Nicomachean Ethics

​After this let us speak of temperance; for these virtues seem to belong to the irrational parts. That temperance is a mean concerned with pleasures, then, has been said by us; for it is less concerned, and not in the same way, with pains; and in the same things licentiousness also appears. With what kind of pleasures, then, let us now define. Let a distinction be made indeed between those of the soul and those of the body, such as ambition and love of learning; for each of these rejoices in that of which he is fond, while the body is not affected at all, but rather the mind; but those who are concerned with such pleasures are called neither temperate nor licentious. Similarly, neither are those concerned with the other pleasures that are not bodily; for those who love stories and are fond of telling them, and spend their days on chance occurrences, we call babblers, but we do not call them licentious, nor those who grieve over money or friends. But temperance would be concerned with bodily pleasures, yet not all of these either; for those who rejoice in things seen through sight, such as colors, shapes, and painting, are called neither temperate nor licentious; and yet it would seem possible to rejoice in these also both as one ought, and to excess and deficiency. Similarly also in things concerning hearing; for no one calls those who rejoice excessively in songs or acting licentious, nor those who do so as they ought temperate. Nor those concerned with smell, except by accident; for we do not call those who rejoice in the smells of apples or roses or incense licentious, but rather those who rejoice in perfumes or dishes; for in these the licentious rejoice because through them a recollection of their desires occurs to them. And one might see even others, when they are hungry, rejoicing in the smells of foods; but to rejoice in such things is characteristic of a licentious person; for to him these are the objects of desire. Nor is there in other animals pleasure according to these senses except by accident. For dogs do not rejoice in the scent of hares but in the eating, though the scent produced the sensation; nor does the lion rejoice in the voice of the ox but in the eating; but that the ox is near he perceived through the voice, and so he appears to rejoice in this; similarly neither on seeing “a hind or a wild goat,” but because he will have food. And temperance and licentiousness are concerned with such pleasures as the other animals also share in, which is why they appear slavish and brutish; and these are touch and taste. But they appear to make little or no use of taste; for the function of taste is the judging of flavors, which is what those who test wines and season dishes do; but they do not very much rejoice in these, or at least the licentious do not, but in the enjoyment, which occurs entirely through touch both in food and in drink and in what are called sexual matters. Therefore a certain glutton wished that his throat might become longer than a crane’s, as rejoicing in the touch. Thus the sense through which licentiousness occurs is the most common; and it would seem justly to be a matter of reproach, because it belongs to us not in so far as we are human, but in so far as we are animals. To rejoice in such things, then, and to love them most of all is brutish. For even the most liberal of the pleasures through touch are excluded, such as those produced in gymnasia through rubbing and heat; for the touch of the licentious person is not concerned with the whole body, but with certain parts.