Nicomachean Ethics

​Magnanimity, as its very name suggests, seems to be concerned with great things. Let us first grasp what kind of things it is concerned with. It makes no difference whether we examine the state of character or the person who acts in accordance with that state. Now, a magnanimous person seems to be one who deems himself worthy of great things and is indeed worthy of them. For he who does this without being worthy is foolish, but no one who acts in accordance with virtue is foolish or senseless. Such, then, is the magnanimous person. For he who is worthy of small things and deems himself worthy of them is temperate, but not magnanimous; for magnanimity consists in greatness, just as beauty implies a large body—small people may be neat and well-proportioned, but not beautiful. But he who deems himself worthy of great things when he is unworthy of them is vain; yet not everyone who deems himself worthy of more than he deserves is vain. But he who deems himself worthy of less than he deserves is pusillanimous, whether his deserts be great or moderate, or even if, being worthy of small things, he claims still less for himself. And the one who is worthy of great things would seem to be [pusillanimous] most of all; for what would he have done, if he were not worthy of so many things? Thus, the magnanimous person is extreme in respect of the greatness of his claims, but intermediate in acting as he ought; for he estimates himself at his true worth, while the others exceed or fall short. If, then, he deems himself worthy of great things, and especially of the greatest, being indeed worthy of them, he will be concerned preeminently with some one object. Now, “worthiness” is spoken of in relation to external goods; and we should assume that to be the greatest which we assign to the gods, and which those of high standing most of all desire, and which is the prize for the finest deeds. Such a thing is honor; for this is indeed the greatest of external goods. Therefore, the magnanimous person is concerned as he ought to be with honors and dishonors. And even without argument, it is evident that magnanimous people are concerned with honor; for it is honor that they especially claim for themselves, but in accordance with their worth. But the pusillanimous person falls short both in relation to his own worth and in relation to the claim of the magnanimous person. The vain person, on the other hand, exceeds in relation to himself, but certainly does not exceed the magnanimous person. And the magnanimous person, if indeed he is worthy of the greatest things, must be the best of men; for the better person is always worthy of a greater thing, and the best of the greatest. Therefore, the truly magnanimous person must be good. And greatness in each virtue would seem to belong to the magnanimous person. It would by no means befit a magnanimous person to flee, swinging his arms, nor to do injustice; for to what end would he do shameful deeds, to whom nothing is great? If we examine the character in detail, the magnanimous person would appear completely ridiculous if he were not good. Nor would he be worthy of honor if he were bad; for honor is the prize of virtue, and it is paid to the good. Magnanimity, then, seems to be a sort of ornament of the virtues; for it makes them greater, and it does not arise without them. For this reason, it is difficult to be truly magnanimous; for it is not possible without nobility and goodness. The magnanimous person, then, is concerned preeminently with honors and dishonors; and he will be moderately pleased with great honors and those bestowed by excellent men, on the ground that he is obtaining what is his own or even less; for there can be no honor worthy of perfect virtue, though he will accept it because they have nothing greater to bestow on him. But honor from casual people and on trivial grounds he will utterly despise; for he is not worthy of these. He will feel similarly about dishonor too; for it cannot justly attach to him. The magnanimous person, then, as has been said, is concerned preeminently with honors; nevertheless, he will also bear himself moderately towards wealth and power and all good and bad fortune, however they may turn out, and will neither be overjoyed by good fortune nor over-distressed by ill fortune. For he does not even regard honor itself as if it were the greatest of things. For power and wealth are desirable for the sake of honor; at all events, those who possess them wish to be honored because of them. But to him for whom even honor is a small thing, other things also must be small. This is why they are thought to be supercilious. It seems, too, that good fortune contributes to magnanimity. For the well-born, the powerful, and the wealthy are deemed worthy of honor; for they are in a position of superiority, and everything that is superior in goodness is more highly honored. Therefore, such circumstances also make people more magnanimous, since they are honored by some. In truth, however, only the good person is to be honored; but he who has both is deemed even more worthy of honor. But those who possess such goods without virtue neither justly deem themselves worthy of great things nor are they rightly called magnanimous; for without perfect virtue these things are impossible.