← Aristotle

Nicomachean Ethics

§3.6

Definition of Courage and the Proper Objects of Fear

Aristotle begins his examination of the individual virtues with courage, defining it as a mean concerned with fear and confidence. He specifies that true courage is properly displayed in the face of the most noble death, particularly in war, where there is room for prowess or where dying is noble.

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§3.6

ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ φόβους καὶ θάρρη, ἤδη φανερὸν γεγένηται· φοβούμεθα δὲ δῆλον ὅτι τὰ φοβερά, ταῦτα δʼ ἐστὶν ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν κακά· διὸ καὶ τὸν φόβον ὁρίζονται προσδοκίαν κακοῦ. φοβούμεθα μὲν οὖν πάντα τὰ κακά, οἷον ἀδοξίαν πενίαν νόσον ἀφιλίαν θάνατον, ἀλλʼ οὐ περὶ πάντα δοκεῖ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι· ἔνια γὰρ καὶ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι καὶ καλόν, τὸ δὲ μὴ αἰσχρόν, οἷον ἀδοξίαν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ φοβούμενος ἐπιεικὴς καὶ αἰδήμων, ὁ δὲ μὴ φοβούμενος ἀναίσχυντος. λέγεται δʼ ὑπό τινων ἀνδρεῖος κατὰ μεταφοράν· ἔχει γάρ τι ὅμοιον τῷ ἀνδρείῳ· ἄφοβος γάρ τις καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος. πενίαν δʼ ἴσως οὐ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι οὐδὲ νόσον, οὐδʼ ὅλως ὅσα μὴ ἀπὸ κακίας μηδὲ διʼ αὑτόν.1 ἀλλʼ οὐδʼ ὁ περὶ ταῦτα ἄφοβος ἀνδρεῖος. λέγομεν δὲ καὶ τοῦτον καθʼ ὁμοιότητα· ἔνιοι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς κινδύνοις δειλοὶ ὄντες ἐλευθέριοί εἰσι καὶ πρὸς χρημάτων ἀποβολὴν εὐθαρσῶς ἔχουσιν. οὐδὲ δὴ εἴ τις ὕβριν περὶ παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκα φοβεῖται ἢ φθόνον ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων, δειλός ἐστιν· οὐδʼ εἰ θαρρεῖ μέλλων μαστιγοῦσθαι, ἀνδρεῖος. περὶ ποῖα οὖν τῶν φοβερῶν ὁ ἀνδρεῖος; ἢ περὶ τὰ μέγιστα; οὐθεὶς γὰρ ὑπομενετικώτερος τῶν δεινῶν. φοβερώτατον δʼ ὁ θάνατος· πέρας γάρ, καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι τῷ τεθνεῶτι δοκεῖ οὔτʼ ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακὸν εἶναι. δόξειε δʼ ἂν οὐδὲ περὶ θάνατον τὸν ἐν παντὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι, οἷον ἐν θαλάττῃ ἢ νόσοις. ἐν τίσιν οὖν; ἢ ἐν τοῖς καλλίστοις; τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἱ ἐν πολέμῳ· ἐν μεγίστῳ γὰρ καὶ καλλίστῳ κινδύνῳ. ὁμόλογοι δὲ τούτοις εἰσὶ καὶ αἱ τιμαὶ αἱ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ παρὰ τοῖς μονάρχοις. κυρίως δὴ λέγοιτʼ ἂν ἀνδρεῖος ὁ περὶ τὸν καλὸν θάνατον ἀδεής, καὶ ὅσα θάνατον ἐπιφέρει ὑπόγυια ὄντα· τοιαῦτα δὲ μάλιστα τὰ κατὰ πόλεμον. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν θαλάττῃ καὶ ἐν νόσοις ἀδεὴς ὁ ἀνδρεῖος, οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ὡς οἱ θαλάττιοι· οἳ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεγνώκασι τὴν σωτηρίαν καὶ τὸν θάνατον τὸν τοιοῦτον δυσχεραίνουσιν, οἳ δὲ εὐέλπιδές εἰσι παρὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν.2 ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἀνδρίζονται ἐν οἷς ἐστὶν ἀλκὴ ἢ καλὸν τὸ ἀποθανεῖν· ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις δὲ φθοραῖς οὐδέτερον ὑπάρχει.

​That courage is a mean concerned with fears and confidence, then, has already become clear. And we fear, clearly, things that are fearful, and these are, to speak plainly, bad things. Therefore people also define fear as the expectation of something bad. Now we fear all bad things, such as disgrace, poverty, disease, friendlessness, and death. But the courageous person does not seem to be concerned with all of them. For some things indeed one ought to fear, and doing so is noble, while not doing so is disgraceful, such as disgrace. For he who fears this is decent and modest, whereas he who does not fear it is shameless. He is called courageous by some by metaphor; for he has something similar to the courageous person, since the courageous person too is a sort of fearless person. Poverty, on the other hand, one ought perhaps not to fear, nor disease, nor generally whatever does not arise from vice or through oneself. Yet not even he who is fearless concerning these is courageous. We speak of him too as such in virtue of a similarity; for some who are cowardly in the dangers of war are nevertheless liberal and are of good confidence in the face of loss of money. Nor indeed is someone cowardly if he fears insult to his children and wife, or envy, or any such thing; nor is he courageous if he is confident when about to be whipped. Concerned with what kinds of fearful things, then, is the courageous person? Surely with the greatest? For no one is more capable of enduring terrible things. And death is the most fearful thing; for it is an end, and nothing more seems to be either good or bad for one who has died. Yet the courageous person would seem not to be concerned even with death under all circumstances, such as at sea or from diseases. In what kinds, then? Surely in the most noble? And such are those in war; for they are in the greatest and most noble danger. Agreeing with this are also the honors in city-states and among monarchs. Properly, then, one would be called courageous who is fearless concerning a noble death, and concerning all things that bring death when they are close at hand; and such things are especially those in war. Not but what the courageous person is also fearless at sea and in diseases, but not in the same way as sailors. For the former [courageous people] have given up hope of safety and are displeased at such a death, whereas the latter [sailors] are hopeful because of their experience. At the same time, people act courageously in situations where there is room for prowess or where dying is noble; but in such forms of destruction neither is present.

Syntax notes2 items
  1. 1115a15οὐδʼ ὅλως ὅσα μὴ ἀπὸ κακίας μηδὲ διʼ αὑτόν.

    The relative clause introduced by ὅσα functions as the object of οὐ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι (one ought not to fear) understood from the preceding clause. The phrase μὴ ἀπὸ κακίας μηδὲ διʼ αὑτόν ('not arising from vice nor through oneself') modifies ὅσα, contrasting things like poverty or disease with disgrace, which does stem from one's own vice and agency.

  2. 1115b1οἳ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεγνώκασι τὴν σωτηρίαν καὶ τὸν θάνατον τὸν τοιοῦτον δυσχεραίνουσιν, οἳ δὲ εὐέλπιδές εἰσι παρὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν.

    Syntactic interpretation of the demonstratives οἳ μὲν and οἳ δὲ. Contextually, the former (οἳ μὲν) refers back to the main subject, 'the courageous,' rather than the immediate antecedent 'sailors.' In situations like a shipwreck where there is no room for active defense (ἀλκὴ), the courageous have abandoned hope of safety and are displeased with such an ignoble death, whereas the latter (οἳ δὲ, the sailors) remain hopeful due to their professional experience.

Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-22)urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg010.humanitext-grc2:3.6