Nicomachean Ethics

One might raise the question of whether suffering injustice and committing injustice have been sufficiently defined. First, whether it is as Euripides said, speaking strangely: “I killed my mother, a brief tale. Voluntarily she willing, or she unwilling and I unwilling?” For is it truly possible for someone to suffer injustice voluntarily, or is it not, but rather all suffering of injustice is involuntary, just as all committing of injustice is voluntary? And is it all one way or the other, or is some voluntary and some involuntary? The same question applies to being treated justly; for all acting justly is voluntary, so that it is reasonable that there should be a similar opposition in each case, and that both suffering injustice and being treated justly should be either voluntary or involuntary. But it would seem strange, even in the case of being treated justly, if all of it were voluntary; for some are treated justly not voluntarily. Next, one might also raise this question: whether everyone who has suffered what is unjust is treated unjustly, or whether, just as it is with doing, so it is with suffering. For in both doing and suffering it is possible to partake of what is just coincidentally; and similarly, it is clear that it is so with what is unjust. For doing what is unjust is not the same as committing injustice, nor is suffering what is unjust the same as suffering injustice; and similarly in the case of acting justly and being treated justly. For it is impossible to suffer injustice if there is no one committing injustice, or to be treated justly if there is no one acting justly. But if committing injustice is simply to injure someone voluntarily, and “voluntarily” means knowing the person, the instrument, and the manner, and the incontinent person voluntarily injures himself, then he would voluntarily suffer injustice, and it would be possible for a person to treat himself unjustly. This is also one of the problems raised: whether it is possible for a person to treat himself unjustly. Furthermore, a person might, through incontinence, be voluntarily injured by another acting voluntarily, so that it would be possible to suffer injustice voluntarily. Or is the definition incorrect, and must we add to “injuring someone knowing the person, the instrument, and the manner” the condition “contrary to that person’s wish”? Thus, a person is indeed injured voluntarily and suffers what is unjust, but no one suffers injustice voluntarily; for no one wishes it, not even the incontinent person, but he acts contrary to his wish. For no one wishes what he does not think to be good, and the incontinent person does not do what he thinks he ought to do. But the person who gives away his own property, as Homer says Glaucus gave to Diomedes: “gold for bronze, what was worth a hundred oxen for what was worth nine,” is not treated unjustly. For giving is in his power, but suffering injustice is not in his power, but there must be someone committing injustice. Regarding suffering injustice, then, it is clear that it is not voluntary.