- Source
- Aristotle. Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea. Bywater, Ingram, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg010.humanitext-grc2:8.3
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-10-30
This section explains that there are three species of friendship based on utility, pleasure, and virtue, showing that the first two are accidental and easily dissolved, while the perfect friendship of good people based on virtue is stable and enduring. It also notes that such perfect friendship requires time and shared intimacy to develop.
διαφέρει δὲ ταῦτα ἀλλήλων εἴδει· καὶ αἱ φιλήσεις ἄρα καὶ αἱ φιλίαι. τρία δὴ τὰ τῆς φιλίας εἴδη, ἰσάριθμα τοῖς φιλητοῖς· καθʼ ἕκαστον γάρ ἐστιν ἀντιφίλησις οὐ λανθάνουσα, οἱ δὲ φιλοῦντες ἀλλήλους βούλονται τἀγαθὰ ἀλλήλοις ταύτῃ ᾗ φιλοῦσιν. οἱ μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλοῦντες ἀλλήλους οὐ καθʼ αὑτοὺς φιλοῦσιν, ἀλλʼ ᾗ γίνεταί τι αὐτοῖς παρʼ ἀλλήλων ἀγαθόν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ διʼ ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ τῷ ποιούς τινας εἶναι ἀγαπῶσι1 τοὺς εὐτραπέλους, ἀλλʼ ὅτι ἡδεῖς αὑτοῖς. οἵ τε δὴ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλοῦντες διὰ τὸ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθὸν στέργουσι, καὶ οἱ διʼ ἡδονὴν διὰ τὸ αὑτοῖς ἡδύ, καὶ οὐχ ᾗ ὁ φιλούμενός ἐστιν, ἀλλʼ ᾗ χρήσιμος ἢ ἡδύς. κατὰ συμβεβηκός τε δὴ αἱ φιλίαι αὗταί εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ἐστὶν ὅσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ φιλούμενος, ταύτῃ φιλεῖται, ἀλλʼ ᾗ πορίζουσιν οἳ μὲν ἀγαθόν τι οἳ δʼ ἡδονήν. εὐδιάλυτοι δὴ αἱ τοιαῦταί εἰσι, μὴ διαμενόντων αὐτῶν ὁμοίων· ἐὰν γὰρ μηκέτι ἡδεῖς ἢ χρήσιμοι ὦσι, παύονται φιλοῦντες. τὸ δὲ χρήσιμον οὐ διαμένει, ἀλλʼ ἄλλοτε ἄλλο γίνεται. ἀπολυθέντος οὖν διʼ ὃ φίλοι ἦσαν, διαλύεται καὶ ἡ φιλία, ὡς οὔσης τῆς φιλίας πρὸς ἐκεῖνα. μάλιστα δʼ ἐν τοῖς πρεσβύταις ἡ τοιαύτη δοκεῖ φιλία γίνεσθαι (οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ οἱ τηλικοῦτοι διώκουσιν ἀλλὰ τὸ ὠφέλιμον), καὶ τῶν ἐν ἀκμῇ καὶ νέων ὅσοι τὸ συμφέρον διώκουσιν. οὐ πάνυ δʼ οἱ τοιοῦτοι οὐδὲ συζῶσι μετʼ ἀλλήλων· ἐνίοτε γὰρ οὐδʼ εἰσὶν ἡδεῖς· οὐδὲ δὴ προσδέονται τῆς τοιαύτης ὁμιλίας, ἐὰν μὴ ὠφέλιμοι ὦσιν· ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον γάρ εἰσιν ἡδεῖς ἐφʼ ὅσον ἐλπίδας ἔχουσιν ἀγαθοῦ.2 εἰς ταύτας δὲ καὶ τὴν ξενικὴν τιθέασιν. ἡ δὲ τῶν νέων φιλία διʼ ἡδονὴν εἶναι δοκεῖ· κατὰ πάθος γὰρ οὗτοι ζῶσι, καὶ μάλιστα διώκουσι τὸ ἡδὺ αὑτοῖς καὶ τὸ παρόν· τῆς ἡλικίας δὲ μεταπιπτούσης καὶ τὰ ἡδέα γίνεται ἕτερα. διὸ ταχέως γίνονται φίλοι καὶ παύονται· ἅμα γὰρ τῷ ἡδεῖ ἡ φιλία μεταπίπτει, τῆς δὲ τοιαύτης ἡδονῆς ταχεῖα ἡ μεταβολή. καὶ ἐρωτικοὶ δʼ οἱ νέοι· κατὰ πάθος γὰρ καὶ διʼ ἡδονὴν τὸ πολὺ τῆς ἐρωτικῆς· διόπερ φιλοῦσι καὶ ταχέως παύονται, πολλάκις τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρας μεταπίπτοντες. συνημερεύειν δὲ καὶ συζῆν οὗτοι βούλονται· γίνεται γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὸ κατὰ τὴν φιλίαν οὕτως. τελεία δʼ ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φιλία καὶ κατʼ ἀρετὴν ὁμοίων· οὗτοι γὰρ τἀγαθὰ ὁμοίως βούλονται ἀλλήλοις ᾗ ἀγαθοί, ἀγαθοὶ δʼ εἰσὶ καθʼ αὑτούς. οἱ δὲ βουλόμενοι τἀγαθὰ τοῖς φίλοις ἐκείνων ἕνεκα μάλιστα φίλοι· διʼ αὑτοὺς γὰρ οὕτως ἔχουσι,3 καὶ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· διαμένει οὖν ἡ τούτων φιλία ἕως ἂν ἀγαθοὶ ὦσιν, ἡ δʼ ἀρετὴ μόνιμον. καὶ ἔστιν ἑκάτερος ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸς καὶ τῷ φίλῳ· οἱ γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἀλλήλοις ὠφέλιμοι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς· καὶ γὰρ ἁπλῶς οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἡδεῖς καὶ ἀλλήλοις· ἑκάστῳ γὰρ καθʼ ἡδονήν εἰσιν αἱ οἰκεῖαι πράξεις καὶ αἱ τοιαῦται, τῶν ἀγαθῶν δὲ αἱ αὐταὶ ἢ ὅμοιαι. ἡ τοιαύτη δὲ φιλία μόνιμος εὐλόγως ἐστίν· συνάπτει γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ πάνθʼ ὅσα τοῖς φίλοις δεῖ ὑπάρχειν. πᾶσα γὰρ φιλία διʼ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν ἢ διʼ ἡδονήν, ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ τῷ φιλοῦντι, καὶ καθʼ ὁμοιότητά τινα· ταύτῃ δὲ πάνθʼ ὑπάρχει τὰ εἰρημένα καθʼ αὑτούς· †ταύτῃ γὰρ ὅμοια4† καὶ τὰ λοιπά, τό τε ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδὺ ἁπλῶς ἐστίν, μάλιστα δὲ ταῦτα φιλητά· καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν δὴ καὶ ἡ φιλία ἐν τούτοις μάλιστα καὶ ἀρίστη. σπανίας δʼ εἰκὸς τὰς τοιαύτας εἶναι· ὀλίγοι γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι. ἔτι δὲ προσδεῖται χρόνου καὶ συνηθείας· κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν εἰδῆσαι ἀλλήλους πρὶν τοὺς λεγομένους ἅλας συναναλῶσαι· οὐδʼ ἀποδέξασθαι δὴ πρότερον οὐδʼ εἶναι φίλους, πρὶν ἂν ἑκάτερος ἑκατέρῳ φανῇ φιλητὸς καὶ πιστευθῇ. οἱ δὲ ταχέως τὰ φιλικὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ποιοῦντες βούλονται μὲν φίλοι εἶναι, οὐκ εἰσὶ δέ, εἰ μὴ καὶ φιλητοί, καὶ τοῦτʼ ἴσασιν· βούλησις μὲν γὰρ ταχεῖα φιλίας γίνεται, φιλία δʼ οὔ.
These differ from one another in species; and so therefore do the ways of loving and the friendships. There are then three species of friendship, equal in number to the objects of love; for in each there is a mutual loving that is not unrecognized, and those who love each other wish goods to each other in that respect in which they love. Those, then, who love each other because of utility do not love each other for themselves, but insofar as some good arises to them from each other. And similarly also those who love because of pleasure; for they do not like witty people for being of a certain character, but because they are pleasant to themselves. Those, therefore, who love because of utility cherish because of what is good for themselves, and those who love because of pleasure cherish because of what is pleasant to themselves, and not insofar as the loved one is who he is, but insofar as he is useful or pleasant. And so these friendships are accidental; for the loved one is loved not insofar as he is who he is, but insofar as they provide, some a certain good, others pleasure. Such friendships indeed are easily dissolved when they do not remain similar; for if they are no longer pleasant or useful, they cease loving. And the useful does not remain, but becomes different at different times. Therefore, when that because of which they were friends is removed, the friendship also is dissolved, as the friendship was directed toward those things. Such friendship seems to occur especially among old people (for people of this age do not pursue the pleasant but the beneficial), and among those in their prime and the young who pursue what is advantageous. But such people do not live together very much; for sometimes they are not even pleasant; nor indeed do they need such association unless they are beneficial; for they are pleasant only to the extent that they have hopes of good. And among these they also place guest-friendship. But the friendship of the young seems to be because of pleasure; for these live according to passion, and especially pursue what is pleasant to themselves and what is present; and as age changes, the pleasant things also become different. Therefore, they quickly become friends and cease; for along with the pleasant the friendship changes, and the change of such pleasure is swift. And the young are also amorous; for the greater part of amorous connection is according to passion and because of pleasure; wherefore they love and quickly cease, changing many times in the same day. And these wish to spend their days and live together; for in this way what concerns friendship arises for them. But the perfect friendship is that of good people, and of those who are similar in virtue; for these wish goods similarly to each other insofar as they are good, and they are good in themselves. And those who wish goods to their friends for their sake are most of all friends; for they are in this state of mind because of themselves, and not accidentally; their friendship therefore remains as long as they are good, and virtue is stable. And each is good absolutely and to his friend; for the good are both good absolutely and beneficial to each other. Similarly, they are also pleasant; for the good are both pleasant absolutely and to each other; for to each, his own actions and those of such kind are according to his pleasure, and the actions of the good are the same or similar. And such friendship is reasonably stable; for it joins in itself all things that ought to belong to friends. For all friendship is because of good or because of pleasure, either absolutely or for the one loving, and according to a certain similarity; and in this friendship all the mentioned things belong in themselves; †for in this they are similar† and the other things, both the absolutely good and the absolutely pleasant are there, and these are most of all lovable; and indeed loving and friendship are most of all and best in these. But it is likely that such friendships are rare; for such people are few. And further, it requires time and intimacy; for according to the proverb, it is not possible to know each other before consuming together the proverbially mentioned salt; nor indeed to accept each other or to be friends before each appears lovable and is trusted by each. And those who quickly perform friendly offices toward each other wish to be friends, but are not, unless they are also lovable and know this; for the wish for friendship arises quickly, but friendship does not.
- 1156a14οὐ γὰρ τῷ ποιούς τινας εἶναι ἀγαπῶσι
The dative construction τῷ with the infinitive εἶναι expresses cause or reason ('by reason of / because of being'). The phrase ποιούς τινας ('of a certain quality') refers to the moral character or essential nature of the person, as opposed to accidental benefits or pleasures they might provide.
- 1156a29ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον γάρ εἰσιν ἡδεῖς ἐφʼ ὅσον ἐλπίδας ἔχουσιν ἀγαθοῦ
The correlative construction ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον... ἐφʼ ὅσον... ('so far... as...') is used here. It syntactically limits the degree to which these people are pleasant to each other, indicating that they are only pleasant to the extent that they maintain expectations of receiving some good (utility) from the other.
- 1156b10διʼ αὑτοὺς γὰρ οὕτως ἔχουσι
The subject of οὕτως ἔχουσι ('are in this state of mind/condition') is those who wish goods to their friends. While διʼ αὑτούς can be interpreted as either 'because of themselves' or 'because of the friends themselves', in this context it corresponds to ἐκείνων ἕνεκα ('for their sake') and contrasts with κατὰ συμβεβηκός ('accidentally'), indicating a stable state based on their own essential character.
- 1156b21†ταύτῃ γὰρ ὅμοια†
The daggers (crux) indicate a corruption in the manuscript tradition. While the general interpretation takes ταύτῃ to refer to this perfect friendship (or 'in this respect') and connects it with the following clause 'the other things are similar,' the syntax remains highly awkward and has led to various emendations by editors.
