Pleasure as an Unimpeded Activity and the Chief Good — Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics Book 7 (13), Greek & English

§7.13

ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι καὶ ἡ λύπη κακόν, ὁμολογεῖται, καὶ φευκτόν· ἣ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς κακόν, ἣ δὲ τῷ πῇ ἐμποδιστική.¹ τῷ δὲ φευκτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον ᾗ φευκτόν τι καὶ κακόν, ἀγαθόν. ἀνάγκη οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι. ὡς γὰρ Σπεύσιππος ἔλυεν, οὐ συμβαίνει ἡ λύσις,² ὥσπερ τὸ μεῖζον τῷ ἐλάττονι καὶ τῷ ἴσῳ ἐναντίον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν φαίη ὅπερ κακόν τι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν. τἄριστόν τʼ οὐδὲν κωλύει ἡδονήν τινα εἶναι, εἰ ἔνιαι φαῦλαι ἡδοναί, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμην τινὰ ἐνίων φαύλων οὐσῶν. ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, εἴπερ ἑκάστης ἕξεώς εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι ἀνεμπόδιστοι, εἴθʼ ἡ πασῶν ἐνέργειά ἐστιν εὐδαιμονία εἴτε ἡ τινὸς αὐτῶν, ἂν ᾖ ἀνεμπόδιστος, αἱρετωτάτην εἶναι·³ τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶν ἡδονή. ὥστε εἴη ἄν τις ἡδονὴ τὸ ἄριστον, τῶν πολλῶν ἡδονῶν φαύλων οὐσῶν, εἰ ἔτυχεν, ἁπλῶς. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάντες τὸν εὐδαίμονα ἡδὺν οἴονται βίον εἶναι, καὶ ἐμπλέκουσι τὴν ἡδονὴν εἰς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, εὐλόγως· οὐδεμία γὰρ ἐνέργεια τέλειος ἐμποδιζομένη, ἡ δʼ εὐδαιμονία τῶν τελείων· διὸ προσδεῖται ὁ εὐδαίμων τῶν ἐν σώματι ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς καὶ τῆς τύχης, ὅπως μὴ ἐμποδίζηται ταῦτα. οἱ δὲ τὸν τροχιζόμενον καὶ τὸν δυστυχίαις μεγάλαις περιπίπτοντα εὐδαίμονα φάσκοντες εἶναι, ἐὰν ᾖ ἀγαθός, ἢ ἑκόντες ἢ ἄκοντες οὐδὲν λέγουσιν. διὰ δὲ τὸ προσδεῖσθαι τῆς τύχης δοκεῖ τισὶ ταὐτὸν εἶναι ἡ εὐτυχία τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, οὐκ οὖσα, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὴ ὑπερβάλλουσα ἐμπόδιός ἐστιν, καὶ ἴσως οὐκέτι εὐτυχίαν καλεῖν δίκαιον· πρὸς γὰρ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ὁ ὅρος αὐτῆς. καὶ τὸ διώκειν δʼ ἅπαντα καὶ θηρία καὶ ἀνθρώπους τὴν ἡδονὴν σημεῖόν τι τοῦ εἶναί πως τὸ ἄριστον αὐτήν· "φήμη δʼ οὔτις πάμπαν ἀπόλλυται, ἥν τινα λαοί πολλοί" ἀλλʼ ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ οὔτε φύσις οὔθʼ ἕξις ἡ ἀρίστη οὔτʼ ἔστιν οὔτε δοκεῖ, οὐδʼ ἡδονὴν διώκουσι τὴν αὐτὴν πάντες, ἡδονὴν μέντοι πάντες. ἴσως δὲ καὶ διώκουσιν οὐχ ἣν οἴονται οὐδʼ ἣν ἂν φαῖεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτήν· πάντα γὰρ φύσει ἔχει τι θεῖον. ἀλλʼ εἰλήφασι τὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος κληρονομίαν αἱ σωματικαὶ ἡδοναὶ διὰ τὸ πλειστάκις τε παραβάλλειν εἰς αὐτὰς καὶ πάντας μετέχειν αὐτῶν· διὰ τὸ μόνας οὖν γνωρίμους εἶναι ταύτας μόνας οἴονται εἶναι. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι, εἰ μὴ ἡδονὴ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια, οὐκ ἔσται ζῆν ἡδέως τὸν εὐδαίμονα· τίνος γὰρ ἕνεκα δέοι ἂν αὐτῆς, εἴπερ μὴ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ λυπηρῶς ἐνδέχεται ζῆν; οὔτε κακὸν γὰρ οὔτʼ ἀγαθὸν ἡ λύπη, εἴπερ μηδʼ ἡδονή· ὥστε διὰ τί ἂν φεύγοι; οὐδὲ δὴ ἡδίων ὁ βίος ὁ τοῦ σπουδαίου, εἰ μὴ καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι αὐτοῦ.

Furthermore, that pain is an evil and is to be avoided is universally agreed; for one kind of pain is an evil simply, and another is so by being a hindrance in some way. But the opposite of what is to be avoided, in so far as it is something to be avoided and an evil, is a good. Therefore, pleasure must necessarily be a good. For the solution that Speusippus used to offer does not hold—namely, that just as the greater is opposed to both the less and the equal, so pleasure is opposed to both pain and the good; for he would not say that pleasure is essentially a kind of evil. And nothing prevents the chief good from being some pleasure, even if some pleasures are bad, just as some science may be the chief good even if some sciences are bad. Perhaps it is even necessary that, if for each state there are unimpeded activities, and whether the activity of all states or of some particular one of them is happiness, this activity (provided it is unimpeded) is the most desirable; and this activity is pleasure. Hence, some pleasure would be the chief good, even if many pleasures happen to be bad, simply. And for this reason everyone thinks that the happy life is a pleasant one, and they weave pleasure into happiness, reasonably enough; for no activity is complete when impeded, and happiness is of the complete things. Therefore, the happy person also needs bodily goods, external goods, and fortune in addition, so that these may not be a hindrance. But those who say that the person on the wheel or the one who has fallen into great misfortunes is happy if he is good, are, whether they mean to or not, talking nonsense. Because of this additional need for fortune, some think that good fortune is identical with happiness, which it is not, since even good fortune when excessive is a hindrance, and perhaps it is then no longer right to call it good fortune; for its limit is defined in relation to happiness. And the fact that all things, both beasts and humans, pursue pleasure is a sign that it is in some way the chief good: “No rumor is altogether lost, which many folk broadcast.” But since the best nature or state is neither the same for all, nor is thought to be, neither do they all pursue the same pleasure, yet all pursue pleasure. Perhaps indeed they pursue not the one they think they do or would say they do, but the same one; for all things have by nature something divine. But bodily pleasures have seized the inheritance of the name because people drift into them most often and all share in them; because these are the only ones familiar, then, they think these are the only ones that exist. It is also clear that, if pleasure and activity are not a good, it will not be possible for the happy person to live pleasantly. For for what purpose would he need pleasure, if it is indeed not a good, but it is possible to live even painfully? For pain is neither an evil nor a good, if indeed pleasure is not; so why would he avoid it? Nor indeed would the life of the excellent person be more pleasant, if his activities were not so.

Syntax notes3 items

1153b1ἣ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς κακόν, ἣ δὲ τῷ πῇ ἐμποδιστική.
The feminine singular relative pronouns are used as demonstrative pronouns with the particles μέν... δέ... to mean 'the one... the other...'. They refer back to the feminine noun ἡ λύπη (pain). The copula ἐστίν and the nominative complement κακόν are ellipted from the second clause. Thus, it translates to: 'for one [pain] is an evil simply, and the other is [an evil] by being a hindrance in some way.'
1153b4ὡς γὰρ Σπεύσιππος ἔλυεν, οὐ συμβαίνει ἡ λύσις,
The subject of the verb συμβαίνει (turns out, holds) is the subsequent noun ἡ λύσις (solution). The structure means: 'for the solution in the way Speusippus offered it does not hold.' Speusippus argued that pleasure is opposed to both pain (the less) and the good (the equal), placing it in a neutral middle. Aristotle rejects this 'solution' (ἡ λύσις) on the grounds that Speusippus would not want to conclude that pleasure is essentially an evil.
1153b9ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον... αἱρετωτάτην εἶναι·
An accusative and infinitive construction introduced by the impersonal adjective ἀναγκαῖον (it is necessary, with ἐστι omitted). The main conditional clause 'if for each state there are unimpeded activities' (εἴπερ... εἰσιν...) is followed by an embedded alternative 'whether the activity of all states or of some particular one is happiness' (εἴτε... εἴτε...). Under the further condition 'if it is unimpeded' (ἂν ᾖ ἀνεμπόδιστος), the main infinitive clause is αἱρετωτάτην εἶναι ('to be the most desirable'). The subject of this infinitive, in the accusative, is omitted but understood as the aforementioned activity (ἐνέργεια).

Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-22)urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg010.humanitext-grc2:7.13