On Memory

​ON MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION. First, then, regarding the sense organs and the objects of sense, in what manner they stand, both in general and with respect to each sense organ individually, has been discussed. Of the remaining topics, we must first consider memory and remembering, what it is, through what cause it occurs, and to which of the parts of the soul this affection and recollecting belong. For the same people are not both good at remembering and good at recollecting, but for the most part, slow people are better at remembering, whereas quick and fast-learning people are better at recollecting. First, then, we must grasp what kinds of things are memorable; for this often misleads. For it is not possible to remember the future, but it is an object of opinion and expectation (and there might even be an expectant science, just as some say divination is), nor of the present, but rather perception; for by this we know neither the future nor the past, but only the present. But memory is of the past. And when the present is present, for example, when one sees this white thing, no one would say they are remembering it, nor the object of contemplation, when one happens to be contemplating and thinking of it; but in the former case one says he perceives, and in the latter only that he knows. But when one possesses knowledge and perception without their active exercises, thus one remembers: that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, in the case of [knowledge], because he learned or contemplated it, and in the case of [perception], because he heard or saw or something of the sort. For whenever one actively exercises memory, one says thus in the soul: that previously he heard, perceived, or thought this. Memory, then, is neither perception nor belief, but a state or affection of one of these, when time has elapsed. Of the “now” in the “now” there is no memory, as has also been said before, but perception of the present, hope of the future, and memory of the past. Therefore, all memory is accompanied by time. Consequently, only those of animals which perceive time remember, and they do so by means of that with which they perceive [time]. Since we have previously spoken about imagination in On the Soul, and it is not possible to think without an image; for the same affection occurs in thinking as in drawing geometric figures; for in the latter case, though we make no use of the triangle’s being of a determinate size, we nevertheless draw it determinate in size; and in the same way, the person who thinks, even if he does not think of quantity, places a quantity before his eyes, but thinks of it not qua quantity. But if its nature is of quantities, though indeterminate, he places a determinate quantity, but thinks of it only qua quantity. Now, for what cause it is not possible to think of anything without continuity, nor without time to think of things not in time, is another discussion. But it is necessary to know magnitude and motion with the same [faculty] by which we also know time, and the image is an affection of the common sense. So it is clear that the knowledge of these belongs to the primary sensory faculty. And memory, even of intelligible objects, does not exist without an image. Therefore, it would belong to the object of thought accidentally, but essentially to the primary sensory faculty. Therefore, it also belongs to certain other animals, and not only to humans and those possessing opinion or prudence. But if it were one of the cognitive parts, it would not belong to many of the other animals, and perhaps to none of mortal creatures, since even now it does not belong to all, because not all have perception of time; for whenever one actively exercises memory, as we also said before, that he saw this or heard or learned, he additionally perceives that it was “before”; and “before” and “after” are in time. To which part of the soul memory belongs, then, is clear, namely to that very part to which imagination belongs; and those things are memorable essentially which are objects of imagination, and accidentally those which are not without imagination.