Nicomachean Ethics

Thus, that moral virtue is a mean, and in what way, and that it is a mean between two vices, one of excess and one of deficiency, and that it is such because it aims at the intermediate in passions and actions, has been sufficiently said. Therefore, it is also a difficult task to be good. For in each case, to find the mean is a difficult task, just as finding the center of a circle is not for everyone but for the one who knows. In the same way, to get angry is easy and in anyone’s power, as is giving money and spending it; but to do this to whom, and to what extent, and when, and for what purpose, and how, is no longer in everyone’s power nor is it easy. Wherefore doing this well is rare, praiseworthy, and beautiful. Therefore, he who aims at the mean must first depart from the more contrary extreme, just as Calypso also advises: “Keep the ship well away from this smoke and surf.” For of the extremes, one is more erroneous and the other less so. Since, then, to hit the mean is extremely difficult, we must, as they say, take the “second voyage” and choose the least of the evils; and this will be achieved most of all in the way we are describing. We must also observe the things to which we ourselves are easily carried away; for different people are by nature inclined toward different things. And this will become recognizable from the pleasure and pain that arise in us. But we must drag ourselves away in the opposite direction; for by pulling ourselves far away from error, we shall arrive at the mean, just as those do who straighten warped pieces of wood. In everything, however, we must especially guard against the pleasant and pleasure; for we do not judge it impartially. Therefore, what the elders of the people felt toward Helen, we too must feel toward pleasure, and in all cases repeat their words; for by dismissing it in this way, we shall err less. By doing these things, then, to speak in summary, we shall be best able to hit the mean. But this is perhaps difficult, especially in particular cases; for it is not easy to define how, and with whom, and on what grounds, and for how long a time one ought to be angry; for we too sometimes praise those who fall short and call them gentle, and sometimes we call those who get angry manly. But he who deviates only a little from the right course is not blamed, whether he inclines toward the more or toward the less, but he who deviates more; for he does not escape notice. But to what point and to what extent he is blameworthy is not easy to define by reason; for neither is any other of the things of perception; such matters lie among particulars, and the judgment lies in perception. This much, then, makes clear that the intermediate state is in all cases praiseworthy, but that we must sometimes incline toward the excess and sometimes toward the deficiency; for in this way we shall most easily hit the mean and the right course.