- Source
- Aristotle. Aristotle's Metaphysics, Vol. 1-2. Ross, William David, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924 (printing).
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg025.humanitext-grc2:9.9
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-10-30
Aristotle demonstrates that actuality is better than potentiality because a single potentiality can lead to opposite states, and consequently, actual evil is worse than its potential. He also illustrates through geometrical proofs that potential mathematical truths are discovered and actualized through cognitive activity.
ὅτι δὲ καὶ βελτίων καὶ τιμιωτέρα τῆς σπουδαίας δυνάμεως ἡ ἐνέργεια, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. ὅσα γὰρ κατὰ τὸ δύνασθαι λέγεται, ταὐτόν ἐστι δυνατὸν τἀναντία, οἷον τὸ δύνασθαι λεγόμενον ὑγιαίνειν ταὐτόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ νοσεῖν, καὶ ἅμα· ἡ αὐτὴ γὰρ δύναμις τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ κάμνειν, καὶ ἠρεμεῖν καὶ κινεῖσθαι, καὶ οἰκοδομεῖν καὶ καταβάλλειν, καὶ οἰκοδομεῖσθαι καὶ καταπίπτειν. τὸ μὲν οὖν δύνασθαι τἀναντία ἅμα ὑπάρχει· τὰ δʼ ἐναντία ἅμα ἀδύνατον, καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας δὲ ἅμα ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν (οἷον ὑγιαίνειν καὶ κάμνειν), ὥστʼ ἀνάγκη τούτων θάτερον εἶναι τἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ δύνασθαι ὁμοίως ἀμφότερον ἢ οὐδέτερον·1 ἡ ἄρα ἐνέργεια βελτίων. ἀνάγκη δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κακῶν τὸ τέλος καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν εἶναι χεῖρον τῆς δυνάμεως· τὸ γὰρ δυνάμενον ταὐτὸ ἄμφω τἀναντία. δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τὸ κακὸν παρὰ τὰ πράγματα· ὕστερον γὰρ τῇ φύσει τὸ κακὸν τῆς δυνάμεως. οὐκ ἄρα οὐδʼ ἐν τοῖς ἐξ ἀρχῆς καὶ τοῖς ἀϊδίοις οὐθὲν ἔστιν οὔτε κακὸν οὔτε ἁμάρτημα οὔτε διεφθαρμένον (καὶ γὰρ ἡ διαφθορὰ τῶν κακῶν ἐστίν). εὑρίσκεται δὲ καὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἐνεργείᾳ·2 διαιροῦντες γὰρ εὑρίσκουσιν. εἰ δʼ ἦν διῃρημένα, φανερὰ ἂν ἦν· νῦν δʼ ἐνυπάρχει δυνάμει. διὰ τί δύο ὀρθαὶ τὸ τρίγωνον; ὅτι αἱ περὶ μίαν στιγμὴν γωνίαι ἴσαι δύο ὀρθαῖς. εἰ οὖν ἀνῆκτο ἡ παρὰ τὴν πλευράν,3 ἰδόντι ἂν ἦν εὐθὺς δῆλον διὰ τί. ἐν ἡμικυκλίῳ ὀρθὴ καθόλου διὰ τί; ἐὰν ἴσαι τρεῖς, ἥ τε βάσις δύο καὶ ἡ ἐκ μέσου ἐπισταθεῖσα ὀρθή, ἰδόντι δῆλον τῷ ἐκεῖνο εἰδότι. ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἀγόμενα εὑρίσκεται· αἴτιον δὲ ὅτι ἡ νόησις ἐνέργεια· ὥστʼ ἐξ ἐνεργείας ἡ δύναμις,4 καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ποιοῦντες γιγνώσκουσιν (ὕστερον γὰρ γενέσει ἡ ἐνέργεια ἡ κατʼ ἀριθμόν).
That the actuality is also better and more valuable than the good potentiality is clear from the following. For all things that are said to be capable, the same thing is capable of contraries; for instance, that which is said to be capable of being healthy is the same as that which is capable of being sick, and at the same time; for the same potentiality is of being healthy and of being sick, of being at rest and of being moved, of building and of pulling down, and of being built and of falling down. Now, to be capable of contraries belongs to a thing at the same time; but the contraries cannot exist at the same time, nor can their actualities exist at the same time (for instance, being healthy and being sick). Therefore, one of these actualities must be the good, whereas the potentiality is equally for both or for neither; therefore the actuality is better. And in the case of bad things, the end and the actuality must be worse than the potentiality; for that which is capable is the same for both contraries. It is clear, then, that evil does not exist apart from actual things; for evil is by nature posterior to potentiality. Therefore, neither in primary principles nor in eternal things is there anything evil or any error or anything damaged (for damage too is of the nature of evil). Geometrical diagrams are also discovered by an activity; for they discover them by dividing them. If they had already been divided, they would have been obvious; but as it is, they are present potentially. Why is the triangle equal to two right angles? Because the angles about one point are equal to two right angles. If, then, the line parallel to the side had been drawn up, it would have been straightway obvious to anyone who saw it why this is so. Why is the angle in a semicircle universally a right angle? If three lines are equal, namely the two parts of the base and the one erected upright from the center, it is obvious to anyone who sees it, provided they know that premise. So it is clear that potentially existing things are discovered by being brought into actuality; and the reason is that thinking is an actuality; so that potentiality comes from actuality, and for this reason they know by doing (for the individual actuality is posterior in generation).
- 9.9τὸ δὲ δύνασθαι ὁμοίως ἀμφότερον ἢ οὐδέτερον
An articular infinitive functioning as a noun meaning "to be capable" or "potentiality." Aristotle states that while the actualities of contraries are mutually exclusive and one is good while the other is bad, the potentiality for them is indifferent—being either for both or for neither in a moral sense. This moral neutrality makes potentiality inferior to the actual good.
- 9.9εὑρίσκεται δὲ καὶ τὰ διαγράμματα ἐνεργείᾳ
Here "diagrámmata" (diagrams) refers to geometrical figures or proofs. Aristotle explains that mathematical truths are discovered by "dividing" (diairoûntes) the figures (i.e., drawing auxiliary lines), which is an "actuality" (energeíā) that brings potential knowledge into actual, explicit sight.
- 9.9εἰ οὖν ἀνῆκτο ἡ παρὰ τὴν πλευράν
A counterfactual conditional construction (conjunction "ei" + past indicative "anēkto", with "an" + past indicative "ēn" in the apodosis). The verb "anágō" (to draw up) refers to a geometrical construction where one extends the base of a triangle and draws a line from the opposite vertex parallel to the side, making it instantly clear that the angles equal two right angles.
- 9.9ὥστʼ ἐξ ἐνεργείας ἡ δύναμις
An assertion of epistemological priority. The mathematical truths potentially inherent in geometrical figures are realized and acquired as actual knowledge only through the intellectual activity of thinking or construction. Thus, cognitive potentiality is said to derive from actuality, reinforcing the chapter's main thesis of the priority of actuality.