- Source
- Aristotle. Aristotelis Physica. Ross, W.D., editor. Oxford: Clarendon, 1960.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
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- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg031.humanitext-grc1:6.3
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-11-18
Aristotle demonstrates that the 'now' which limits the past and the future is indivisible and identical, and argues that neither motion nor rest can occur within the 'now'.
Ἀνάγκη δὲ καὶ τὸ νῦν τὸ μὴ καθʼ ἕτερον ἀλλὰ καθʼ αὑτὸ καὶ πρῶτον λεγόμενον ἀδιαίρετον εἶναι, καὶ ἐν ἅπαντι τὸ τοιοῦτο χρόνῳ ἐνυπάρχειν. ἔστιν γὰρ ἔσχατόν τι τοῦ γεγονότος, οὗ ἐπὶ τάδε οὐθέν ἐστι τοῦ μέλλοντος, καὶ πάλιν τοῦ μέλλοντος, οὗ ἐπὶ τάδε οὐθέν ἐστι τοῦ γεγονότος· ὅ δή φαμεν ἀμφοῖν εἶναι πέρας.1 τοῦτο δὲ ἐὰν δειχθῇ ὅτι τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν καὶ ταὐτόν, ἅμα φανερὸν ἔσται καὶ ὅτι ἀδιαίρετον. ἀνάγκη δὴ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι τὸ νῦν τὸ ἔσχατον ἀμφοτέρων τῶν χρόνων· εἰ γὰρ ἕτερον, ἐφεξῆς μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη θάτερον θατέρῳ διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι συνεχὲς ἐξ ἀμερῶν, εἰ δὲ χωρὶς ἑκάτερον, μεταξὺ ἔσται χρόνος· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ συνεχὲς τοιοῦτον ὥστʼ εἶναί τι συνώνυμον2 μεταξὺ τῶν περάτων. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ χρόνος τὸ μεταξύ, διαιρετὸν ἔσται· πᾶς γὰρ χρόνος δέδεικται ὅτι διαιρετός. ὥστε διαιρετὸν τὸ νῦν. εἰ δὲ διαιρετὸν τὸ νῦν, ἔσται τι τοῦ γεγονότος ἐν τῷ μέλλοντι καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐν τῷ γεγονότι· καθʼ ὃ γὰρ ἂν διαιρεθῇ, τοῦτο διοριεῖ τὸν παρήκοντα καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα χρόνον. ἅμα δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἂν καθʼ αὑτὸ εἴη τὸ νῦν, ἀλλὰ καθʼ ἕτερον· ἡ γὰρ διαίρεσις οὐ καθʼ αὑτό. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τοῦ νῦν τὸ μέν τι γεγονὸς ἔσται τὸ δὲ μέλλον, καὶ οὐκ ἀεὶ τὸ αὐτὸ γεγονὸς ἢ μέλλον. οὐδὲ δὴ τὸ νῦν τὸ αὐτό· πολλαχῇ γὰρ διαιρετὸς ὁ χρόνος. ὥστʼ εἰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν, ἀνάγκη τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι τὸ ἐν ἑκατέρῳ νῦν. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ ταὐτό, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ ἀδιαίρετον· εἰ γὰρ διαιρετόν, πάλιν ταὐτὰ συμβήσεται καὶ ἐν τῷ πρότερον. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν ἔστιν τι ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ ἀδιαίρετον, ὅ φαμεν εἶναι τὸ νῦν, δῆλόν ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων· ὅτι δʼ οὐθὲν ἐν τῷ νῦν κινεῖται, ἐκ τῶνδε φανερόν ἐστιν. εἰ γάρ, ἐνδέχεται καὶ θᾶττον κινεῖσθαι καὶ βραδύτερον. ἔστω δὴ τὸ νῦν ἐφʼ ᾧ N, κεκινήσθω δʼ ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ θᾶττον τὴν AB. οὐκοῦν τὸ βραδύτερον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἐλάττω τῆς AB κινηθήσεται, οἶον τὴν ΑΓ. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ βραδύτερον ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ νῦν κεκίνηται τὴν ΑΓ, τὸ θᾶττον ἐν ἐλάττονι τούτου κινηθήσεται, ὥστε διαιρεθήσεται τὸ νῦν. ἀλλʼ ἦν ἀδιαίρετον. οὐκ ἄρα ἔστιν κινεῖσθαι ἐν τῷ νῦν. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδʼ ἠρεμεῖν· ἠρεμεῖν γὰρ λέγομεν τὸ πεφυκὸς κινεῖσθαι μὴ κινούμενον ὅτε πέφυκεν καὶ οὗ καὶ ὥς, ὥστʼ ἐπεὶ ἐν τῷ νῦν οὐθὲν πέφυκε κινεῖσθαι, δῆλον ὡς οὐδʼ ἠρεμεῖν. ἔτι δʼ εἰ τὸ αὐτὸ μέν ἐστι τὸ νῦν ἐν ἀμφοῖν τοῖν χρόνοιν, ἐνδέχεται δὲ τὸν μὲν κινεῖσθαι τὸν δʼ ἠρεμεῖν ὅλον, τὸ δʼ ὅλον κινούμενον τὸν χρόνον3 ἐν ὁτῳοῦν κινηθήσεται τῶν τούτου καθʼ ὃ πέφυκε κινεῖσθαι, καὶ τὸ ἠρεμοῦν ὡσαύτως ἠρεμήσει, συμβήσεται τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα ἠρεμεῖν καὶ κινεῖσθαι· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἔσχατον τῶν χρόνων ἀμφοτέρων, τὸ νῦν. ἔτι δʼ ἠρεμεῖν μὲν λέγομεν τὸ ὁμοίως ἔχον καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ τὰ μέρη νῦν καὶ πρότερον· ἐν δὲ τῷ νῦν οὐκ ἔστι τὸ πρότερον, ὥστʼ οὐδʼ ἠρεμεῖν. ἀνάγκη ἄρα καὶ κινεῖσθαι τὸ κινούμενον ἐν χρόνῳ καὶ ἠρεμεῖν τὸ ἠρεμοῦν.
It is necessary also that the ‘now’ which is so called not in virtue of something else but in itself and primarily, should be indivisible, and that such a ‘now’ should be inherent in all time. For there is some extreme of the past, on this side of which there is nothing of the future, and again of the future, on this side of which there is nothing of the past; which we indeed say is the limit of both. And if this is shown to be of such a kind and to be identical, it will at the same time be manifest that it is also indivisible. It is necessary indeed that the ‘now’ which is the extreme of both times should be the same; for if they were different, the one could not be consecutive to the other, because that which is continuous cannot be composed of indivisibles; and if each is separate, there will be time between them; for everything continuous is such that there is something of the same name between its limits. But indeed, if the intermediate is time, it will be divisible; for every time has been shown to be divisible. Consequently the ‘now’ will be divisible. But if the ‘now’ is divisible, there will be something of the past in the future and of the future in the past; for at whatever point it may be divided, this will limit the past and the future time. And at the same time, the ‘now’ would not exist in itself, but in virtue of something else; for division is not in virtue of itself. Moreover, of the ‘now’ one part will be past and another future, and it will not always be the same part that is past or future. Nor indeed will the ‘now’ be the same; for time is divisible in many ways. So that if these things are impossible to obtain, it is necessary that the ‘now’ in each should be the same. But indeed, if it is the same, it is manifest that it is also indivisible; for if it were divisible, the same consequences will follow again as before. That there is, then, something indivisible in time, which we say is the ‘now’, is clear from what has been said. And that nothing moves in the ‘now’ is manifest from what follows. For if it were possible, it is possible for a thing to move both faster and slower. Let the ‘now’ be represented by N, and let the faster have moved in it through the distance AB. Consequently, the slower will move in the same time through a distance less than AB, say AC. But since the slower has moved through AC in the whole of the ‘now’, the faster will move through it in less time than this, so that the ‘now’ will be divided. But it was indivisible. Therefore, it is not possible to move in the ‘now’. But indeed, neither is it possible to be at rest; for we say that a thing is at rest which, being naturally capable of motion, is not moving when, where, and as it is its nature to do so; so that since nothing is naturally capable of motion in the ‘now’, it is clear that neither is it possible to be at rest. Furthermore, if the ‘now’ is the same in both times, and it is possible for a thing to be in motion through the whole of the one time and to be at rest through the whole of the other, and that which is in motion through the whole of a time will move in any part of it in which it is naturally capable of moving, and that which is at rest will likewise be at rest, it will result that the same thing is at the same time at rest and in motion; for the same extreme of both times is the ‘now’. Furthermore, we say that a thing is at rest when both itself and its parts are in the same state now and formerly; but in the ‘now’ there is no ‘formerly’, so that neither is it possible to be at rest. It is necessary, therefore, both that that which is in motion should move in time, and that that which is at rest should be at rest in time.
- 234a1ὅ δή φαμεν ἀμφοῖν εἶναι πέρας
The relative pronoun 'ὅ' refers to the extreme of the past and the extreme of the future just mentioned, i.e., the 'now' (τὸ νῦν), which is identified as the common limit (πέρας) of both times.
- 234a5συνώνυμον
Meaning 'synonymous' or 'of the same name'. In Aristotle's context, it indicates that between the limits of any continuous thing, there must always exist something of the same kind as that continuous thing (e.g., time between the limits of time, a line between the limits of a line).
- 234a35τὸ δʼ ὅλον κινούμενον τὸν χρόνον
An accusative of duration, 'that which is in motion through the whole of a time'. This passage expresses the premise that what moves through a whole interval of time must move in any of its parts (τῶν τούτου), so long as it is naturally capable of moving.
Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-22) · Revisions to the English translation and the original (3, latest 2026-09-22)
- 2026-09-22 AI review — source 1
- 2026-09-21 AI review — source 1
- 2026-09-16 OCR errors repaired — source 1
