Metaphysics

​Since we are seeking this science, this must be considered: what kind of causes and what kind of principles the science which is wisdom is concerned with. If indeed we should take the conceptions we have about the wise man, perhaps from this it would become more apparent. We suppose indeed, first, that the wise man knows all things as far as possible, without having science of them individually; next, that he who is able to know difficult things, and those not easy for a human being to know, is wise (for perceiving is common to all, wherefore it is easy and not at all wise); further, that he who is more precise and more capable of teaching the causes is wiser in every science; and that of the sciences, that which is desirable for its own sake and for the sake of knowing is wisdom to a greater degree than that which is for the sake of results, and that the more authoritative science is wisdom to a greater degree than the ancillary one; for the wise man ought not to be commanded but to command, and he should not obey another, but the less wise should obey him. Such, then, and so many are the conceptions we have about wisdom and the wise. And of these, the knowing all things must necessarily belong to him who especially possesses the universal science (for he knows in a way all the underlying subjects); and indeed these are also about the most difficult things for men to know, namely, the most universal things (for they are farthest from the senses). And the most precise of the sciences are those which are especially of first principles (for those from fewer elements are more precise than those spoken of with addition, as arithmetic is of geometry); but indeed, that which is theoretical of causes is also more capable of teaching (for those who teach are those who state the causes concerning each thing); and knowing and understanding for their own sake belong especially to the science of that which is most knowable (for he who chooses understanding for its own sake will especially choose the science which is most truly science, and such is the science of that which is most knowable). And the most knowable things are the first principles and the causes (for through these and from these other things are known, but not these through the underlying things); and the most authoritative of the sciences, and more authoritative than the ancillary one, is that which knows for the sake of what each thing must be done; and this is the good of each thing, and in general the best in all nature. From all that has been said, then, the name we are seeking falls upon the same science; for this must be theoretical of the first principles and causes; for indeed the good and that for the sake of which is one of the causes. And that it is not a productive science is clear also from those who first philosophized; for it is owing to wonder that men both now and at first began to philosophize, having wondered at first at the obvious difficulties, and then having advanced little by little and raised difficulties about the greater matters, as about the phenomena of the moon and those of the sun and stars, and about the genesis of the universe.