαι2 γίγνεται ἐπιστῆμον. ὅταν γὰρ γένηται τὸ κατὰ μέρος, ἐπίσταταί πως τὰ καθόλου τῷ ἐν μέρει. πάλιν δὲ τῆς χρήσεως καὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας οὐκ ἔστι γένεσις, εἰ μή τις καὶ τῆς ἀναβλέψεως καὶ τῆς ἁφῆς οἴεται γένεσιν εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ χρῆσθαι καὶτὸ ἐνεργεῖν ὄμοιον τούτοις. ἡ δʼ ἐξἀρχῆς λῆψις τῆς ἐπιστήμης γένεσις οὐκἔστινοὐδʼ ἀλλοίωσις· τῷγὰρ ήρεμῆσαι καὶ στῆναι τὴν διάνοιαν3 ἐπίστασθαι καὶ φρονεῖν λεγόμεθα, εἰς δὲ τὸ ἠρεμεῖν οὐκ ἔστι γένεσις· ὅλως γὰρ οὐδεμιᾶς μεταβολῆς,4 καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον. ἔτιδʼ ὥσπερ ὅταν ἐκ τοῦ μεθύειν ἢ καθεύδειν ἢ νοσεῖν εἰς τἀναντία μεταστῇ τις, οὔ φαμεν ἐπιστήμονα γεγονέναι πάλιν (καίτοι ἀδύνατος ἦν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ χρῆσθαι πρότερον), οῦτως οὐδʼ ὅταν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λαμβάνῃ τὴν ἔξιν· τῷ γὰρ καθίστασθαι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῆς φυσικῆς ταραχῆς φρόνιμόν τι γίγνεται καὶ ἐπιστῆμον. διὸ καὶ τὰ παιδία οὔτε μανθάνειν δύνανται οὔτε κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ὁμοίως κρίνειν τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις· πολλὴ γὰρ ἡ ταραχὴ καὶ ἡ κίνησις. καθίσταται δὲ καὶ ἠρεμίζεται πρὸς ἔνια μὲν ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως αὐτῆς, πρὸς ἔνια δʼ ὑπʼ ἄλλων, ἐν ἀμφοτέροις δὲ ἀλλοιουμένων τινῶν τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῆς χρήσεως καὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας, ὅταν νήφων γένηται καὶ ἐγερθῇ. φανερὸν οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι τὸ ἀλλοίοῦσθαι καὶ ἡ ἀλλοίωσις ἔν τε τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς γίγνεται καὶ ἐν τῷ αἰσθητικῷ μορίῳ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐν ἄλλῳ δʼ οὐδενὶ πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

Similarly also in the case of the states of the soul; for these also consist entirely in being in a certain relation to something, and the virtues are perfections, while the vices are departures. Moreover, virtue disposes a thing well in respect of its proper affections, and vice badly. So that neither will these be alterations; nor indeed are the losses and acquisitions of them. But it is necessary that they are generated while the sensitive part is altered. And it will be altered by sensible things; for all moral virtue is concerned with bodily pleasures and pains, and these exist either in acting, or in remembering, or in hoping. Those in action, therefore, are in accordance with sensation, so as to be moved by some sensible thing, while those in memory and in hope are from this; for they are pleased either remembering what sort of things they suffered, or hoping what sort of things they are going to suffer. So that it is necessary that all such pleasure is produced by sensible things. And since, when pleasure and pain are produced, vice and virtue are also produced (for they are concerned with these), and pleasures and pains are alterations of the sensitive part, it is clear that it is necessary that they lose and acquire these also while something is altered. So that their generation is with alteration, but they themselves are not alterations. But indeed, neither are the states of the intellectual part alterations, nor is there generation of them. For we speak of that which has knowledge especially in respect of being in a certain relation to something. Moreover, it is also clear that there is no generation of them; for that which has knowledge potentially becomes knowing not by being itself moved at all, but by the presence of something else. For when the particular comes to be, one knows in a way the universal by the particular. And again, of the use and the activity there is no generation, unless one thinks there is also a generation of looking and of touching; for using and acting are similar to these. And the initial acquisition of knowledge is not a generation or an alteration; for we are said to know and to understand by the intellect resting and coming to a stand, and there is no generation into resting; for in general there is no generation of any change, as was said before. Moreover, just as when someone changes to the opposite states from being drunk, sleeping, or sick, we do not say that he has become knowing again (even though he was previously unable to use his knowledge), so also when he acquires the state from the beginning; for it is by the soul settling down from its natural confusion that it becomes prudent and knowing. Therefore children are neither able to learn nor to judge according to their sensations in the same way as their elders; for there is much confusion and motion. And it settles down and is quieted in some respects by nature itself, and in others by other things, but in both cases while certain things in the body are altered, just as in the case of use and activity, when one becomes sober and is awakened. It is clear, therefore, from what has been said, that being altered and alteration occur both in sensible things and in the sensitive part of the soul, but in nothing else except accidentally.

Syntax notes4 items
  1. 247a5γίγνεσθαι δʼ αὐτὰς ἀναγκαῖον ἀλλοιουμένου τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ μέρους

    ἀλλοιουμένου τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ μέρους is a genitive absolute construction expressing the temporal or causal condition under which the states of the soul (αὐτάς) come into being.

  2. 247b5τῷ ἄλλο ὑπάρξαι

    This is an articular infinitive in the dative case without a preposition, expressing means or cause ("by the presence of something else"). ἄλλο functions as the subject accusative of the infinitive ὑπάρξαι.

  3. 247b5τῷ γὰρ ἠρεμῆσαι καὶ στῆναι τὴν διάνοιαν

    An articular infinitive in the dative case (τῷ ἠρεμῆσαι καὶ στῆναι) expressing cause or means, accompanied by τὴν διάνοιαν as its subject accusative ("by the intellect resting and coming to a stand").

  4. 247b10ὅλως γὰρ οὐδεμιᾶς μεταβολῆς

    The genitive οὐδεμιᾶς μεταβολῆς depends on the omitted phrase γένεσίς ἐστιν (or similar), meaning "for in general there is no generation of any change."

Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-22) · Revisions to the English translation and the original (6, latest 2026-09-22)
  • 2026-09-22 AI review — source 1
  • 2026-09-21 AI review — source 5
urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg031.humanitext-grc1:7.3#2