Metaphysics

(for everything is dissolved into that of which it consists, and no such thing appears apart from the simple bodies). Nor is it fire or any other of the elements; for apart from any of them being infinite, it is impossible for the whole, even if it is finite, either to be or to become any one of them, as Heraclitus says that all things at some time become fire. The same argument applies also to the one which the physicists posit apart from the elements; for everything changes from the contrary, as from hot to cold. —Further, a sensible body is somewhere, and the place of the whole and of the part is the same (for instance, of earth); so that if it is homogeneous, it will be either motionless or always in motion. But this is impossible (for why should it move down rather than up, or anywhere else? For instance, if there were a clod of earth, where will it move or remain? For the place of the body akin to it is infinite. Will it then occupy the whole place? And how? What then is its rest and its motion? Or will it remain everywhere—and so not move, or move everywhere —and so not stop?). And if the whole is heterogeneous, the places are also heterogeneous, and first, the body of the whole is not one except by contact, and next, these will be either finite or infinite in species. Now they cannot be finite (for some will be infinite and others not, if the whole is infinite, such as fire or water; but such a state is destruction to their contraries). And if they are infinite and simple, the places are also infinite and there will be infinitely many elements. But if this is impossible and the places are finite, the whole must also be finite. In general, it is impossible for there to be an infinite body and a place for bodies, if every sensible body has either weight or lightness; for it will move either toward the center or upward, but it is impossible for the infinite, whether as a whole or as a half, to be affected in either way. For how will you divide it? Or how can there be a down and an up, or an extremity and a center, in the infinite? Further, every sensible body is in a place, and there are six kinds of place, but it is impossible for these to exist in an infinite body. In general, if it is impossible for place to be infinite, it is also impossible for body to be so; for that which is in a place is somewhere, and this means either up or down or some of the other directions, and each of these is a limit. But the infinite is not the same in magnitude, motion, and time, as if it were a single nature; rather, the posterior is so called in virtue of the prior, for instance, motion is called infinite in virtue of the magnitude over which it moves or alters or increases, and time in virtue of the motion.