Nicomachean Ethics

​It would seem to follow next to discuss magnificence as well. For this too seems to be a virtue concerned with wealth; but unlike liberality, it does not extend to all actions concerning wealth, but only to those involving expenditure; and in these, it exceeds liberality in scale. For as its very name suggests, it is a suitable expenditure in a grand scale. But this scale is relative; for the same expenditure is not suitable for a trierarch and for a leader of a sacred embassy. What is suitable, then, is relative to the person himself, the circumstances in which he acts, and the object of his action. But he who spends in small or moderate matters according to what is fitting is not called magnificent—as in the line “often did I give to a beggar”—but rather he who does so in great matters. For the magnificent person is liberal, but the liberal person is not necessarily magnificent. Of such a state, the deficiency is called meanness, and the excess is called vulgarity, tastelessness, and the like, which do not exceed in the greatness of expenditure on what is proper, but make a show of display in the wrong circumstances and in the wrong way; we shall speak about these later. But the magnificent person is like an expert; for he is able to observe what is suitable and to spend large sums in good taste. For as we said at the beginning, a state is defined by its activities and by the things with which it is concerned. The expenditures of the magnificent person, therefore, are great and suitable. Such, then, are also his works; for in this way there will be a great expenditure that is suitable to the work. So the work must be worthy of the expenditure, and the expenditure worthy of the work, or even exceed it. And the magnificent person will spend such sums for the sake of the noble; for this is common to all the virtues. Moreover, he will do so gladly and open-handedly; for meticulous calculation is a mark of meanness. And he will consider how the work can be finest and most suitable, rather than how much it will cost or how it can be done for the least. Thus the magnificent person must also be liberal. For the liberal person will also spend what he ought and as he ought; but in these, it is the ‘great’ of the magnificent person—that is, the scale—where magnificence is concerned, even though liberality is about the same things, and from an equal expenditure the magnificent person will make the work more magnificent. For the virtue of a possession is not the same as that of a work. For a possession is most prized if it is worth the most, such as gold, but a work is prized if it is great and noble (for the contemplation of such a work is wonderful, and magnificence is wonderful); and magnificence is the virtue of a work on a grand scale. Among expenditures, those we call prized are, for instance, those concerning the gods—votive offerings, buildings, and sacrifices—and likewise concerning everything divine, and all those that are public-spirited, such as when people think they ought to provide a chorus splendidly, or equip a trireme, or host a feast for the city. But in all these cases, as has been said, reference is also made to the agent—who he is and what resources he has; for the expenditures must be worthy of these, and be suitable not only to the work but also to the doer.