Metaphysics

”what it is to be not-man” signifies something different, if indeed “to be white” and “to be man” are different; for the former is much more opposed, so as to signify something different. And if he should say that “white” also signifies the same and one thing, we shall say again what was said before, that all things will be one and not only those that are opposed. But if this is not possible, what has been said follows, provided that he answers the question. But if, when one asks a simple question, he adds the negations also, he does not answer the question. For nothing prevents the same thing from being both man and white and ten thousand other things in number; but nevertheless, when asked whether it is true to say that this is a man or not, he must answer what signifies one thing, and not add that it is also white and large. For it is impossible to go through the accidents since they are infinite; so he must either go through all or none. Similarly, then, even if the same thing is ten thousand times a man and not-man, one should not add in answering the question whether it is a man, that it is at the same time also not-man, unless one must also add in answering all the other accidents that belong or do not belong to it; and if he does this, he is not conversing. — In general, those who say this destroy substance and what it is to be. For they must assert that all things are accidental, and that there is no such thing as “what it is to be a man” or “to be an animal.” For if there is to be such a thing as “what it is to be a man,” this will not be “what it is to be a not-man” or “not to be a man” (and yet these are the negations of it); for what it signified was one thing, and this was the substance of something. And to signify substance is that the being for it is not anything else. But if for him “what it is to be a man” is “what it is to be a not-man” or “not to be a man,” it will be something else, so that they must say that there will be no such definition of anything, but all things are by accident. For by this, substance and accident are distinguished; for “white” is accidental to “man” because he is white, but not just what is white. But if all things are said by accident, there will be no first subject of which they are said, if always the accident signifies the predication of some subject. It is necessary, then, to proceed to infinity. But this is impossible; for not even more than two are combined. For an accident is not accidental to an accident, unless because both are accidental to the same thing. I mean, for example, that “white” is “musical” and this is “white” because both are accidental to “man.” But Socrates is not musical in this way, namely, because both are accidental to some other thing. Since, therefore, some accidents are said in this way and others in that, those which are said in the way that “white” is of Socrates cannot be infinite in the upward direction, as if to “white Socrates” some other thing were accidental; for some one thing does not come from them all. Nor indeed will there be some other accident belonging to “white,” as for instance “musical”; for this is no more accidental to that than that to this, and at the same time it is distinguished that some are accidental in this way, and others as “musical” is to Socrates; and those which are of the latter kind are not accidents accidental to an accident, but those of the former kind are, so that not everything will be said by accident. There will be, therefore, something that signifies substance even thus. And if this is so, it has been shown that it is impossible for contradictions to be predicated at the same time. — Furthermore, if all contradictions are true at the same time of the same subject, it is clear that all things will be one. For the same thing will be a trireme and a wall and a man, if it is possible either to affirm or to deny anything of everything, as is necessary for those who say the argument of Protagoras. For if to someone the man seems not to be a trireme, it is clear that he is not a trireme; so that he also is, if indeed the contradiction is true. And indeed there comes about the saying of Anaxagoras, “all things together”; so that nothing truly exists. They seem, therefore, to be speaking of the indefinite, and while thinking they are speaking of being, they are speaking of non-being; for that which is in potentiality and not in actuality is the indefinite. But at all events they must say of everything either the affirmation or the negation. For it would be absurd if to each thing its own negation belongs, but the negation of something else which does not belong to it does not belong to it. I mean, for example, if it is true to say of a man that he is not a man, it is clear that he is also either a trireme or not a trireme. If, then, the affirmation belongs, the negation must also belong; but if the affirmation does not belong, at least the negation will belong more than its own negation. If, then, that negation also belongs, the negation of trireme will also belong; and if this belongs, the affirmation also will. — These, then, are the consequences for those who say this argument, and also that it is not necessary either to assert or to deny. For if it is true that he is a man and not-man, it is clear that he will be neither a man nor not-man.