On Memory

​Remaining is to speak about recollection. First, then, all those things that are true in inquiry-based arguments must be assumed as underlying facts. For recollection is neither a recovery of memory nor its acquisition; for when one first learns or experiences something, one neither recovers any memory (since none has previously existed) nor acquires it from the beginning; but when the state and the affection have arisen, then there is memory. Consequently, memory does not arise along with the arising of the affection. Furthermore, when it has first arisen in the individual and ultimate, the affection is already present in the affected subject, as is the knowledge, if indeed one should call the state or the affection knowledge (and nothing prevents us from accidentally remembering some of the things we know); but remembering in itself does not exist until time has elapsed; for one remembers now what one saw or experienced before, not what one experiences now, one remembers now. And further, it is clear that to remember is not to have just now recollected, but to be in the state of having perceived or experienced it from the beginning. But when one recovers the knowledge or perception which one previously had, or that of which we said the state is memory, this is, and is at that time, the recollecting of one of the things mentioned. And remembering happens, and memory follows. Nor indeed are these things unqualifiedly so, if what previously existed arises again, but in one way they are, and in another way they are not. For it is possible for the same person to learn and discover the same thing twice; therefore, recollecting must differ from these, and one must recollect from a greater principle inherent within than that from which they learn. Recollections occur because this movement is naturally adapted to occur after that one; if of necessity, it is clear that when that one is moved, this one will be moved; but if not of necessity but by habit, it will be moved for the most part. But it happens that some people are habituated by a single occurrence more than others who are moved many times; wherefore, having seen some things once, we remember them more than other things seen many times. So when we recollect, we spark some of the prior movements, until we are moved to that after which that other one is accustomed to follow. Hence we hunt for the next in series, starting our thought from the present or from something else, and from what is similar, or opposite, or neighboring. Through this, recollection occurs; for the movements of these things are in some cases the same, in others simultaneous, and in others they possess a part, so that the remaining portion is small which was moved after that. They seek, then, in this way, and even when not seeking, they recollect in this way, when that movement arises after another. And for the most part, when other movements such as we have spoken of have occurred, that one has arisen. Nor is there any need to examine far-off things to see how we remember, but rather those near at hand; for it is clear that the method is the same—I mean the next in series—without one’s having previously sought or recollected. For by habit the movements follow one another, this one after that one. And when, therefore, one wishes to recollect, one will do this: one will seek to grasp a starting-point of a movement, after which that other one will be. Hence recollections from a starting-point occur most quickly and beautifully; for as the things are related to each other in succession, so also are the movements. And those things that have a certain order, like mathematical proofs, are easy to remember; but those badly ordered are remembered with difficulty. And in this, recollecting differs from relearning, in that one will be able somehow to move by oneself to that which is after the starting-point. But when one does not do so, but rather through another, one no longer remembers.