← Aristotle

Physics

§3.3

Location of Motion and Identity of Acting and Being Acted Upon

In this chunk, Aristotle clarifies that motion is in the movable and presents a logical puzzle concerning the identity of the activities of acting and being-acted-upon. He resolves this puzzle by distinguishing between essential identity and relational identity using the road between Athens and Thebes, concluding with a comprehensive definition of motion.

View ▾
View
Translation
Typeface
AI ↗
← PrevNext →
§3.3

Καὶ τὸ ἀπορούμενον δὲ φανερόν, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ κίνησις ἐν τῷ κινητῷ·1 ἐντελέχεια γάρ ἐστι τούτου ὑπὸ τοῦ κινητικοῦ. καὶ ἡ τοῦ κινητικοῦ δὲ ἐνέργεια οὐκ ἄλλη ἐστίν· δεῖ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι ἐντελέχειαν ἀμφοῖν· κινητικὸν μὲν γάρ ἐστιν τῷ δύνασθαι, κινοῦν δὲ τῷ ἐνεργεῖν, ἀλλʼ ἔστιν ἐνεργητικὸν τοῦ κινητοῦ, ὥστε ὁμοίως μία ἡ ἀμφοῖν ἐνέργεια ὥσπερ τὸ αὐτὸ διάστημα ἕν πρὸς δύο καὶ δύο πρὸς ἕν, καὶ τὸ ἄναντες καὶ τὸ κάταντες· ταῦτα γὰρ ἕν μέν ἐστιν, ὁ μέντοι λόγος οὐχ εἶς· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ κινοῦντος καὶ κινουμένου. ἔχει δʼ ἀπορίαν λογικήν·2 ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ἴσως εἶναί τινα ἐνέργειαν τοῦ ποιητικοῦ καὶ τοῦ παθητικοῦ· τὸ μὲν δὴ ποίησις, τὸ δὲ πάθησις, ἔργον δὲ καὶ τέλος τοῦ μὲν ποίημα, τοῦ δὲ πάθος. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἄμφω κινήσεις, εἰ μὲν ἕτεραι, ἐν τίνι; ἢ γὰρ ἄμφω ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι καὶ κινουμένῳ, ἢ ἡ μὲν ποίησις ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι, ἡ δὲ πάθησις ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι (εἰ δὲ δεῖ καὶ ταύτην ποίησιν καλεῖν, ὁμώνυμος ἂν εἴη). ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τοῦτο, ἡ κίνησις ἐν τῷ κινοῦντι ἔσται (ὁ γὰρ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐπὶ κινοῦντος καὶ κινουμένου), ὥστʼ ἢ πᾶν τὸ κινοῦν κινήσεται, ἢ ἔχον κίνησιν οὐ κινήσεται. εἰ δʼ ἄμφω ἐν τῷ κινουμένω καὶ πάσχοντι, καὶ ἡ ποίησις καὶ ἡ πάθησις, καὶ ἡ δίδαξις καὶ ἡ μάθησις δύο οὖσαι ἐν τῷ μανθάνοντι, πρῶτον μὲν ἡ ἐνέργεια ἡ ἑκάστου οὐκ ἐν ἑκάστῳ ὑπάρξει, εἶτα ἄτοπον δύο κινήσεις ἅμα κινεῖσθαι· τίνες γὰρ ἔσονται ἀλλοιώσεις δύο τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ εἰς ἕν εἶδος; ἀλλʼ ἀδύνατον. ἀλλὰ μία ἔσται ἡ ἐνέργεια. ἀλλʼ ἄλογον δύο ἑτέρων τῷ εἴδει τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ μίαν εἶναι ἐνέργειαν· καὶ ἔσται, εἴπερ ἡ δίδαξις καὶ ἡ μάθησις τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἡ ποίησις καὶ ἡ πάθησις, καὶ τὸ διδάσκειν τῷ μανθάνειν τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν τῷ πάσχειν, ὥστε τὸν διδάσκοντα ἀνάγκη ἔσται πάντα μανθάνειν καὶ τὸν ποιοῦντα πάσχειν. ἤ οὔτε τὸ τὴν ἄλλου ἐνέργειαν ἐν ἑτέρῳ εἶναι ἄτοπον (ἔστι γὰρ ἡ δίδαξις ἐνέργεια τοῦ διδασκαλικοῦ, ἔν τινι μέντοι, καὶ οὐκ ἀποτετμημένη, ἀλλὰ τοῦδε ἐν τῷδε, οὔτε μίαν δυοῖν κωλύει οὐθὲν τὴν αὐτὴν εἶναι (μὴ ὡς τῷ εἶναι τὸ αὐτό,3 ἀλλʼ ὡς ὑπάρχει τὸ δυνάμει ὄν πρὸς τὸ ἐνεργοῦν), οὔτʼ ἀνάγκη τὸν διδάσκοντα μανθάνειν, οὐδʼ εἰ τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν, μὴ μέντοι ὥστε τὸν λόγον εἶναι ἕνα τὸν 〈τὸ〉τί ἦν εἶναι λέγοντα, οἷον ὡς λώπιον καὶ ἱμάτιον, ἀλλʼ ὡς ἡ ὁδὸς ἡ Θήβηθεν Ἀθήναζε καὶ ἡ Ἀθήνηθεν εἰς Θήβας, ὥσπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον; οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ πάντα ὑπάρχει τοῖς ὁπωσοῦν τοῖς αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ μόνον οἶς τὸ εἶναι τὸ αὐτό. οὐ μὴν ἀλλʼ οὐδʼ εἰ ἡ δίδαξις τῇ μαθήσει τὸ αὐτό, καὶ τὸ μανθάνειν τῷ διδάσκειν, ὥσπερ οὐδʼ εἰ ἡ διάστασις μία τῶν διεστηκότων, καὶ τὸ διίστασθαι ἐνθένθε ἐκεῖσε κἀκεῖθεν δεῦρο ἕν καὶ τὸ αὐτό. ὅλως δʼ εἰπεῖν οὐδʼ ἡ δίδαξις τῇ μαθήσει οὐδʼ ἡ ποίησις τῇ παθήσει τὸ αὐτὸ κυρίως, ἀλλʼ ᾦ ὑπάρχει ταῦτα, ἡ κίνησις· τὸ γὰρ τοῦδε ἐν τῶδε καὶ τὸ τοῦδε ὑπὸ τοῦδε ἐνέργειαν εἶναι ἕτερον τῷ λόγῳ.4 τί μὲν οὖν ἐστιν κίνησις εἴρηται καὶ καθόλου καὶ κατὰ μέρος· οὐ γὰρ ἄδηλον πῶς ὁρισθήσεται τῶν εἰδῶν ἕκαστον αὐτῆς· ἀλλοίωσις μὲν γὰρ ἡ τοῦ ἀλλοιωτοῦ, ᾖ ἀλλοιωτόν, ἐντελέχεια. ἔτι δὲ γνωριμώτερον, ἡ τοῦ δυνάμει ποιητικοῦ καὶ παθητικοῦ, ᾖ τοιοῦτον, ἁπλῶς τε καὶ πάλιν καθʼ ἕκαστον, ἢ οἰκοδόμησις ἢ ἰάτρευσις. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ λεχθήσεται τρόπον καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων κινήσεων ἑκάστης.

And the puzzle is also resolved, in that it is clear that motion is in the movable; for it is the fulfillment of this by the mover. And the activity of the mover is not other than this; for there must be a fulfillment of both. For it is a mover by being capable, but it moves by being active, yet it is active upon the movable, so that the activity of both is likewise one, just as the same interval is one to two and two to one, and the upward slope and the downward slope. For these are one, but their definition is not one. And it is likewise also in the case of the mover and the moved. But it has a logical puzzle. For it is perhaps necessary that there is some activity of the active and of the passive; the one is acting, the other being-acted-upon, and the work and end of the one is an act, and of the other a passion. Since, then, both are motions, if they are different, in what are they? For either both are in the patient and the moved, or the acting is in the agent and the being-acted-upon is in the patient (and if we must call this latter also ‘acting’, it would be homonymous). But indeed if this is so, motion will be in the mover (for the same argument applies to the mover and the moved), so that either every mover will be moved, or having motion it will not be moved. But if both are in the moved and the patient, both the acting and the being-acted-upon, and teaching and learning, being two, are in the learner, first of all, the activity of each will not belong to each, and secondly, it is absurd for two motions to be moved at the same time. For what will be two alterations of the one thing into one form? But this is impossible. But [then] the activity will be one. But it is irrational for the activity of two things different in species to be one and the same. And it will be so, if indeed teaching and learning are the same, and acting and being-acted-upon, and to teach is the same as to learn, and to act as to be-acted-upon, so that it will be necessary for the teacher to learn everything and the agent to be acted upon. Or is it that neither is it absurd for the activity of one thing to be in another (for teaching is the activity of the teacher-like, in something indeed, and not cut off, but of this in that), nor does anything prevent one and the same activity from belonging to two (not as being the same in essence, but as the potential being is related to the active), nor is it necessary for the teacher to learn, even if acting and being-acted-upon are the same, yet not so that the definition stating the essence is one, as ‘mantle’ and ‘cloak’, but as the road from Thebes to Athens and that from Athens to Thebes, as was also said before? For not all the same things belong to things that are the same in any way whatsoever, but only to those whose essence is the same. Indeed, not even if teaching is the same as learning, and to learn as to teach, just as if the distance of two separated things is one, to go from here to there and from there to here is not therefore one and the same. To speak generally, neither teaching is the same as learning nor acting as being-acted-upon in the strict sense, but that in which these belong, namely motion; for to be the activity ‘of this in that’ and ‘of this by that’ is different in definition. What motion is, then, has been said both generally and particularly; for it is not unclear how each of its species will be defined. For alteration is the fulfillment of the alterable, as alterable. Still more clearly, [the fulfillment] of what is potentially active and passive, as such, both generally and again in each case, e.g. house-building or healing. And the same account will be given concerning each of the other motions.

Syntax notes4 items
  1. 202a3Καὶ τὸ ἀπορούμενον δὲ φανερόν, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ κίνησις ἐν τῷ κινητῷ

    The phrase 'to aporoumenon' (what was being puzzled over) refers to the puzzle discussed since Book III, Chapter 1: 'where is motion located (in the mover or in the moved)?' The following 'hoti' clause is a noun clause explaining its content.

  2. 202a21ἔχει δʼ ἀπορίαν λογικήν

    The adjective 'logikēn' here means a 'logical' or 'dialectical' difficulty, introducing an aporia that arises from conceptual or linguistic definitions and logical consistency rather than the physical reality of things.

  3. 202b8μὴ ὡς τῷ εἶναι τὸ αὐτό

    The phrase 'tōi einai' is a dative substantival infinitive meaning 'in being' or 'in essence'. It distinguishes between things that are identical in definition or essence ('to ti ēn einai', e.g., mantle and cloak) and those identical relationally (e.g., uphill and downhill).

  4. 202b21τὸ γὰρ τοῦδε ἐν τῶδε καὶ τὸ τοῦδε ὑπὸ τοῦδε ἐνέργειαν εἶναι ἕτερον τῷ λόγῳ

    The construction 'to ... energeian einai' is an accusative-with-infinitive clause forming a noun phrase. It argues that being the activity 'of this in that' ('toude en tōide') and 'of this by that' ('toude hypo toude') are different in definition ('tōi logōi') due to the direction of agent and patient.

Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-22) · Revisions to the English translation and the original (3, latest 2026-11-04)
  • 2026-11-04 Curator — source 1
  • 2026-09-21 AI review — source 1
  • 2026-09-16 OCR errors repaired — source 1
urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg031.humanitext-grc1:3.3