- Source
- Aristotle. Aristotelis Physica. Ross, W.D., editor. Oxford: Clarendon, 1960.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg031.humanitext-grc1:2.3#1
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-11-18
The author argues that scientific knowledge requires grasping the 'why' of things, and presents the four primary types of causes—material, formal, efficient, and final—explaining how multiple causes can apply to the same thing and how a single cause can produce contrary effects.
#1 Διυρισμένων δὲ τούτων ἐπισκεπτέον περὶ τῶν αἰτίων, ποῖά τε καὶ πόσα τὸν ἀριθμόν ἐστιν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ τοῦ εἰδέναι χάριν ἡ πραγματεία, εἰδέναι δὲ οὐ πρότερον οἰόμεθα ἕκαστον πρὶν ἂν λάβωμεν τὸ διὰ τί περὶ ἕκαστον (τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶ τὸ λαβεῖν τὴν πρώτην αἰτίαν), δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡμῖν τοῦτο ποιητέον καὶ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς καὶ πάσης τῆς φυσικῆς μεταβολῆς, ὅπως εἰδότες αὐτῶν τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀνάγειν εἰς αὐτὰς πειρώμεθα τῶν ζητουμένων ἕκαστον. ἕνα μὲν οὖν τρόπον αἴτιον λέγεται τὸ ἐξ οὗ γίγνεταί τι ἐνυπάρχοντος, οἷον ὁ χαλκὸς τοῦ ἀνδριάντος καὶ ὁ ἄργυρος τῆς φιάλης καὶ τὰ τούτων γένη· ἄλλον δὲ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα, τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι1 καὶ τὰ τούτου γένη (οἷον τοῦ διὰ πασῶν τὰ δύο πρὸς ἕν, καὶ ὅλως ὁ ἀριθμός) καὶ τὰ μέρη τὰ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. ἔτι ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς ἡ πρώτη ἢ τῆς ἠρεμήσεως, οἷον ὁ βουλεύσας αἴτιος, καὶ ὁ πατὴρ τοῦ τέκνου, καὶ ὅλως τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦ ποιουμένου καὶ τὸ μεταβάλλον τοῦ μεταβαλλομένου. ἔτι ὡς τὸ τέλος· τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶν τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, οἶον τοῦ περιπατεῖν ἡ ὑγίεια· διὰ τί γὰρ περιπατεῖ; φαμέν “ἵνα ὑγιαίνῃ”, καὶ εἰπόντες οὕτως οἰόμεθα ἀποδεδωκέναι τὸ αἶτιον. καὶ ὅσα δὴ κινήσαντος ἄλλου2 μεταξὺ γίγνεται τοῦ τέλους, οἷον τῆς ὑγιείας ἡ ἰσχνασία ἢ ἡ κάθαρσις ἢ τὰ φάρμακα ἢ τὰ ὄργανα· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα τοῦ τέλους ἕνεκά ἐστιν, διαφέρει δὲ ἀλλήλων ὡς ὄντα τὰ μὲν ἔργα τὰ δʼ ὄργανα. τὰ μὲν οὖν αἴτια σχεδὸν τοσαυταχῶς λέγεται, συμβαίνει δὲ πολλαχῶς λεγομένων τῶν αἰτίων καὶ πολλὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ αἴτια εἶναι, οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷον τοῦ ἀνδριάντος καὶ ἡ ἀνδριαντοποιικὴ καὶ ὁ χαλκός, οὐ καθʼ ἕτερόν τι ἀλλʼ ἀνδριάς, ἀλλʼ οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ὡς ὕλη τὸ δʼ ὡς ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις. ἔστιν δέ τινα καὶ ἀλλήλων αἴτια, οἷον τὸ πονεῖν τῆς εὐεξίας καὶ αὕτη τοῦ πονεῖν· ἀλλʼ οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ὡς τέλος τὸ δʼ ὡς ἀρχὴ κινήσεως. ἔτι δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τῶν ἐναντίων ἐστίν· ὃ γὰρ παρὸν αἶτιον τοῦδε, τοῦτο καὶ ἀπὸν αἰτιώμεθα ἐνίοτε τοῦ ἐναντίου, οἷον τὴν ἀπουσίαν τοῦ κυβερνήτου τῆς τοῦ πλοίου ἀνατροπῆς, οὗ ἦν ἡ παρουσία αἰτία τῆς σωτηρίας. ἅπαντα δὲ τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα αἴτια εἰς τέτταρας πίπτει τρόπους τοὺς φανερωτάτους. τὰ μὲν γὰρ στοιχεῖα τῶν συλλαβῶν καὶ ἡ ὕλη τῶν σκευαστῶν καὶ τὸ πῦρ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τὰ μέρη τοῦ ὅλου καὶ αἱ ὑποθέσεις τοῦ συμπεράσματος3 ὡς τὸ ἐξ οὗ αἴτιά ἐστιν, τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν ὡς τὸ ὑποκείμενον, οἷον τὰ μέρη, τὰ δὲ ὡς τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, τό τε ὅλον καὶ ἡ σύνθεσις καὶ τὸ εἶδος· τὸ δὲ σπέρμα καὶ ὁ ἰατρὸς καὶ ὁ βουλεύσας καὶ ὅλως τὸ ποιοῦν, πάντα ὅθεν ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς ἢ στάσεως· τὰ δʼ ὡς τὸ τέλος καὶ τἀγαθὸν τῶν ἄλλων· τὸ γὰρ οὗ ἕνεκα βέλτιστον καὶ τέλος τῶν ἄλλων ἐθέλει εἶναι· διαφερέτω δὲ μηδὲν εἰπεῖν αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν.
These things having been determined, we must consider concerning causes, of what sort and how many in number they are. For since our inquiry is for the sake of knowing, and we do not think we know each thing before we have grasped the ‘why’ concerning each (and this is to grasp the primary cause), it is clear that we also must do this both concerning generation and corruption and all physical change, so that, knowing their principles, we may try to refer each of our inquiries to them. In one way, then, that out of which something comes to be and which is immanent is called a cause, such as the bronze of the statue, the silver of the bowl, and the genera of these. In another way, the form and the archetype, and this is the definition (logos) of the essence (what it was to be) and its genera (such as, of the octave, the ratio of two to one, and in general number), and the parts in the definition. Furthermore, that from which the first beginning of change or of rest comes; for example, the one who has deliberated is a cause, and the father of the child, and in general the producer of the product and the changer of the changed. Furthermore, as the end; and this is that for the sake of which, as health is of walking. For why does he walk? We say “in order to be healthy,” and in speaking thus we think we have given the cause. And also whatever things come to be between [the beginning] and the end when something else has initiated the motion, such as, for health, reducing weight, or purging, or drugs, or instruments; for all these are for the sake of the end, though they differ from one another as some being actions and others instruments. The causes, then, are spoken of in about so many ways, and it happens, since causes are spoken of in many ways, that there are also many causes of the same thing, not accidentally; for example, of the statue both the art of statue-making and the bronze are causes, not in respect of anything else but of the statue, yet not in the same way, but the one as matter and the other as that from which the motion comes. And there are some things which are causes of each other, as labor is of good condition and this of labor; yet not in the same way, but the one as the end and the other as the beginning of motion. Furthermore, the same thing is the cause of contraries; for that which by its presence is the cause of this, we sometimes blame this very thing by its absence for the contrary, as the absence of the helmsman for the shipwreck, whose presence was the cause of safety. And all the causes now mentioned fall into four most manifest ways. For the letters of syllables, the matter of manufactured things, fire and such things of bodies, the parts of the whole, and the premises of the conclusion are causes as ‘that out of which’; and of these, some as the substrate, such as the parts, and others as the essence, namely the whole, the synthesis, and the form. But the seed, the doctor, the one who has deliberated, and in general the producer, are all that from which the beginning of change or of rest comes. And others are as the end and the good of the rest; for that for the sake of which wishes to be the best and the end of the rest; let it make no difference whether we say it is the actual good or the apparent good.
- 194b26τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι
Aristotle's technical term for 'essence' (literally 'the what it was to be'). The use of the imperfect ἦν signifies the timeless or pre-existing nature of a thing's identity. Syntactically, the genitive phrase depends on ὁ λόγος (definition, formula).
- 194b35κινήσαντος ἄλλου
A genitive absolute construction consisting of the aorist active participle of κινέω and the subject ἄλλου (another). It functions adverbially, expressing the prior condition or cause ('when something else has initiated the motion') for the subsequent process described by the main verb γίγνεται.
- 195a18αἱ ὑποθέσεις τοῦ συμπεράσματος
Meaning 'the premises of the conclusion'. Aristotle classifies 'premises' (ὑποθέσεις) under the category of material cause ('that out of which'). The genitive τοῦ συμπεράσματος is objective, indicating the relation wherein the premises serve as the constituent elements from which the conclusion is produced.
Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-22) · Revisions to the English translation and the original (3, latest 2026-09-22)
- 2026-09-22 AI review — source 1
- 2026-09-21 AI review — source 1
- 2026-09-16 OCR errors repaired — source 1
