Nicomachean Ethics

​Since there is also relaxation in life, and in this a pastime accompanied by play, there seems to be here too a certain harmonious social intercourse, both in what kind of things one ought to say and how, and likewise in listening. And it will also make a difference to speak among such people or to listen to such people. And it is clear that in these matters too there is an excess and a deficiency of the mean. Now, those who exceed in the ridiculous seem to be buffoons and vulgar, striving for the ridiculous at all costs, and aiming more at raising a laugh than at saying what is seemly and not paining the person being mocked; while those who would not say anything ridiculous themselves and are displeased with those who do seem to be boorish and stiff. But those who play in a well-tuned manner are called ready-witted, as if they were of a versatile turn; for such movements are thought to belong to character, and just as bodies are judged by their movements, so also are characters. But since the ridiculous is common, and most people enjoy play and mocking more than they ought, even buffoons are called ready-witted as if they were refined; but that they differ, and not a little, is clear from what has been said. To the mean state also belongs dexterity; and it belongs to the dexterous person to say and listen to such things as are fitting for a decent and gentlemanly person; for there are some things fitting for such a person to say in the way of play, and to listen to, and the play of the gentlemanly person differs from that of the slavish person, and that of the educated from that of the uneducated. One may see this also from the old and the new comedies; for to the former, obscenity was ridiculous, but to the latter, innuendo rather; and these differ not a little in respect of decency. Should we, then, define the person who mocks well by his saying what is not unfitting for a gentlemanly person, or by his not paining the listener, or even by his pleasing him? Or is such a thing at least indefinite? For different things are hateful and pleasant to different people. And he will also listen to such things; for what a person tolerates listening to, he is also thought to do. He will not indeed do everything; for mockery is a sort of abuse, and since legislators forbid some kinds of abuse, they perhaps ought to have forbidden some kinds of mockery as well. So the refined and gentlemanly person will be thus disposed, being as it were a law to himself. Such, then, is the person in the mean, whether he is called dexterous or ready-witted. But the buffoon is defeated by the ridiculous, and sparing neither himself nor others if he can raise a laugh, and saying such things as the refined person would never say, and some indeed he would not even listen to. On the other hand, the boorish person is useless for such social intercourse; for contributing nothing, he is displeased with everything. Yet relaxation and play seem to be necessary in life. There are, then, three mean states in life as has been said, and they are all concerned with some association in words and actions. But they differ in that one is concerned with truth, and the others with what is pleasant. And of those concerned with pleasure, one is in play, and the other in the social intercourses of the rest of life.

Regarding shame, it is not fitting to speak of it as a sort of virtue; for it resembles a passion rather than a state of character. At any rate, it is defined as a sort of fear of dishonor, and it produces its effect in a manner similar to the fear of terrible things; for those who feel ashamed blush, while those who fear death grow pale. Both, indeed, appear to be in some way bodily, which seems to belong to a passion rather than a state of character. And this passion does not suit every age, but the young. For we think that those of this age ought to be bashful because, living by passion, they make many mistakes, but are kept in check by shame; and we praise those among the young who are bashful, but no one would praise an older person for being shamefaced; for we think he ought not to do anything for which shame is felt. For indeed shame does not belong to a decent person, if indeed it occurs in connection with bad actions (for such things ought not to be done; and if some things are disgraceful in truth and others according to reputation, it makes no difference; for neither ought to be done, so that one ought not to feel shame). And it belongs to a bad person to be of such a character as to do any of the disgraceful things. But to be so disposed that if one should do any of such things one would feel ashamed, and on this account to think oneself decent, is absurd; for shame is felt for voluntary actions, and the decent person will never voluntarily do bad things. Shame indeed might be decent hypothetically; for if one were to do them, one would feel ashamed; but this does not apply to the virtues. And if shamelessness is bad, and not to be ashamed to do disgraceful things, that does not make it any more decent for one who does such things to feel ashamed. Nor indeed is self-control a virtue, but a sort of mixed state; but this will be shown later. Now let us speak about justice.