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Metaphysics

§8.2

Substance as Actuality and Definition by Differences

The passage discusses the actuality (form) of sensible substances, presenting Democritus's three atomic differences and exploring the various meanings of "being" and the components of physical definitions.

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§8.2

ἐπεὶ δʼ ἡ μὲν ὡς ὑποκειμένη καὶ ὡς ὕλη οὐσία ὁμολογεῖται, αὕτη δʼ ἐστὶν ἡ δυνάμει, λοιπὸν τὴν ὡς ἐνέργειαν οὐσίαν1 τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰπεῖν τίς ἐστιν. Δημόκριτος μὲν οὖν τρεῖς διαφορὰς ἔοικεν οἰομένῳ2 εἶναι (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑποκείμενον σῶμα, τὴν ὕλην, ἓν καὶ ταὐτόν, διαφέρειν δὲ ἢ ῥυσμῷ, ὅ ἐστι σχῆμα, ἢ τροπῇ, ὅ ἐστι θέσις, ἢ διαθιγῇ, ὅ ἐστι τάξις)· φαίνονται δὲ πολλαὶ διαφοραὶ οὖσαι, οἷον τὰ μὲν συνθέσει λέγεται3 τῆς ὕλης, ὥσπερ ὅσα κράσει καθάπερ μελίκρατον, τὰ δὲ δεσμῷ οἷον φάκελος, τὰ δὲ κόλλῃ οἷον βιβλίον, τὰ δὲ γόμφῳ οἷον κιβώτιον, τὰ δὲ πλείοσι τούτων, τὰ δὲ θέσει οἷον οὐδὸς καὶ ὑπέρθυρον (ταῦτα γὰρ τῷ κεῖσθαί πως διαφέρει), τὰ δὲ χρόνῳ οἷον δεῖπνον καὶ ἄριστον, τὰ δὲ τόπῳ οἷον τὰ πνεύματα· τὰ δὲ τοῖς τῶν αἰσθητῶν πάθεσιν οἷον σκληρότητι καὶ μαλακότητι, καὶ πυκνότητι καὶ ἀραιότητι, καὶ ξηρότητι καὶ ὑγρότητι, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐνίοις τούτων τὰ δὲ πᾶσι τούτοις, καὶ ὅλως τὰ μὲν ὑπεροχῇ τὰ δὲ ἐλλείψει. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸ ἔστι τοσαυταχῶς λέγεται· οὐδὸς γὰρ ἔστιν ὅτι οὕτως κεῖται, καὶ τὸ εἶναι τὸ οὕτως αὐτὸ κεῖσθαι σημαίνει, καὶ τὸ κρύσταλλον εἶναι τὸ οὕτω πεπυκνῶσθαι. ἐνίων δὲ τὸ εἶναι καὶ πᾶσι τούτοις ὁρισθήσεται, τῷ τὰ μὲν μεμῖχθαι, τὰ δὲ κεκρᾶσθαι, τὰ δὲ δεδέσθαι, τὰ δὲ πεπυκνῶσθαι, τὰ δὲ ταῖς ἄλλαις διαφοραῖς κεχρῆσθαι, ὥσπερ χεὶρ ἢ πούς. ληπτέα οὖν τὰ γένη τῶν διαφορῶν (αὗται γὰρ ἀρχαὶ ἔσονται τοῦ εἶναι), οἷον τὰ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἢ πυκνῷ καὶ μανῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς τοιούτοις· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα ὑπεροχὴ καὶ ἔλλειψίς ἐστιν. εἰ δέ τι σχήματι ἢ λειότητι καὶ τραχύτητι, πάντα εὐθεῖ καὶ καμπύλῳ. τοῖς δὲ τὸ εἶναι τὸ μεμῖχθαι ἔσται, ἀντικειμένως δὲ τὸ μὴ εἶναι. φανερὸν δὴ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι εἴπερ ἡ οὐσία αἰτία τοῦ εἶναι ἕκαστον,4 ὅτι ἐν τούτοις ζητητέον τί τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι τούτων ἕκαστον. οὐσία μὲν οὖν οὐδὲν τούτων οὐδὲ συνδυαζόμενον, ὅμως δὲ τὸ ἀνάλογον ἐν ἑκάστῳ· καὶ ὡς ἐν ταῖς οὐσίαις τὸ τῆς ὕλης κατηγορούμενον5 αὐτὴ ἡ ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁρισμοῖς μάλιστα. οἷον εἰ οὐδὸν δέοι ὁρίσασθαι, ξύλον ἢ λίθον ὡδὶ κείμενον ἐροῦμεν, καὶ οἰκίαν πλίνθους καὶ ξύλα ὡδὶ κείμενα (ἢ ἔτι καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἐπʼ ἐνίων ἔστιν), εἰ δὲ κρύσταλλον, ὕδωρ πεπηγὸς ἢ πεπυκνωμένον ὡδί· συμφωνία δὲ ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος μῖξις τοιαδί· τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. φανερὸν δὴ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι ἡ ἐνέργεια ἄλλη ἄλλης ὕλης καὶ ὁ λόγος· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἡ σύνθεσις τῶν δʼ ἡ μῖξις τῶν δὲ ἄλλο τι τῶν εἰρημένων. διὸ τῶν ὁριζομένων οἱ μὲν λέγοντες τί ἐστιν οἰκία, ὅτι λίθοι πλίνθοι ξύλα, τὴν δυνάμει οἰκίαν λέγουσιν, ὕλη γὰρ ταῦτα· οἱ δὲ ἀγγεῖον σκεπαστικὸν χρημάτων καὶ σωμάτων ἤ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον προτιθέντες, τὴν ἐνέργειαν λέγουσιν· οἱ δʼ ἄμφω ταῦτα συντιθέντες τὴν τρίτην καὶ τὴν ἐκ τούτων οὐσίαν (ἔοικε γὰρ ὁ μὲν διὰ τῶν διαφορῶν λόγος τοῦ εἴδους καὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας εἶναι, ὁ δʼ ἐκ τῶν ἐνυπαρχόντων τῆς ὕλης μᾶλλον)· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἵους Ἀρχύτας ἀπεδέχετο ὅρους· τοῦ συνάμφω γάρ εἰσιν. οἷον τί ἐστι νηνεμία; ἠρεμία ἐν πλήθει ἀέρος· ὕλη μὲν γὰρ ὁ ἀήρ, ἐνέργεια δὲ καὶ οὐσία ἡ ἠρεμία. τί ἐστι γαλήνη; ὁμαλότης θαλάττης· τὸ μὲν ὑποκείμενον ὡς ὕλη ἡ θάλαττα, ἡ δὲ ἐνέργεια καὶ ἡ μορφὴ ἡ ὁμαλότης. φανερὸν δὴ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων τίς ἡ αἰσθητὴ οὐσία ἐστὶ καὶ πῶς· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ὕλη, ἡ δʼ ὡς μορφὴ καὶ ἐνέργεια, ἡ δὲ τρίτη ἡ ἐκ τούτων.

​Since the substance as substrate and as matter is agreed upon, and this is potential substance, it remains to say what the substance as actuality of sensible things is. Democritus, then, seems to think that there are three differences (for the underlying body, the matter, is one and the same, but they differ either by “rhysmos”, which is shape, or by “trope”, which is position, or by “diathige”, which is order). But there appear to be many differences; for instance, some things are said to be defined by the composition of their matter, like all those by mixture, such as honey-water, others by binding, like a bundle, others by glue, like a book, others by bolting, like a chest, others by several of these, others by position, like a threshold and a lintel (for these differ by being placed in a certain way), others by time, like dinner and breakfast, others by place, like winds. And others are defined by the properties of sensible things, like hardness and softness, density and rarity, dryness and wetness; and some by some of these, others by all of these, and in general, some by excess, and others by defect. Consequently, it is clear that “is” is also spoken of in as many ways; for a threshold “is” because it is placed in this way, and its “being” signifies its being placed in this way, and for ice “to be” means to be condensed in this way. And for some things, “being” will be defined by all of these: by some parts being mixed, others blended, others bound, others condensed, and others employing the other differences, as for instance a hand or a foot. We must therefore grasp the genera of differences (for these will be the principles of being), such as those defined by the “more and less”, or the dense and rare, and other such things; for all these are excess and defect. And if anything is defined by shape or by smoothness and roughness, all these are defined by the straight and the curved. And for some, “being” will be to be mixed, and oppositely, “not being” will be not to be mixed. It is clear, then, from these things that if substance is the cause of being of each thing, it is in these [differences] that we must seek what is the cause of being of each of these things. Substance indeed is none of these, nor is it a combination of them, yet there is an analogy in each; and just as in substances that which is predicated of the matter is the actuality itself, so also it is most of all in the other definitions. For example, if we had to define a threshold, we shall say “wood or stone placed in this way”; and a house “bricks and logs placed in this way” (or further, also the final cause in some cases); and if ice, ”water frozen or condensed in this way”; and harmony “a mixture of high and low pitch in this way”; and in the same manner for the other things. It is clear, then, from these things that the actuality is different for different matter, and so is the formula; for of some things it is the composition, of others the mixture, and of others some other of the things mentioned. Therefore, among those who define, some in saying what a house is, say “stones, bricks, logs”, and they speak of the potential house, for these are matter; while those who propose “a covering vessel for property and bodies” or some other such thing, speak of the actuality; and those who combine both of these speak of the third substance, composed of these (for the formula by means of the differences seems to be of the form and the actuality, while that from the inherent parts is rather of the matter). Similarly also such definitions as Archytas used to accept; for they are of the concrete whole. For example, “What is windless calm? Stillness in a large volume of air”; for air is the matter, and stillness is the actuality and substance. “What is a calm sea? Flatness of the sea”; the sea is the substrate as matter, and flatness is the actuality and the form. It is clear, then, from what has been said, what the sensible substance is, and in what way: one is as matter, another as form and actuality, and the third is that composed of these.

Syntax notes5 items
  1. 1042b10λοιπὸν τὴν ὡς ἐνέργειαν οὐσίαν

    An impersonal construction with λοιπόν + infinitive (εἰπεῖν), meaning "it remains to say." λοιπόν functions either adverbially or as a neuter nominative adjective with ἐστί omitted.

  2. 1042b12ἔοικεν οἰομένῳ

    Some manuscripts read ἔοικεν οἴεσθαι ("seems to think"), but if the dative participle οἰομένῳ is retained, it must agree with an implied dative (referring to Democritus or an observer), suggesting "he seems, to one who thinks, to..." or is a corruption of the infinitive.

  3. 1042b16τὰ μὲν συνθέσει λέγεται

    Meaning "some things are said to be (or defined) by the composition of their matter." The verb λέγεται in a definitional context often carries the sense of "to be defined."

  4. 1043a3εἴπερ ἡ οὐσία αἰτία τοῦ εἶναι ἕκαστον

    A conditional clause with the conjunction εἴπερ ("if indeed"). The genitive infinitive τοῦ εἶναι modifies αἰτία ("cause"), forming "the cause of being of each thing."

  5. 1043a5τὸ τῆς ὕλης κατηγορούμενον

    Meaning "that which is predicated of the matter." The genitive τῆς ὕλης depends on the passive participle κατηγορούμενον, expressing that of which something is predicated.

Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-22)urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg025.humanitext-grc2:8.2