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Physics

§4.13

The Now as Link and Division and Temporal Adverbs

Aristotle discusses the 'now' as preserving the continuity of time while being potentially divisible, contrasting it with a mathematical point, and defines various temporal terms. He also reaffirms that time is inherently the cause of destruction.

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§4.13

Τὸ δὲ νῦν ἐστιν συνέχεια1 χρόνου, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη· συνέχει γὰρ τὸν χρόνον τὸν παρεληλυθότα καὶ ἐσόμενον, καὶ πέρας χρόνου ἐστίν· ἔστι γὰρ τοῦ μὲν ἀρχή, τοῦ δὲ τελευτή. ἀλλὰ τοῦτʼ οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς στιγμῆς μενούσης2 φανερόν. διαιρεῖ δὲ δυνάμει. καὶ ᾗ μὲν τοιοῦτο, αἰεὶ ἕτερον τὸ νῦν, ᾗ δὲ συνδεῖ, αἰεὶ τὸ αὐτό, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν μαθηματικῶν γραμμῶν (οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ αἰεὶ στιγμὴ τῇ νοήσει· διαιρούντων γὰρ ἄλλη καὶ ἄλλη· ᾗ δὲ μία, ἡ αὐτὴ πάντῃ)—οὕτω καὶ τὸ νῦν τὸ μὲν τοῦ χρόνου διαίρεσις κατὰ δύναμιν, τὸ δὲ πέρας ἀμφοῖν καὶ ἑνότης· ἔστι δὲ ταὐτὸ καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὸ ἡ διαίρεσις καὶ ἡ ἕνωσις, τὸ δʼ εἶναι3 οὐ ταὐτό. τὸ μὲν οὖν οὕτω λέγεται τῶν νῦν, ἄλλο δʼ ὅταν ὁ χρόνος ὁ τούτου ἐγγὺς ᾖ. ἥξει νῦν, ὅτι τήμερον ἥξει· ἥκει νῦν, ὅτι ἦλθε τήμερον. τὰ δʼ ἐν Ἰλίῳ γέγονεν οὐ νῦν, οὐδʼ ὁ κατακλυσμὸς νῦν· καίτοι συνεχὴς ὁ χρόνος εἰς αὐτά, ἀλλʼ ὅτι οὐκ ἐγγύς. τὸ δὲ ποτέ χρόνος ὡρισμένος πρὸς τὸ πρότερον νῦν, οἷον ποτὲ ἐλήφθη Τροία, καὶ ποτὲ ἔσται κατακλυσμός· δεῖ γὰρ πεπεράνθαι πρὸς τὸ νῦν. ἔσται ἄρα ποσός τις ἀπὸ τοῦδε χρόνος εἰς ἐκεῖνο, καὶ ἦν εἰς τὸ παρελθόν. εἰ δὲ μηδεὶς χρόνος ὃς οὔ ποτε,4 πᾶς ἂν εἴη χρόνος πεπερασμένος. ἆῤ οὖν ὑπολείψει; ἢ οὔ, εἴπερ αἰεὶ ἔστι κίνησις; ἄλλος οὖν ἢ ὁ αὐτὸς πολλάκις; δῆλον ὅτι ὡς ἂν ἡ κίνησις, οὕτω καὶ ὁ χρόνος· εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ μία γίγνεταί ποτε, ἔσται καὶ χρόνος εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτός, εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἔσται. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ νῦν τελευτὴ καὶ ἀρχὴ χρόνου, ἀλλʼ οὐ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν παρήκοντος τελευτή, ἀρχὴ δὲ τοῦ μέλλοντος, ἔχοι ἂν ὥσπερ ὁ κύκλος ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ πως τὸ κυρτὸν καὶ τὸ κοῖλον, οὕτως καὶ ὁ χρόνος ἀεὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ καὶ τελευτῇ. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δοκεῖ ἀεὶ ἕτερος· οὐ γὰρ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀρχὴ καὶ τελευτὴ τὸ νῦν· ἅμα γὰρ ἂν καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ τἀναντία ἂν εἴη. καὶ οὐχ ὑπολείψει δή· αἰεὶ γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ. τὸ δʼ ἤδη τὸ ἐγγύς ἐστι τοῦ παρόντος νῦν ἀτόμου μέρος τοῦ μέλλοντος χρόνου (πότε βαδίζεις; ἤδη, ὅτι ἐγγὺς ὁ χρόνος ἐν ᾧ μέλλει), καὶ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος χρόνου τὸ μὴ πόρρω τοῦ νῦν (πότε βαδίζεις; ἤδη βεβάδικα). τὸ δὲ Ἴλιον φάναι ἤδη ἑαλωκέναι οὐ λέγομεν, ὅτι λίαν πόρρω τοῦ νῦν. καὶ τὸ ἄρτι τὸ ἐγγὺς τοῦ παρόντος νῦν μόριον τοῦ παρελθόντος. πότε ἦλθες; ἄρτι, ἐὰν ᾖ ὁ χρόνος ἐγγὺς τοῦ ἐνεστῶτος νῦν. πάλαι δὲ τὸ πόρρω. τὸ δʼ ἐξαίφνης τὸ ἐν ἀναισθήτῳ χρόνῳ διὰ μικρότητα ἐκστάν· μεταβολὴ δὲ πᾶσα φύσει ἐκστατικόν. ἐν δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ πάντα γίγνεται καὶ φθείρεται· διὸ καὶ οἱ μὲν σοφώτατον ἔλεγον, ὁ δὲ Πυθαγόρειος Πάρων ἀμαθέστατον, ὅτι καὶ ἐπιλανθάνονται ἐν τούτῳ, λέγων ὀρθότερον. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι φθορᾶς μᾶλλον ἔσται καθʼ αὑτὸν αἴτιος ἢ γενέσεως, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ πρότερον (ἐκστατικὸν γὰρ ἡ μεταβολὴ καθʼ αὑτήν), γενέσεως δὲ καὶ τοῦ εἶναι κατὰ συμβεβηκός. σημεῖον δὲ ἱκανὸν ὅτι γίγνεται μὲν οὐδὲν ἄνευ τοῦ κινεῖσθαί πως αὐτὸ καὶ πράττειν, φθείρεται δὲ καὶ μηδὲν κινούμενον. καὶ ταύτην μάλιστα λέγειν εἰώθαμεν ὑπὸ τοῦ χρόνου φθοράν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ ταύτην ὁ χρόνος ποιεῖ, ἀλλὰ συμβαίνει ἐν χρόνῳ γίγνεσθαι καὶ ταύτην τὴν μεταβολήν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔστιν ὁ χρόνος καὶ τί, καὶ ποσαχῶς λέγεται τὸ νῦν, καὶ τί τὸ ποτὲ καὶ τὸ ἄρτι καὶ τὸ ἤδη καὶ τὸ πάλαι καὶ τὸ ἐξαίφνης, εἴρηται.

The ‘now’ is a continuity of time, as was said; for it connects past time and future time, and is a limit of time; for it is the beginning of the one and the end of the other. But this is not as evident as it is in the case of the point which remains. And it divides potentially. And in so far as it is such, the ‘now’ is always different, but in so far as it binds together, it is always the same, just as in the case of mathematical lines (for it is not always the same point in thought; for to those who divide, it is one and then another; but in so far as it is one, it is the same in every way)—so also the ‘now’ is on the one hand a division of time potentially, and on the other hand the limit and unity of both; and the division and the union are the same thing and in respect of the same thing, but their being is not the same. This is one way in which the ‘now’ is spoken of, but another is when the time which is close to it is meant. ‘He will come now,’ because he will come today; ‘he has come now,’ because he came today. But the events at Ilium did not happen ‘now,’ nor is the deluge ‘now’—although time is continuous up to them—but because they are not near. ‘At some time’ is a time determined in relation to the prior ‘now,’ for instance, ‘at some time Troy was taken,’ and ‘at some time there will be a deluge’; for it must be bounded in relation to the ‘now.’ There will therefore be some quantity of time from this ‘now’ to that event, and there was so in relation to the past. But if there is no time which is not ‘at some time,’ then all time would be finite. Will it then fail? Or not, if indeed motion always exists? Is it then different, or the same repeatedly? Clearly, as the motion is, so is the time; for if the same and single motion at some time occurs, the time too will be one and the same, and if not, it will not. Since the ‘now’ is an end and a beginning of time, but not of the same time, but the end of the past and the beginning of the future, then, just as the circle has in some way the convex and the concave in the same place, so also time is always at a beginning and an end. And because of this, it always seems different; for the ‘now’ is not the beginning and end of the same thing; for then contraries would exist at the same time and in the same respect. And indeed it will not fail; for it is always at a beginning. ‘Already’ is that part of future time which is near the present indivisible ‘now’ (e.g. ‘When are you walking?’ ‘Already,’ because the time in which he is about to do so is near), and that part of past time which is not far from the ‘now’ (e.g. ‘When are you walking?’ ‘I have already walked’). But we do not say that Ilium has ‘already’ been taken, because it is too far from the ‘now.’ And ‘just now’ is the part of the past near to the present ‘now.’ ‘When did you come?’ ‘Just now,’ if the time is near to the present ‘now.’ ‘Long ago’ is that which is far. And ‘suddenly’ is that which departs from its state in a time imperceptible because of its smallness; and all change is by nature a departing from a state. All things come into being and pass away in time; wherefore some called it the wisest of things, but the Pythagorean Paron called it the most ignorant, because people also forget in it—speaking more correctly. It is clear, then, that it will be in itself the cause of destruction rather than of coming into being, as was said before too (for change in itself is a departing from a state), but of coming into being and of being, accidentally. An adequate sign of this is that nothing comes into being without itself being moved in some way and acting, but a thing is destroyed even when not being moved at all. And this destruction is what we are most accustomed to call destruction ‘by time.’ Nevertheless, not even this does time produce, but it just happens that this change too occurs in time. That time is, therefore, and what it is, and in how many ways the ‘now’ is spoken of, and what ‘at some time,’ ‘just now,’ ‘already,’ ‘long ago,’ and ‘suddenly’ are, has been said.

Syntax notes4 items
  1. 222a13συνέχεια

    Here, not only the passive sense of 'continuity' but also the active nuance of 'that which holds together' or 'connector' (in connection with the verb συνέχει) is strongly emphasized.

  2. 222a13ἐπὶ τῆς στιγμῆς μενούσης

    A genitive phrase governed by the preposition ἐπί, where μενούσης is a participle modifying στιγμῆς. It means 'in the case of a point which remains,' referring to a stationary geometrical point, as opposed to the flowing nature of time.

  3. 222a20τὸ δʼ εἶναι

    A nominal use of the infinitive meaning 'to be' or 'essence (definition)'. It indicates that while division (διαίρεσις) and union (ἕνωσις) are identical as an actual event in the 'now', they are distinct in their conceptual definition (εἶναι).

  4. 222a28εἰ δὲ μηδεὶς χρόνος ὃς οὔ ποτε

    A conditional clause containing a double negative: 'if there is no time which is not at some time (pote).' The verb ἔστι (or a related predicate) is omitted after the relative pronoun ὅς.

Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-22) · No revisions to the English translation or the originalurn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg031.humanitext-grc1:4.13