Metaphysics

A difficulty not less than any other has been left aside by both those of today and those of former times, whether the principles of perishable and of imperishable things are the same or different. For if they are the same, how is it that some things are perishable and others imperishable, and for what cause? Now Hesiod and his followers, and all those who are theologians, cared only for what was plausible to themselves, but neglected us. (For making the principles gods, and saying that they are generated from gods, they say that those which have not tasted nectar and ambrosia become mortal, clearly speaking of these names as familiar to themselves; and yet concerning the offering itself of these causes, they have spoken beyond us; for if they touch them for the sake of pleasure, nectar and ambrosia are in no way causes of being, but if for the sake of being, how could they be eternal if they stand in need of food?) —But indeed, concerning those who play the wise mythologically, it is not worth examining with seriousness; but from those who speak by demonstration we must inquire, cross-examining them as to why ever indeed, although existing from the same things, some of existing things are eternal by nature while others perish. And since they neither state a cause nor is it reasonable that it should be so, it is clear that their principles and causes would not be the same. For even the one whom someone might think speaks most consistently with himself, Empedocles, has suffered the same; for he posits Strife as a certain principle which is the cause of destruction, but it would seem nonetheless that this also generates things, except for the One; for all other things are from this, except God. Indeed he says: “From which all things that were, and all that are, and all that will be hereafter, trees sprouted, and men and women, beasts and birds and water-nourished fish, and long-lived gods.” And apart from these things it is clear; for if it were not in things, all things would be one, as he says; for when they come together, “then Strife stood at the outermost limit.” Wherefore it also results for him that the most blessed God is less intelligent than the others; for He does not know all things; for He does not have Strife, and knowledge is of like by like. “For with earth, (he says,) we have seen earth, and with water water, and with air divine air, but with fire destructive fire, and love with love, and strife with baneful strife.” But returning to the point from which our discussion came, this at least is clear, that it results for him that Strife is no more the cause of destruction than of being; and likewise Love is not the cause of being, for bringing things together into the One, it destroys other things. And at the same time he states no cause of the change itself except that it is so by nature: “But when indeed great Strife was nurtured in the limbs, and leaped up to its honors as the time was being fulfilled, which has been driven for them in turn by a broad oath;” as though it were necessary to change, but he reveals no cause of this necessity. But nonetheless, he alone says at least this much consistently; for he does not make some of existing things perishable and others imperishable, but all things perishable except the elements. But the difficulty now mentioned is why some things are so and others not, if indeed they are from the same. —Now, that the principles would not be the same, let this much be said. But if the principles are different, one difficulty is whether these too will be imperishable or perishable. For if they are perishable, it is clear that these too must be from certain things (for everything perishes into those things from which it is), so that it results that there are other prior principles of the principles, which is impossible, both if the series stops and if it goes on to infinity; and further, how will perishable things exist, if the principles are destroyed? But if they are imperishable, why will some things be perishable from these being imperishable, and others imperishable from the other principles? For this is not reasonable, but is either impossible or requires much explanation. And further, no one has even attempted to posit different principles, but they state the same principles for all things. But they skim over the first difficulty as if they were taking this as something small.