The Divine Intellect as Thought Thinking Itself — Aristotle, Metaphysics Book 12 (9), Greek & English

§12.9

τὰ δὲ περὶ τὸν νοῦν ἔχει τινὰς ἀπορίας· δοκεῖ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τῶν φαινομένων θειότατον, πῶς δʼ ἔχων τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη, ἔχει τινὰς δυσκολίας. εἴτε γὰρ μηδὲν νοεῖ, τί ἂν εἴη τὸ σεμνόν, ἀλλʼ ἔχει ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ὁ καθεύδων· εἴτε νοεῖ, τούτου δʼ ἄλλο κύριον, οὐ γάρ ἐστι τοῦτο ὅ ἐστιν αὐτοῦ ἡ οὐσία νόησις, ἀλλὰ δύναμις,¹ οὐκ ἂν ἡ ἀρίστη οὐσία εἴη· διὰ γὰρ τοῦ νοεῖν τὸ τίμιον αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει. ἔτι δὲ εἴτε νοῦς ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ εἴτε νόησίς ἐστι, τί νοεῖ; ἢ γὰρ αὐτὸς αὑτὸν ἢ ἕτερόν τι· καὶ εἰ ἕτερόν τι, ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ ἢ ἄλλο. πότερον οὖν διαφέρει τι ἢ οὐδὲν τὸ νοεῖν τὸ καλὸν ἢ τὸ τυχόν; ἢ καὶ ἄτοπον τὸ διανοεῖσθαι περὶ ἐνίων; δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι τὸ θειότατον καὶ τιμιώτατον νοεῖ, καὶ οὐ μεταβάλλει· εἰς χεῖρον γὰρ ἡ μεταβολή, καὶ κίνησίς τις ἤδη τὸ τοιοῦτον. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν εἰ μὴ νόησίς ἐστιν ἀλλὰ δύναμις, εὔλογον ἐπίπονον εἶναι τὸ συνεχὲς αὐτῷ τῆς νοήσεως· ἔπειτα δῆλον ὅτι ἄλλο τι ἂν εἴη τὸ τιμιώτερον ἢ ὁ νοῦς, τὸ νοούμενον.² καὶ γὰρ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ ἡ νόησις ὑπάρξει καὶ τὸ χείριστον νοοῦντι, ὥστʼ εἰ φευκτὸν τοῦτο (καὶ γὰρ μὴ ὁρᾶν ἔνια κρεῖττον ἢ ὁρᾶν), οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ ἄριστον ἡ νόησις. αὑτὸν ἄρα νοεῖ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κράτιστον, καὶ ἔστιν ἡ νόησις νοήσεως νόησις. φαίνεται δʼ ἀεὶ ἄλλου ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις καὶ ἡ δόξα καὶ ἡ διάνοια, αὑτῆς δʼ ἐν παρέργῳ. ἔτι εἰ ἄλλο τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ νοεῖσθαι, κατὰ πότερον αὐτῷ τὸ εὖ ὑπάρχει; οὐδὲ γὰρ ταὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι νοήσει καὶ νοουμένῳ. ἢ ἐπʼ ἐνίων ἡ ἐπιστήμη τὸ πρᾶγμα,³ ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν ποιητικῶν ἄνευ ὕλης ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν θεωρητικῶν ὁ λόγος τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ ἡ νόησις; οὐχ ἑτέρου οὖν ὄντος τοῦ νοουμένου καὶ τοῦ νοῦ, ὅσα μὴ ὕλην ἔχει, τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται, καὶ ἡ νόησις τῷ νοουμένῳ μία. ἔτι δὴ λείπεται ἀπορία, εἰ σύνθετον τὸ νοούμενον· μεταβάλλοι γὰρ ἂν ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι τοῦ ὅλου. ἢ ἀδιαίρετον πᾶν τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὕλην—ὥσπερ ὁ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς ἢ ὅ γε τῶν συνθέτων ἔχει ἔν τινι χρόνῳ⁴ (οὐ γὰρ ἔχει τὸ εὖ ἐν τῳδὶ ἢ ἐν τῳδί, ἀλλʼ ἐν ὅλῳ τινὶ τὸ ἄριστον, ὂν ἄλλο τι)— οὕτως δʼ ἔχει αὐτὴ αὑτῆς ἡ νόησις τὸν ἅπαντα αἰῶνα;

But the details concerning the intellect involve certain difficulties; for it seems to be the most divine of the phenomena, but what state it must be in to be of this character involves some problems. For if it thinks of nothing, what would be its majesty? Rather, it is in a state like one who sleeps. But if it thinks, and something else is master of this, then—since its substance is not thinking, but a capacity—it would not be the best substance; for it is through thinking that its value belongs to it. Further, whether its substance is intellect or thinking, what does it think? For it thinks either itself or something else; and if something else, either the same thing always or something different. Does it, then, make any difference or none whether it thinks of the beautiful or of any chance thing? Or is it even absurd to think about certain things? It is clear, then, that it thinks of what is most divine and precious, and it does not change; for change would be for the worse, and such a thing is already a certain movement. First, then, if it is not thinking but a capacity, it is reasonable that the continuity of thinking should be painful to it. Secondly, it is clear that something else would be more precious than the intellect, namely, that which is thought of. For both thinking and thought will belong even to one who thinks of the worst thing, so that if this is to be avoided (for indeed not seeing certain things is better than seeing them), thinking would not be the best thing. Therefore, it thinks of itself, if indeed it is the most excellent thing, and its thinking is a thinking of thinking. But science, sensation, opinion, and discursive thought seem always to be of something else, and of themselves only on the side. Further, if thinking and being thought of are different, in respect of which of them does well-being belong to it? For the being of thinking and that of being thought of are not the same. Or is it that in some cases science is the object itself? In the productive sciences, the substance without matter and the ‘what it was to be’ is the object; in the theoretical sciences, the definition is the object and the thinking. Since, then, that which is thought of and the intellect are not different, in the case of things that do not have matter, they will be the same, and the thinking will be one with that which is thought of. Still, a difficulty remains, if that which is thought of is composite; for it would change in the parts of the whole. Or is everything which does not have matter indivisible—just as the human intellect, or rather that of composite things, is for some certain time (for it does not have its well-being in this or that moment, but its best state in some whole, which is something different)— and is this the state of the thinking which is of itself throughout all eternity?

Syntax notes4 items

1074b15οὐ γάρ ἐστι τοῦτο ὅ ἐστιν αὐτοῦ ἡ οὐσία νόησις, ἀλλὰ δύναμις
This parenthetical clause explains why the intellect cannot be the best substance if its essence (ἡ οὐσία) is not 'thinking' (νόησις) itself but a 'capacity' (δύναμις). If its essence is merely a capacity, its actualization depends on an external object of thought, and the controlling power (κύριον) would belong to the object rather than the intellect itself.
1074b30ἄλλο τι ἂν εἴη τὸ τιμιώτερον ἢ ὁ νοῦς, τὸ νοούμενον
Syntactically, τὸ νοούμενον is in apposition to ἄλλο τι, and the subject of the sentence is τὸ τιμιώτερον ('that which is more precious'). Aristotle points out the absurdity that if the intellect were a mere capacity, its value would be determined by its object, making the passive object of thought more precious than the active intellect itself.
1074b35ἢ ἐπʼ ἐνίων ἡ ἐπιστήμη τὸ πρᾶγμα
The particle ἤ introduces Aristotle's own solution ('Or is it that in some cases science is the object itself?') to the difficulty raised just before regarding the separation of 'thinking' (active) and 'being thought of' (passive). This serves as the starting point for demonstrating the identity of subject and object, especially in the case of immaterial things.
1075a7ὥσπερ ὁ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς ἢ ὅ γε τῶν συνθέτων ἔχει ἔν τινι χρόνῳ
The pronoun ὅ refers back to νοῦς (intellect) and governs τῶν συνθέτων ('of composite things'). It describes how the human intellect, or the intellect of composite things, achieves its best state (τὸ ἄριστον) only for a limited time, contrasting it with the divine self-thinking which is in this state 'throughout all eternity' (tòn hápanta aiôna).

Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-22)urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg025.humanitext-grc2:12.9