- Source
- Aristotle. Aristotelis Physica. Ross, W.D., editor. Oxford: Clarendon, 1960.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg031.humanitext-grc1:1.1
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-11-18
Presents the methodology of physical inquiry, stating that we must proceed from what is more knowable to us (confused wholes or universals) to what is more knowable by nature (principles, elements, and particulars).
Ἐπειδὴ1 τὸ εἰδέναι καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι2 συμβαίνει περὶ πάσας τὰς μεθόδους, ὧν εἰσὶν ἀρχαὶ ἢ αἴτια ἢ στοιχεῖα, ἐκ τοῦ ταῦτα γνωρίζειν (τότε γὰρ οἰόμεθα γιγνώσκειν ἕκαστον, ὅταν τὰ αἴτια γνωρίσωμεν τὰ πρῶτα καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς πρώτας καὶ μέχρι τῶν στοιχείων), δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῆς περὶ φύσεως ἐπιστήμης πειρατέον διορίσασθαι πρῶτον τὰ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς. πέφυκε δὲ ἐκ τῶν γνωριμωτέρων ἡμῖν ἡ ὁδὸς καὶ σαφεστέρων ἐπὶ τὰ σαφέστερα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμώτερα· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ ἡμῖν τε γνώριμα καὶ ἁπλῶς. διόπερ ἀνάγκη τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον προάγειν ἐκ τῶν ἀσαφεστέρων μὲν τῇ φύσει ἡμῖν δὲ σαφεστέρων ἐπὶ τὰ σαφέστερα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμώτερα. ἔστι δʼ ἡμῖν τὸ πρῶτον δῆλα καὶ σαφῆ τὰ συγκεχυμένα μᾶλλον· ὕστερον δʼ ἐκ τούτων γίγνεται γνώριμα τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ διαιροῦσι3 ταῦτα, διὸ ἐκ τῶν καθόλου ἐπὶ τὰ καθʼ ἕκαστα δεῖ προϊέναι· τὸ γὰρ ὅλον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν γνωριμώτερον, τὸ δὲ καθόλου ὅλον τί ἐστι· πολλὰ γὰρ περιλαμβάνει ὡς μέρη τὸ καθόλου. πέπονθε δὲ ταὐτὸ τοῦτο τρόπον τινὰ καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα πρὸς τὸν λόγον· ὅλον γάρ τι καὶ ἀδιορίστως σημαίνει, οἷον ὁ κύκλος, ὁ δὲ ὁρισμὸς αὐτοῦ διαιρεῖ εἰς τὰ καθʼ ἕκαστα. καὶ τὰ παιδία τὸ μὲν πρῶτον προσαγορεύει πάντας τοὺς ἄνδρας πατέρας καὶ μητέρας τὰς γυναῖκας, ὕστερον δὲ διορίζει τούτων ἑκάτερον.
Since knowing and understanding arise in all methods of inquiry that have principles, causes, or elements, from the knowledge of these (for we think we know each thing only when we have known its first causes, its first principles, and as far as its elements), it is clear that in the science of nature too we must try first to determine what concerns principles. The natural way for us is from what is more knowable and clearer to us to what is clearer and more knowable by nature; for the same things are not knowable to us and knowable absolutely. Therefore, we must necessarily proceed in this way from what is less clear by nature but clearer to us to what is clearer by nature and more knowable. Now, what is first plain and clear to us is rather confused wholes; but later, from these, their elements and principles become known to those who divide them. Therefore, we must proceed from universals to particulars; for the whole is more knowable according to sensation, and the universal is a sort of whole, since the universal comprehends many things as parts. This same thing happens in a way also to names in relation to their definition; for a name signifies some whole and indefinitely, as for example ‘circle’, but its definition divides it into its particulars. Children too at first call all men fathers and all women mothers, but later distinguish each of them.
- 183b1Ἐπειδὴ
Ἐπειδὴ is a subordinating causal conjunction ('since/because'), introducing the causal clause leading to the main conclusion starting with δῆλον ὅτι.
- 183b1τὸ εἰδέναι καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι
The two articular infinitives τὸ εἰδέναι ('to know') and τὸ ἐπίστασθαι ('to understand') function as the subject of the verb συμβαίνει. In Aristotelian philosophy, the former refers to general cognition and the latter to systematic, scientific knowledge based on causes.
- 184a20διαιροῦσι
διαιροῦσι can be interpreted either as the dative plural of the present active participle ('for those who divide/for us dividing [them]') or as the third-person plural of the verb ('they divide'). It is most natural to understand it as a dative participle agreeing with the implied ἡμῖν ('for us') from the previous context.
Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-22) · Revisions to the English translation and the original (2, latest 2026-09-21)
- 2026-09-21 AI review — source 1
- 2026-08-22 Reader report (fixed by a curator) — source 1
