Nicomachean Ethics

​Having defined the voluntary and the involuntary, the next subject is to discuss choice; for it seems to be most intimately related to virtue, and to judge character even better than actions do. Choice, then, is manifestly voluntary, but is not the same thing, the voluntary having a wider scope. For both children and the other animals share in the voluntary, but not in choice, and actions done on the spur of the moment we call voluntary, but not in accordance with choice. And those who say that it is appetite or anger or wish or some kind of opinion do not seem to speak correctly. For choice is not common to irrational creatures as well, but appetite and anger are. Also, the incontinent man acts from appetite, but not from choice, while the continent man on the contrary acts from choice, but not from appetite. And appetite is contrary to choice, but not appetite to appetite. And appetite has to do with the pleasant and the painful, but choice has to do with neither the painful nor the pleasant. Anger is even less like choice; for actions due to anger seem least of all to be in accordance with choice. But neither is it wish, indeed, though it seems very close to it. For choice is not of impossible things, and if anyone said he chose them, he would be thought a fool; but wish can be of impossible things, for instance, immortality. And wish is also about things that could in no way be done by oneself, as that a certain actor or athlete should win; but no one chooses such things, but only what he thinks could be done by his own agency. Further, wish is rather of the end, but choice of the means to the end; for instance, we wish to be healthy, but we choose the means by which we shall become healthy, and we wish to be happy and say we do, but to say we choose to be happy is not fitting; for in general choice seems to be about things that are in our power. Neither can it be opinion; for opinion is thought to be about everything, and no less about things eternal and impossible than about things in our power; and it is distinguished by being true or false, not by being bad or good, but choice is distinguished rather by these. In general, then, perhaps no one says it is the same as opinion. But neither is it the same as any particular opinion; for by choosing good or bad things we are of a certain character, which we are not by holding opinions. And we choose to take or avoid something of this sort, but we hold opinions as to what a thing is or to whom it is advantageous or how; but we do not hold opinions at all as to taking or avoiding it. And choice is praised rather for being directed to the right object than for being rightly directed, but opinion is praised for being truly held. And we choose what we best know to be good, but we hold opinions about what we do not know at all well. And it is not thought that the same people choose best and hold the best opinions, but some hold better opinions, but through vice choose what they ought not. But whether opinion precedes choice or accompanies it is no matter, for we are not considering this, but whether choice is identical with some opinion. What then, or what kind of thing is it, since it is none of the things mentioned? It is manifestly voluntary, but not all that is voluntary is choice. Is it, then, what has been deliberated on beforehand? For choice is accompanied by reason and thought. Even its name seems to suggest this, as being what is chosen before other things.