Metaphysics

Let this much be said about this substance. On the other hand, everyone makes the principles contraries, just as in the case of physical things, and likewise in the case of immobile substances. But if it is impossible for anything to be prior to the principle of all things, it would be impossible for the principle, being something else, to be a principle, as if one were to say that white is a principle, not in so far as it is something else, but in so far as it is white, yet that it exists of a subject and is white while being something else; for that subject will be prior to it. But indeed all things come to be from contraries as from a certain subject; therefore, this must belong most of all to the contraries. Therefore, all contraries are always of a subject, and none is separate; and just as it also appears that nothing is contrary to substance, so too the argument testifies. Therefore, none of the contraries is properly the principle of all things, but the principle is something else. But they make one of the contraries matter, some opposing the unequal to the one, as being the nature of multiplicity, and others opposing multiplicity to the one (for numbers are generated, for some from the dyad of the unequal, namely the great and the small, and for others from multiplicity, but in both cases by the substance of the one). For even he who says that the unequal and the one are elements, and that the unequal is a dyad consisting of the great and the small, speaks of the unequal, the great, and the small as being one, and does not distinguish that they are one in definition, but not in number. But indeed they do not correctly render the principles which they call elements, some speaking of the great and the small along with the one, making these three elements of numbers, two as matter and the one as form, others speaking of the much and the few, because the great and the small are by nature more proper to magnitude, and others speaking of what is more universal in these cases, the exceeding and the exceeded. And this makes virtually no difference with respect to some of the consequences, but only with respect to the logical difficulties, which they guard against because they themselves bring forward logical demonstrations. Except that it belongs to the same argument to claim that the exceeding and the exceeded are principles rather than the great and the small, and that number is prior to the dyad from the elements; for both are more universal. But now they assert the one but do not assert the other. Others oppose the other and the different to the one, and others multiplicity and the one. But if existing things are, as they wish, from contraries, and to the one either nothing is contrary, or if it must be so, multiplicity is, and the unequal is contrary to the equal, and the other to the same, and the different to it, then those who oppose the one to multiplicity hold a certain opinion most of all, yet not even these do so adequately; for the one will be few, since multiplicity is opposed to fewness, and much to few. But that the “one” signifies a measure is clear. And in everything there is some other subject, as in harmony a quarter-tone, and in magnitude a finger or a foot or something of the sort, and in rhythms a beat or a syllable; and likewise in weight there is some definite weight. And in all cases it is in the same manner, in qualities a certain quality, in quantities a certain quantity, and the measure is indivisible, either in form or to perception, since the one is not some substance in itself. And this is reasonable; for the “one” signifies that it is a measure of some multiplicity, and number that it is a measured multiplicity and a multiplicity of measures (wherefore also reasonably the “one” is not a number; for the measure is not measures, but both the measure and the “one” are principles). But the measure must always belong as some same thing to all; for instance, if they are horses, the measure is a horse, and if they are men, a man. And if they are a man, a horse, and a god, the measure is perhaps an animal, and their number will be animals. But if they are a man, white, and walking, their number is least of all, because they all belong to the same thing which is one in number; nevertheless, their number will be a number of genera, or of some other such designation.