Why Sex Does Not Divide Species: Perishable and Imperishable — Aristotle, Metaphysics Book 10 (9–10), Greek & English

§10.9

ἀπορήσειε δʼ ἄν τις διὰ τί γυνὴ ἀνδρὸς οὐκ εἴδει διαφέρει, ἐναντίου τοῦ θήλεος καὶ τοῦ ἄρρενος ὄντος¹ τῆς δὲ διαφορᾶς ἐναντιώσεως, οὐδὲ ζῷον θῆλυ καὶ ἄρρεν ἕτερον τῷ εἴδει· καίτοι καθʼ αὑτὸ τοῦ ζῴου αὕτη ἡ διαφορὰ καὶ οὐχ ὡς λευκότης ἢ μελανία ἀλλʼ ᾗ ζῷον καὶ τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν ὑπάρχει. ἔστι δʼ ἡ ἀπορία αὕτη σχεδὸν ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ διὰ τί ἡ μὲν ποιεῖ τῷ εἴδει ἕτερα ἐναντίωσις ἡ δʼ οὔ, οἷον τὸ πεζὸν καὶ τὸ πτερωτόν, λευκότης δὲ καὶ μελανία οὔ. ἢ ὅτι τὰ μὲν οἰκεῖα πάθη τοῦ γένους τὰ δʼ ἧττον; καὶ ἐπειδή ἐστι τὸ μὲν λόγος τὸ δʼ ὕλη, ὅσαι μὲν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ εἰσὶν ἐναντιότητες εἴδει ποιοῦσι διαφοράν, ὅσαι δʼ ἐν τῷ συνειλημμένῳ τῇ ὕλῃ² οὐ ποιοῦσιν. διὸ ἀνθρώπου λευκότης οὐ ποιεῖ οὐδὲ μελανία, οὐδὲ τοῦ λευκοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἔστι διαφορὰ κατʼ εἶδος πρὸς μέλανα ἄνθρωπον, οὐδʼ ἂν ὄνομα ἓν τεθῇ. ὡς ὕλη γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, οὐ ποιεῖ δὲ διαφορὰν ἡ ὕλη· οὐδʼ ἀνθρώπου γὰρ εἴδη εἰσὶν οἱ ἄνθρωποι διὰ τοῦτο, καίτοι ἕτεραι αἱ σάρκες καὶ τὰ ὀστᾶ ἐξ ὧν ὅδε καὶ ὅδε· ἀλλὰ τὸ σύνολον ἕτερον μέν, εἴδει δʼ οὐχ ἕτερον, ὅτι ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐναντίωσις. τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶ τὸ ἔσχατον ἄτομον· ὁ δὲ Καλλίας ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος μετὰ τῆς ὕλης·³ καὶ ὁ λευκὸς δὴ ἄνθρωπος, ὅτι Καλλίας λευκός· κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὖν ὁ ἄνθρωπος. οὐδὲ χαλκοῦς δὴ κύκλος καὶ ξύλινος· οὐδὲ τρίγωνον χαλκοῦν καὶ κύκλος ξύλινος, οὐ διὰ τὴν ὕλην εἴδει διαφέρουσιν ἀλλʼ ὅτι ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἔνεστιν ἐναντίωσις. πότερον δʼ ἡ ὕλη οὐ ποιεῖ ἕτερα τῷ εἴδει, οὖσά πως ἑτέρα, ἢ ἔστιν ὡς ποιεῖ; διὰ τί γὰρ ὁδὶ ὁ ἵππος τουδὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἕτερος τῷ εἴδει; καίτοι σὺν τῇ ὕλῃ οἱ λόγοι αὐτῶν. ἢ ὅτι ἔνεστιν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἐναντίωσις; καὶ γὰρ τοῦ λευκοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ μέλανος ἵππου, καὶ ἔστι γε εἴδει, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ᾗ ὁ μὲν λευκὸς ὁ δὲ μέλας, ἐπεὶ καὶ εἰ ἄμφω λευκὰ ἦν, ὅμως ἂν ἦν εἴδει ἕτερα. τὸ δὲ ἄρρεν καὶ θῆλυ τοῦ ζῴου οἰκεῖα μὲν πάθη, ἀλλʼ οὐ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀλλʼ ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ καὶ τῷ σώματι, διὸ τὸ αὐτὸ σπέρμα θῆλυ ἢ ἄρρεν γίγνεται παθόν τι πάθος. τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ τῷ εἴδει ἕτερον εἶναι, καὶ διὰ τί τὰ μὲν διαφέρει εἴδει τὰ δʼ οὔ, εἴρηται.

One might raise the question why a woman does not differ from a man in species, since female and male are contrary and their difference is a contrariety, and why a female and male animal are not other in species; and yet this difference belongs to animal in itself, and not like whiteness or blackness, but female and male belong to it insofar as it is an animal. This question is almost the same as why one contrariety makes things other in species while another does not—e.g., walking and winged do, but whiteness and blackness do not. Is it because some are proper attributes of the genus and others are less so? And since one is definition and the other is matter, as many contrarieties as are in the definition make a difference in species, but as many as are in what is taken together with matter do not. Therefore, the whiteness or blackness of a man does not make a difference, nor is there a difference in species between a white man and a black man, not even if a single name is given to them. For man is as matter, and matter does not make a difference; for this is why men are not species of man, although the flesh and bones of which this one and that one are made are different; but the concrete whole is other, though not other in species, because there is no contrariety in the definition. And this is the ultimate indivisible. But Callias is the definition with the matter; and so is the white man, because Callias is white; therefore, “man” is white accidentally. Nor, indeed, are a bronze circle and a wooden one other in species; nor do a bronze triangle and a wooden circle differ in species because of their matter, but because there is contrariety in the definition. But does matter, being in some way other, not make things other in species, or is there a way in which it does? For why is this horse other in species than this man? And yet their definitions are with their matter. Is it because there is contrariety in the definition? For indeed there is in the case of a white man and a black horse, and they are indeed other in species, but not insofar as the one is white and the other black, since even if both were white, they would still be other in species. And male and female are proper attributes of animal, yet not in respect of substance but in the matter and the body; wherefore the same seed becomes female or male by undergoing a certain affection. What it is, then, to be other in species, and why some things differ in species and others do not, has been stated.

§10.10

ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία ἕτερα τῷ εἴδει, τὸ δὲ φθαρτὸν καὶ τὸ ἄφθαρτον ἐναντία (στέρησις γὰρ ἀδυναμία διωρισμένη),⁴ ἀνάγκη ἕτερον εἶναι τῷ γένει τὸ φθαρτὸν καὶ τὸ ἄφθαρτον. νῦν μὲν οὖν ἐπʼ αὐτῶν εἰρήκαμεν τῶν καθόλου ὀνομάτων, ὥστε δόξειεν ἂν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ὁτιοῦν ἄφθαρτον καὶ φθαρτὸν ἕτερα εἶναι τῷ εἴδει, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν (τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι, καὶ ἅμα, ἐὰν ᾖ τῶν καθόλου, ὥσπερ ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἴη ἂν καὶ λευκὸς καὶ μέλας, καὶ τῶν καθʼ ἕκαστον· εἴη γὰρ ἄν, μὴ ἅμα, ὁ αὐτὸς λευκὸς καὶ μέλας· καίτοι ἐναντίον τὸ λευκὸν τῷ μέλανι)· ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐναντίων τὰ μὲν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὑπάρχει ἐνίοις, οἷον καὶ τὰ νῦν εἰρημένα καὶ ἄλλα πολλά, τὰ δὲ ἀδύνατον, ὧν ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ φθαρτὸν καὶ τὸ ἄφθαρτον· οὐδὲν γάρ ἐστι φθαρτὸν κατὰ συμβεβηκός·⁵ τὸ μὲν γὰρ συμβεβηκὸς ἐνδέχεται μὴ ὑπάρχειν, τὸ δὲ φθαρτὸν τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπαρχόντων ἐστὶν οἷς ὑπάρχει· ἢ ἔσται τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἓν φθαρτὸν καὶ ἄφθαρτον, εἰ ἐνδέχεται μὴ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ τὸ φθαρτόν. ἢ τὴν οὐσίαν ἄρα ἢ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἀνάγκη ὑπάρχειν τὸ φθαρτὸν ἑκάστῳ τῶν φθαρτῶν. ὁ δʼ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀφθάρτου· τῶν γὰρ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπαρχόντων ἄμφω. ᾗ ἄρα καὶ καθʼ ὃ πρῶτον τὸ μὲν φθαρτὸν τὸ δʼ ἄφθαρτον, ἔχει ἀντίθεσιν, ὥστε ἀνάγκη γένει ἕτερα εἶναι. φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι οὐκ ἐνδέχεται εἶναι εἴδη τοιαῦτα οἷα λέγουσί τινες· ἔσται γὰρ καὶ ἄνθρωπος ὁ μὲν φθαρτὸς ὁ δʼ ἄφθαρτος. καίτοι τῷ εἴδει ταὐτὰ λέγεται εἶναι τὰ εἴδη τοῖς τισὶ καὶ οὐχ ὁμώνυμα· τὰ δὲ γένει ἕτερα πλεῖον διέστηκεν ἢ τὰ εἴδει.

Since contraries are other in species, and the perishable and the imperishable are contraries (for privation is a determinate incapacity), the perishable and the imperishable must be other in genus. Now we have spoken of these using the universal names, so that it might seem not to be necessary that any imperishable and perishable thing are other in species, just as white and black are not (for the same thing can be both, and at the same time, if they are universals, e.g., man can be both white and black, and also in the case of particulars; for the same person can be, though not at the same time, both white and black, although white is contrary to black). But of contraries, some belong to some things accidentally, such as those just mentioned and many others, but for others this is impossible, among which are the perishable and the imperishable; for nothing is perishable accidentally. For an accident can not-belong, but the perishable is among those things which belong of necessity to those to which they belong; otherwise, the same and single thing will be perishable and imperishable, if it is possible for the perishable not to belong to it. Therefore, the perishable must either be the substance or be in the substance of each of the perishable things. And the same argument holds also for the imperishable; for both are among those things which belong of necessity. In respect of that, therefore, and in respect of what they are primarily, the one perishable and the other imperishable, they have opposition, so that they must be other in genus. It is clear, therefore, that there cannot be such Forms as some people say there are; for there would be a man who is perishable and another who is imperishable. And yet the Forms are said to be the same in species as the particulars, and not homonymous; but things other in genus are further apart than things other in species.

Syntax notes5 items

1058a30ἐναντίου τοῦ θήλεος καὶ τοῦ ἄρρενος ὄντος
Genitive absolute expressing either cause ("since female and male are contrary") or concession ("although female and male are contrary"). It sets up the background condition for the aporia that follows.
1058b1ἐν τῷ συνειλημμένῳ τῇ ὕλῃ
Referring to "that which is taken together with matter." This designates the sphere of material aspects of individuals where non-essential accidental differences (such as whiteness or blackness of skin) occur, in contrast to the essential contrarieties contained in the definition (logos).
1058b10ὁ δὲ Καλλίας ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος μετὰ τῆς ὕλης
A concrete individual, Callias, is defined as "the definition/form (logos) with the matter." This underscores that while a particular is a composite of form and matter, individual differences derive from the matter rather than the definition.
1058b25στέρησις γὰρ ἀδυναμία διωρισμένη
Aristotle's definition of privation (sterēsis) as "determinate incapacity." This positions perishability not merely as the absence of imperishability, but as a privative opposition—an inherent "incapacity" in the substance.
1059a1οὐδὲν γάρ ἐστι φθαρτὸν κατὰ συμβεβηκός
The thesis that "nothing is perishable by accident." This indicates that perishability is not an accidental property (such as a man being white), but belongs of necessity to the substance or is the substance of the thing itself.

Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-22)urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg025.humanitext-grc2:10.9-10.10