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Metaphysics

§6.2#2

Definition of the Accidental and the Absence of Its Science

Aristotle defines the accidental as that which is neither always nor for the most part, showing that its cause lies in matter that can be otherwise. He argues that there can be no science of the accidental, since all science is only concerned with what is always or for the most part.

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§6.2#2

ὃ γὰρ ἂν ᾖ μήτʼ ἀεὶ μήθʼ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, τοῦτό φαμεν συμβεβηκὸς εἶναι. οἷον ἐπὶ κυνὶ1 ἂν χειμὼν γένηται καὶ ψῦχος, τοῦτο συμβῆναί φαμεν, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἂν πνῖγος καὶ ἀλέα, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τὸ δʼ οὔ. καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον λευκὸν εἶναι συμβέβηκεν (οὔτε γὰρ ἀεὶ οὔθʼ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ), ζῷον δʼ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. καὶ τὸ ὑγιάζειν δὲ τὸν οἰκοδόμον συμβεβηκός, ὅτι οὐ πέφυκε τοῦτο ποιεῖν οἰκοδόμος ἀλλὰ ἰατρός, ἀλλὰ συνέβη ἰατρὸν εἶναι τὸν οἰκοδόμον. καὶ ὀψοποιὸς ἡδονῆς στοχαζόμενος ποιήσειεν ἄν τι ὑγιεινόν, ἀλλʼ οὐ κατὰ τὴν ὀψοποιητικήν· διὸ συνέβη, φαμέν, καὶ ἔστιν ὡς ποιεῖ,2 ἁπλῶς δʼ οὔ. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλων δυνάμεις εἰσὶν αἱ ποιητικαί, τῶν δʼ οὐδεμία τέχνη οὐδὲ δύναμις ὡρισμένη· τῶν γὰρ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὄντων ἢ γιγνομένων καὶ τὸ αἴτιόν ἐστι κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ὥστʼ ἐπεὶ οὐ πάντα ἐστὶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ἀεὶ ἢ ὄντα ἢ γιγνόμενα, ἀλλὰ τὰ πλεῖστα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὄν· οἷον οὔτʼ ἀεὶ οὔθʼ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ὁ λευκὸς μουσικός ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ δὲ γίγνεταί ποτε, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἔσται (εἰ δὲ μή, πάντʼ ἔσται ἐξ ἀνάγκης)· ὥστε ἡ ὕλη ἔσται αἰτία ἡ ἐνδεχομένη παρὰ τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἄλλως τοῦ συμβεβηκότος.3 ἀρχὴν δὲ τηνδὶ ληπτέον, πότερον οὐδέν ἐστιν οὔτʼ αἰεὶ οὔθʼ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. ἢ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον; ἔστιν ἄρα τι παρὰ ταῦτα τὸ ὁπότερʼ ἔτυχε καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ἀλλὰ πότερον τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, τὸ δʼ ἀεὶ οὐθενὶ ὑπάρχει, ἢ ἔστιν ἄττα ἀΐδια; περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ὕστερον σκεπτέον, ὅτι δʼ ἐπιστήμη οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ συμβεβηκότος φανερόν· ἐπιστήμη μὲν γὰρ πᾶσα ἢ τοῦ ἀεὶ ἢ τοῦ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ—πῶς γὰρ ἢ μαθήσεται ἢ διδάξει ἄλλον; δεῖ γὰρ ὡρίσθαι ἢ τῷ ἀεὶ ἢ τῷ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, οἷον ὅτι ὠφέλιμον τὸ μελίκρατον τῷ πυρέττοντι ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ—τὸ δὲ παρὰ τοῦτο οὐχ ἕξει λέγειν,4 πότε οὔ, οἷον νουμηνίᾳ· ἢ γὰρ ἀεὶ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ τὸ τῇ νουμηνίᾳ· τὸ δὲ συμβεβηκός ἐστι παρὰ ταῦτα. τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ διὰ τίνʼ αἰτίαν καὶ ὅτι ἐπιστήμη οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ, εἴρηται.

​For whatever is neither always nor for the most part, this we say is accidental. For example, if a storm and cold should occur during the dog-days, we say this happened accidentally, but not if stifling heat and warmth occur, because the latter is always or for the most part, but the former is not. And it is accidental for a man to be white (for it is neither always nor for the most part), but to be an animal is not by accident. And it is also accidental for the builder to cure, because a builder is not suited by nature to do this, but a doctor is, and it accidentally happened that the builder was a doctor. And a cook, aiming at pleasure, might make something healthy, but not by the art of cookery; therefore “it accidentally happened,” we say, and there is a way in which he makes it, but not simply. For of other things there are productive capacities, but of these there is no definite art or capacity; for of things that exist or come to be by accident, the cause is also by accident. So, since not all things are or come to be of necessity and always, but most things are for the most part, it is necessary that being by accident exists. For example, a white man is neither always nor for the most part musical, but since he sometimes becomes so, it will be by accident (otherwise, all things will be of necessity). Therefore, the matter which is capable of being otherwise than for the most part will be the cause of the accidental. But we must take this as a starting point: is there nothing that is neither always nor for the most part? Or is this impossible? There is, then, something besides these, namely, the ‘as it chances’ and the accidental. But is there only that which is for the most part, while that which is always belongs to nothing, or are there some eternal things? About these, then, we must inquire later, but that there is no science of the accidental is clear; for all science is either of that which is always or of that which is for the most part—for how else will one learn or teach another? For it must be defined either by the ‘always’ or by the ‘for the most part’, for example, that honey-water is beneficial to a feverish patient for the most part—but what is besides this one will not be able to say, when it is not, for instance, on the new moon; for ‘on the new moon’ also is either always or for the most part; but the accidental is besides these. What, then, the accidental is, and through what cause, and that there is no science of it, has been said.

Syntax notes4 items
  1. 1026b32ἐπὶ κυνὶ

    The preposition ἐπί with the dative case is used temporally to mean 'at the time of.' The noun κύων (dog) refers to Sirius (the Dog Star), denoting the 'dog-days,' the hottest period of summer. The occurrence of cold weather during this season is given as an example of an accidental event.

  2. 1027a5ἔστιν ὡς ποιεῖ

    The impersonal expression ἔστιν ὡς, containing the relative adverb ὡς, means 'there is a way in which' or 'in a certain sense.' Here it expresses a qualified affirmation regarding the cook who accidentally made something healthy: 'there is a sense in which he makes it, but not simply,' because it does not result from the essential and defined capacity of the art of cookery.

  3. 1027a10ἡ ὕλη ἔσται αἰτία ἡ ἐνδεχομένη παρὰ τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἄλλως τοῦ συμβεβηκότος

    A sentence with a complex attributive structure. The subject is ὕλη (matter), which is modified by the attributive participle phrase ἡ ἐνδεχομένη ... ἄλλως (which is capable of being otherwise). The prepositional phrase παρὰ τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ (contrary to what is for the most part) modifies ἄλλως (otherwise), making the complete subject 'matter which is capable of being otherwise than for the most part.' The genitive τοῦ συμβεβηκότος depends on the noun αἰτία (cause).

  4. 1027a20τὸ δὲ παρὰ τοῦτο οὐχ ἕξει λέγειν

    The verb ἕξει (third-person singular future of ἔχω) with the infinitive λέγειν expresses ability ('will be able to say'). The subject is contextually implied as the human subject (the teacher or learner) mentioned in the preceding sentence, or the personified 'science.' The accusative phrase τὸ παρὰ τοῦτο ('that which is besides this,' i.e., what deviates from the always or for the most part) functions as the direct object of λέγειν.

Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-22) · Revision history (1, latest 2026-09-22)
  • 2026-09-22 AI review — source 1
urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg025.humanitext-grc2:6.2#2