Metaphysics

”False” is said in one way as a “false thing”, and of this, in one way because it is not combined or is impossible to be combined (as it is said that the diagonal is commensurate, or that you are sitting; for of these, one is false always, the other sometimes; for in this way these are non-existent); and in another way, such things as exist indeed, but are of such a nature as to appear either not of such a kind as they are, or what they are not (as shadow-painting and dreams; for these are indeed something, but not that of which they produce the appearance). Things, then, are called false in this way, either by not being themselves, or by the appearance from them being that of a non-existent thing. And a “false statement” is the statement of non-existent things, insofar as it is false; wherefore every statement is false of something other than that of which it is true, as the statement of a circle is false of a triangle. And the statement of each thing is in one way one, namely that of the “what it was to be”, but in another way many, since a thing itself and itself affected in some way are somehow the same, as Socrates and musical Socrates (but the false statement is simply the statement of nothing). Wherefore Antisthenes thought foolishly when he claimed that nothing should be spoken of except by its own statement, one statement for one thing; from which it followed that it was not possible to contradict, and almost not even to tell a falsehood. But it is possible to speak of each thing not only by its own statement but also by that of another, falsely indeed and completely so, but in a way also truly, as eight is called double by the statement of the dyad. These things, then, are called false in this way, but a “false man” is one who is ready and choosing such statements, not for the sake of something else but for its own sake, and one who is apt to produce such statements in others, just as we say those things are false which produce a false appearance. Wherefore the argument in the Hippias deceives by assuming that the same person is false and true. For it takes the one who is able to tell a falsehood to be false (and this is the one who knows and is prudent); and further, that the one who is voluntarily bad is better. But this takes a falsehood through induction—for the one who limps voluntarily is better than the one who does so involuntarily—by calling limping “imitating”, since if he were voluntarily lame, he would perhaps be worse, just as in the case of character, so also here.

”Accidental” is said of that which belongs to something and of which it is true to say so, but neither of necessity nor for the most part; for example, if someone digging a hole for a plant found a treasure. This, then, is accidental to the one digging the hole, namely finding a treasure; for neither does this come from this or after this of necessity, nor if one plants does one for the most part find a treasure. And a musical person might be white; but since this happens neither of necessity nor for the most part, we call it accidental. So, since there is something belonging to something, and some of these belong somewhere and sometime, whatever belongs indeed, but not because it was this thing now or here, will be accidental. Nor indeed is there any definite cause for the accidental, but only the chance cause; and this is indefinite. It happened to someone to go to Aegina, if he did not arrive there for the sake of going there, but was driven out of his course by a storm or captured by pirates. The accident, then, has come to be or exists, but not qua itself but qua another; for the storm was the cause of his coming not to where he was sailing, and this happened to be Aegina. “Accidental” is also said in another way, namely, of all those things which belong to each thing in itself without being in its substance, as having two right angles belongs to the triangle. And while it is possible for these to be eternal, none of the former can be. But the explanation of this is in other works.