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Physics

§4.3

Senses of Being in Something and Zeno's Puzzle

The text systemizes the eight senses of being 'in' something, and demonstrates that it is impossible for a thing to be in itself, either primarily or accidentally. Based on this, Aristotle resolves Zeno's puzzle that place must be in a place, confirming that place is distinct from matter and form.

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§4.3

Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ληπτέον ποσαχῶς ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ λέγεται. ἕνα μὲν δὴ τρόπον ὡς ὁ δάκτυλος ἐν τῇ χειρὶ καὶ ὅλως τὸ μέρος ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ. ἄλλον δὲ ὡς τὸ ὅλον ἐν τοῖς μέρεσιν· οὐ γάρ ἐστι παρὰ τὰ μέρη τὸ ὅλον. ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ὡς ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐν ζῴῳ καὶ ὅλως εἶδος ἐν γένει. ἄλλον δὲ ὡς τὸ γένος ἐν τῷ εἴδει καὶ ὅλως τὸ μέρος τοῦ εἴδους ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. ἔτι ὡς ἡ ὑγίεια ἐν θερμοῖς καὶ ψυχροῖς καὶ ὅλως τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ. ἔτι ὡς ἐν βασιλεῖ τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ ὅλως ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ κινητικῷ. ἔτι ὡς ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ ὅλως ἐν τῷ τέλει· τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα. πάντων δὲ κυριώτατον τὸ ὡς ἐν ἀγγείῳ καὶ ὅλως ἐν τόπῳ. ἀπορήσειε δʼ ἄν τις, ἆρα καὶ αὐτό τι ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι, ἢ οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ πᾶν ἢ οὐδαμοῦ ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ. διχῶς δὲ τοῦτʼ ἔστιν, ἤτοι καθʼ αὑτὸ ἢ καθʼ ἕτερον. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ᾖ μόρια τοῦ ὅλου τὸ ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ ἐν τούτῳ, λεχθήσεται τὸ ὅλον ἐν αὐτῷ· λέγεται γὰρ καὶ κατὰ τὰ μέρη, οἷον λευκὸς ὅτι ἡ ἐπιφάνεια λευκή, καὶ ἐπιστήμων ὅτι τὸ λογιστικόν. ὁ μὲν οὖν ἀμφορεὺς οὐκ ἔσται ἐν αὐτῷ, οὐδʼ ὁ οἶνος· ὁ δὲ τοῦ οἴνου ἀμφορεὺς ἔσται· ὅ τε γὰρ καὶ ἐν ᾧ, ἀμφότερα τοῦ αὐτοῦ μόρια. οὕτω μὲν οὖν ἐνδέχεται αὐτό τι ἐν αὐτῷ εἶναι, πρώτως δʼ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται. οἷον τὸ λευκὸν ἐν σώματι (ἡ ἐπιφάνεια γὰρ ἐν σώματι), ἡ δʼ ἐπιστήμη ἐν ψυχῇ· κατὰ ταῦτα δὲ αἱ προσηγορίαι μέρη ὄντα, ὥς γε ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ1 (ὁ δὲ ἀμφορεὺς καὶ ὁ οἶνος χωρὶς μὲν ὄντα οὐ μέρη, ἅμα δέ διὸ ὅταν ᾖ μέρη, ἔσται αὐτὸ ἐν αὐτῷ)· οἷον τὸ λευκὸν ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ ὅτι ἐν σώματι, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ὅτι ἐν ἐπιφανείᾳ· ἐν δὲ ταύτη οὐκέτι κατʼ ἄλλο. καὶ ἕτερά γε τῷ εἴδει ταῦτα, καὶ ἄλλην φύσιν ἔχει ἑκάτερον καὶ δύναμιν, ἥ τʼ ἐπιφάνεια καὶ τὸ λευκόν. οὔτε δὴ ἐπακτικῶς σκοποῦσιν οὐδὲν ὁρῶμεν ἐν ἑαυτῷ κατʼ οὐδένα τῶν διορισμῶν, τῷ τε λόγῳ δῆλον ὅτι ἀδύνατον· δεήσει γὰρ ἀμφότερα ἑκάτερον ὑπάρχειν, οἷον τὸν ἀμφορέα ἀγγεῖόν τε καὶ οἶνον εἶναι καὶ τὸν οἶνον οἶνόν τε καὶ ἀμφορέα, εἴπερ ἐνδέχεται αὐτό τι ἐν αὐτῷ εἶναι. ὥστʼ εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα ἐν ἀλλήλοις εἶεν, ὁ μὲν ἀμφορεὺς δέξεται τὸν οἶνον οὐχ ᾗ αὐτὸς οἶνος ἀλλʼ ᾗ ἐκεῖνος, ὁ δʼ οἶνος ἐνέσται ἐν τῷ ἀμφορεῖ οὐχ ᾖ αὐτὸς ἀμ· φορεὺς ἀλλʼ ᾗ ἐκεῖνος. κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὸ εἶναι2 ὅτι ἕτερον, δῆλον· ἄλλος γὰρ ὁ λόγος τοῦ ἐν ᾧ καὶ τοῦ ἐν τούτῳ. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐνδέχεται· ἅμα γὰρ δύο ἐν ταὐτῷ ἔσται· αὐτός τε γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ ὁ ἀμφορέὺς ἔσται, εἰ οὗ ἡ φύσις δεκτική, τοῦτʼ ἐνδέχεται ἐν αὐτῷ εἶναι, καὶ ἔτι ἐκεῖνο οὗ δεκτικόν, οἶον, εἰ οἴνου, ὁ οἶνος. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀδύνατον ἐν αὐτῷ τι εἶναι πρώτως, δῆλον· ὃ δὲ Ζήνων ἠπόρει, ὅτι εἰ ὁ τόπος ἐστί τι, ἔν τινι ἔσται, λύειν οὐ χαλεπόν· οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει ἐν ἄλλῳ εἶναι τὸν πρῶτον τόπον, μὴ μέντοι ὡς ἐν τόπῳ ἐκείνῳ,3 ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ ἡ μὲν ὑγίεια ἐν τοῖς θερμοῖς ὡς ἕξις, τὸ δὲ θερμὸν ἐν σώματι ὡς πάθος. ὥστε οὐκ ἀνάγκη εἰς ἄπειρον ἰέναι. ἐκεῖνο δὲ φανερόν, ὅτι ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν τὸ ἀγγεῖον τοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ (ἕτερον γὰρ τὸ πρώτως ὅ τε καὶ ἐν ᾧ), οὐκ ἂν εἴη οὔτε ἡ ὕλη οὔτε τὸ εἶδος ὁ τόπος, ἀλλʼ ἕτερον. ἐκείνου γάρ τι ταῦτα τοῦ ἐνόντος, καὶ ἡ ὕλη καὶ ἡ μορφή. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἔστω διηπορημένα.

​After these things, we must grasp in how many ways one thing is said to be in another. In one way, indeed, as the finger is in the hand, and in general as the part is in the whole. In another way, as the whole is in the parts; for the whole is not apart from the parts. In another way, as man is in animal, and in general as the species is in the genus. In another way, as the genus is in the species, and in general as the part of the definition is in the definition. Further, as health is in the hot and the cold, and in general as the form is in the matter. Further, as the affairs of the Greeks are in the king, and in general as things are in the first mover. Further, as a thing is in the good, and in general as it is in the end; and this is that for the sake of which. And the most proper of all is as a thing is in a vessel, and in general in a place. An obstacle might be raised by someone, whether a thing can also be in itself, or nothing can, but everything is either nowhere or in something else. This is in two ways, either in virtue of itself or in virtue of another. For when the container and what is in it are parts of the whole, the whole will be said to be in itself; for the whole is also spoken of in respect of its parts, as a man is called white because his surface is white, and knowing because his rational part is so. The vessel itself, then, will not be in itself, nor will the wine, but the vessel of wine will be; for both that which is in it and that in which it is are parts of the same whole. In this way, then, it is possible for a thing to be in itself, but primarily it is not possible. For example, whiteness is in the body (for the surface is in the body), and knowledge is in the soul; and in respect of these the appellations are given to the parts, as in the case of a man (for the vessel and the wine, when separate, are not parts, but when together they are; wherefore when they are parts, the thing will be in itself); for example, whiteness is in a man because it is in the body, and in this because it is on the surface, but in this latter no longer in virtue of something else. And these are different in species, and each has a different nature and power, namely, the surface and the whiteness. Neither, then, if we consider inductively, do we see anything in itself under any of the definitions, and by reason it is clear that it is impossible. For it will be necessary for both to belong to each, for instance, for the vessel to be both vessel and wine, and for the wine to be both wine and vessel, if indeed it is possible for a thing to be in itself. So that, however much they might be in each other, the vessel will receive the wine not in so far as it is itself wine but in so far as the other is, and the wine will be in the vessel not in so far as it is itself a vessel but in so far as the other is. In respect of their being, then, that they are different is clear; for the definition of the container and of that which is in it is different. But indeed, neither is it possible accidentally; for then two things would be in the same place at once. For the vessel itself will be in itself, if that whose nature is receptive can be in itself, and further that which it is receptive of, for example, if of wine, the wine. That, then, it is impossible for anything to be in itself primarily is clear. And the puzzle that Zeno raised—that if place is something, it will be in a place—is not hard to solve. For nothing prevents the primary place from being in something else, yet not as in a place, but just as health is in the hot as a state, and heat is in the body as an affection. So that there is no necessity to go on to infinity. And this is clear, that since the vessel is no part of what is in it (for that which is primarily in something and that in which it is are different), neither matter nor form can be place, but something else. For these, both the matter and the shape, are parts of that which is in it. Let these questions, then, be regarded as thoroughly discussed.

Syntax notes3 items
  1. 210a30κατὰ ταῦτα δὲ αἱ προσηγορίαι μέρη ὄντα, ὥς γε ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ

    κατὰ ταῦτα (according to these) refers to the examples where whiteness is in the body (surface) and knowledge is in the soul (rational part). μέρη ὄντα is a nominative participle phrase (neuter plural) meaning "being parts [of the whole]", explaining the reason why the appellations (αἱ προσηγορίαι) of the parts can be applied to the whole, as in the case of a man.

  2. 210b10εἰ οὗ ἡ φύσις δεκτική, τοῦτʼ ἐνδέχεται ἐν αὐτῷ εἶναι

    The syntax here features τοῦτο (the containing thing, such as a vessel) as both the subject and the antecedent of the relative pronoun οὗ. The clause οὗ ἡ φύσις δεκτική means "that whose nature is receptive," and the whole sentence constructs a conditional: "if that whose nature is receptive can be in itself."

  3. 210b21οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει ἐν ἄλλῳ εἶναι τὸν πρῶτον τόπον, μὴ μέντοι ὡς ἐν τόπῳ ἐκείνῳ

    This is the solution to Zeno's paradox of the infinite regress of place. Even if τὸν πρῶτον τόπον (the primary place) is in something else, it is not contained there "as in a place" (ὡς ἐν τόπῳ). By appealing to other categories of "being in" (like health in the hot as a state, or heat in the body as an affection), Aristotle avoids the infinite regress.

Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-22) · Revisions to the English translation and the original (5, latest 2026-11-04)
  • 2026-11-04 Curator — source 1
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urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg031.humanitext-grc1:4.3