Metaphysics

​Therefore, those who posit the universe as one and some one nature as matter, and this as corporeal and possessing magnitude, are clearly in error in many ways. For they posit the elements of bodies alone, but not of incorporeal things, even though incorporeal things also exist. And while attempting to state the causes concerning generation and destruction, and treating of nature in all things, they do away with the cause of motion. And further, by positing substance as the cause of nothing, nor the “what it is”, and in addition to these, by easily speaking of any of the simple bodies except earth as a principle, without having examined how they generate from one another — I mean fire, water, earth, and air. For some arise from one another by combination, and others by separation, and this makes the greatest difference with respect to being prior and posterior. For on the one hand, that from which they first arise by combination would seem to be the most elementary of all, and such would be the one with the smallest parts and the rarest of bodies (wherefore those who posit fire as the principle would speak most in agreement with this argument; and indeed everyone of the others agrees that the element of bodies is of this kind; at least none of those who speak of the one has deemed earth to be an element, obviously because of its large parts, but each of the other three elements has received some judge, for some say fire, others water, and others air is this; and yet why indeed do they not speak also of earth, as most men do? For they say that all things are earth, and Hesiod also says that earth was the first of bodies to come into being; so ancient and popular has this assumption happened to be) — therefore, according to this argument, neither if anyone speaks of any of these except fire, nor if anyone posits this as denser than air but rarer than water, would he speak correctly; but on the other hand, if that which is posterior in generation is prior by nature, and that which is concocted and combined is posterior in generation, the contrary of these would be the case, water being prior to air, and earth to water. — Concerning, then, those who posit one cause such as we have mentioned, let these things be said; and the same would apply even if someone posits these as more, as Empedocles says that the matter consists of four bodies. For it is necessary that for him also some things happen the same, and others in a peculiar way. For we see them generating from one another, as fire and earth do not always remain the same body (and it has been spoken concerning them in our works on nature), and concerning the cause of things in motion, whether one or two must be posited, we must by no means think that it has been spoken either correctly or reasonably at all. And in general, alteration must be done away with for those who speak in this way; for cold will not come from hot, nor hot from cold. For what would those contraries themselves undergo, and what would be that one nature which becomes fire and water, which he denies? And if anyone should assume that Anaxagoras speaks of two elements, he would assume it most of all in accordance with a reason which, though he himself did not articulate it, he would nevertheless have necessarily followed had others led him to it. For while it is absurd in other respects to say that all things were mixed at the beginning, both because it follows that things must have pre-existed unmixed, and because it is not the nature of any chance thing to mix with any chance thing, and in addition to these, because properties and accidents would be separated from substances (for mixture and separation belong to the same things), yet if anyone should follow him, articulating together what he wishes to say, he would perhaps appear to speak in a more modern way. For when nothing was separated, it is clear that nothing was true to say of that substance — I mean, for example, that it was neither white nor black or grey or any other color, but it was of necessity colorless; for otherwise it would have had some of these colors; and likewise, by this same argument, it was tasteless, nor had it any other of similar properties; for it was not possible for it to be of any quality, nor of any quantity, nor any specific thing.