Nicomachean Ethics

​Indeed, those who are in the grip of passions are in just such a state; for anger, sexual desires, and some such things clearly alter even the body, and in some cases even cause madness. It is clear, then, that we must say that incontinent people are in a similar state to these. But uttering words that come from knowledge is no sign; for those who are in these passions also utter demonstrations and verses of Empedocles, and those who have just begun to learn string together words, but do not yet know them; for the knowledge must become part of their nature, and this requires time. So we must suppose that those who act incontinently speak in the same way as actors. Further, one might also look at the cause from the standpoint of nature in this way. For one premise is a universal opinion, and the other is about particulars, where perception is already authoritative. And when a single premise arises from them, the soul must, in the former case, assert the conclusion, and in the case of productive premises, act immediately. For example, if ‘everything sweet ought to be tasted’, and ‘this before me is sweet’ as one of the particulars, the person who has the ability and is not prevented must of necessity act on this at the same time. When, therefore, the universal premise is present within us preventing us from tasting, and another premise is present saying ‘everything sweet is pleasant’ and ‘this is sweet’ (and this latter is active), and desire happens to be present within us, then, while the former tells us to avoid this, desire leads us on; for desire has the power to move each of the bodily parts. Consequently, it turns out that one acts incontinently under the influence, in a way, of a rule or an opinion, which is not contrary in itself, but only accidentally, to the right rule—for it is the desire, not the opinion, that is contrary to it. For this reason also beasts are not incontinent, because they have no universal concepts, but only mental images and memories of particulars. How the ignorance is dissolved and the incontinent person becomes knowing again, is the same explanation as that for a drunken or sleeping person, and is not peculiar to this state; we must hear it from the physiologists. But since the last premise is an opinion about a perceptible object and is authoritative over actions, a person in the grip of passion either does not possess this premise, or possesses it in such a way that possessing it was not equivalent to knowing it, but only to reciting it, as a drunken man recites the verses of Empedocles. And because the last term is not a universal, and does not seem to be scientific in the same way as the universal, the conclusion which Socrates sought to establish seems to result. For the passion does not arise when what is thought to be knowledge in the strict sense is present, nor is this knowledge dragged about by the passion, but rather the perceptual knowledge is. Concerning, then, acting incontinently with knowledge or without, and in what sense one can do so, let this suffice.