Application of the Mean to Specific Virtues — Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics Book 2 (7#1), Greek & English

§2.7#1

δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ μόνον καθόλου λέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς καθʼ ἕκαστα ἐφαρμόττειν. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς περὶ τὰς πράξεις λόγοις οἱ μὲν καθόλου κοινότεροί εἰσιν, οἱ δʼ ἐπὶ μέρους ἀληθινώτεροι· περὶ γὰρ τὰ καθʼ ἕκαστα αἱ πράξεις, δέον δʼ ἐπὶ τούτων συμφωνεῖν.¹ ληπτέον οὖν ταῦτα ἐκ τῆς διαγραφῆς. περὶ μὲν οὖν φόβους καὶ θάρρη ἀνδρεία μεσότης· τῶν δʼ ὑπερβαλλόντων² ὁ μὲν τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ ἀνώνυμος (πολλὰ δʼ ἐστὶν ἀνώνυμα), ὁ δʼ ἐν τῷ θαρρεῖν ὑπερβάλλων θρασύς, ὁ δʼ ἐν τῷ μὲν φοβεῖσθαι ὑπερβάλλων τῷ δὲ θαρρεῖν ἐλλείπων δειλός. περὶ ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας—οὐ πάσας, ἧττον δὲ †καὶ† περὶ τὰς λύπας³—μεσότης μὲν σωφροσύνη, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἀκολασία. ἐλλείποντες δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς οὐ πάνυ γίνονται· διόπερ οὐδʼ ὀνόματος τετυχήκασιν οὐδʼ οἱ τοιοῦτοι, ἔστωσαν δὲ ἀναίσθητοι. περὶ δὲ δόσιν χρημάτων καὶ λῆψιν μεσότης μὲν ἐλευθεριότης, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἀσωτία καὶ ἀνελευθερία. ἐναντίως δʼ ἐν αὐταῖς ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἄσωτος ἐν μὲν προέσει ὑπερβάλλει ἐν δὲ λήψει ἐλλείπει, ὁ δʼ ἀνελεύθερος ἐν μὲν λήψει ὑπερβάλλει ἐν δὲ προέσει ἐλλείπει. νῦν μὲν οὖν τύπῳ καὶ ἐπὶ κεφαλαίου λέγομεν, ἀρκούμενοι αὐτῷ τούτῳ· ὕστερον δὲ ἀκριβέστερον περὶ αὐτῶν διορισθήσεται. περὶ δὲ χρήματα καὶ ἄλλαι διαθέσεις εἰσί, μεσότης μὲν μεγαλοπρέπεια (ὁ γὰρ μεγαλοπρεπὴς διαφέρει ἐλευθερίου· ὃ μὲν γὰρ περὶ μεγάλα, ὃ δὲ περὶ μικρά), ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἀπειροκαλία καὶ βαναυσία, ἔλλειψις δὲ μικροπρέπεια· διαφέρουσι δʼ αὗται τῶν περὶ τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, πῇ δὲ διαφέρουσιν, ὕστερον ῥηθήσεται. περὶ δὲ τιμὴν καὶ ἀτιμίαν μεσότης μὲν μεγαλοψυχία, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ χαυνότης τις λεγομένη, ἔλλειψις δὲ μικροψυχία· ὡς δʼ ἐλέγομεν ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα,⁴ τῷ περὶ μικρὰ διαφέρουσαν, οὕτως ἔχει τις καὶ πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν, περὶ τιμὴν οὖσαν μεγάλην, αὐτὴ περὶ μικρὰν οὖσα· ἔστι γὰρ ὡς δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι τιμῆς καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἧττον, λέγεται δʼ ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων ταῖς ὀρέξεσι φιλότιμος, ὁ δʼ ἐλλείπων ἀφιλότιμος, ὁ δὲ μέσος ἀνώνυμος. ἀνώνυμοι δὲ καὶ αἱ διαθέσεις, πλὴν ἡ τοῦ φιλοτίμου φιλοτιμία. ὅθεν ἐπιδικάζονται οἱ ἄκροι τῆς μέσης χώρας·⁵ καὶ ἡμεῖς δὲ ἔστι μὲν ὅτε τὸν μέσον φιλότιμον καλοῦμεν ἔστι δʼ ὅτε ἀφιλότιμον, καὶ ἔστι μὲν ὅτε ἐπαινοῦμεν τὸν φιλότιμον ἔστι δʼ ὅτε τὸν ἀφιλότιμον. διὰ τίνα δʼ αἰτίαν τοῦτο ποιοῦμεν, ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς ῥηθήσεται· νῦν δὲ περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν λέγωμεν κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον.

But this must not only be stated in general terms, but must also be applied to the particular cases. For among the statements concerning actions, the general ones are more common, but those on particular points are more true; for actions are concerned with particulars, and we must agree with these. We must, therefore, take these from the table. Now, concerning fear and confidence, courage is the mean; of those who exceed, the one who exceeds in fearlessness is nameless (and many cases are nameless), while the one who exceeds in confidence is rash, and the one who exceeds in fear and is deficient in confidence is cowardly. Concerning pleasures and pains—not all of them, and to a lesser degree concerning pains—the mean is temperance, and the excess is self-indulgence. Those who are deficient concerning pleasures do not occur very much; wherefore also such people have not even received a name, but let them be called insensible. Concerning the giving and taking of wealth, the mean is liberality, and the excess and deficiency are prodigality and meanness. But people exceed and fall short in opposite ways in these; for the prodigal exceeds in giving but falls short in taking, while the mean person exceeds in taking but falls short in giving. For now, then, we speak in outline and summary, being content with just this; but later they will be defined more precisely. Concerning wealth there are also other dispositions: the mean is magnificence (for the magnificent man differs from the liberal man, since the former is concerned with great things, the latter with small ones), the excess is vulgarity and lack of taste, and the deficiency is pettiness; these differ from those concerned with liberality, and how they differ will be stated later. Concerning honor and dishonor, the mean is magnanimity, the excess is a certain vanity so-called, and the deficiency is pusillanimity; and just as we said liberality is related to magnificence, differing by being concerned with small things, so also is there a certain state related to magnanimity, which is concerned with great honor, while this state itself is concerned with small honor; for it is possible to desire honor as one ought, and more than one ought, and less, and the one who exceeds in his desires is called ambitious, the one who is deficient is called unambitious, while the intermediate one is nameless. The dispositions are also nameless, except that of the ambitious man, which is ambition. Whence the extremes claim the middle position; and we ourselves also sometimes call the intermediate person ambitious and sometimes unambitious, and sometimes we praise the ambitious person and sometimes the unambitious. For what reason we do this will be stated in the following; but now let us speak of the rest in the manner we have indicated.

Syntax notes5 items

1107a30δέον δʼ ἐπὶ τούτων συμφωνεῖν
The participle δέον is used impersonally (either as an omission of δέον ἐστί or as an accusative absolute) meaning 'it being necessary to agree.' It follows the causal clause περὶ γὰρ τὰ καθʼ ἕκαστα αἱ πράξεις (for actions are concerned with particulars) to express the necessity that general accounts must harmonize with concrete cases.
1107b1τῶν δʼ ὑπερβαλλόντων
A genitive phrase acting as a partitive genitive ('of those who exceed'), introducing the subjects of the subsequent clauses ὁ μὲν.... Because this excess refers to two different scales (fear and confidence), it is subdivided into different types of 'excessive' individuals.
1107b5ἧττον δὲ †καὶ† περὶ τὰς λύπας
This parenthetical clause explains Aristotle's ethical definition that temperance (σωφροσύνη) is primarily concerned with pleasures, and only to a lesser degree with pains. Despite the cruces around †καὶ† indicating textual corruption or doubt, the context yields the sense 'and to a lesser extent, indeed, concerning pains.'
1107b24ὡς δʼ ἐλέγομεν ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα
The phrase ἔχειν πρὸς... denotes 'to be related to...' Here it describes how liberality is related to magnificence, with the following dative phrase of respect/cause τῷ περὶ μικρὰ διαφέρουσαν ('differing by being concerned with small things') explaining the exact nature of this relationship.
1107b31ὅθεν ἐπιδικάζονται οἱ ἄκροι τῆς μέσης χώρας·
The verb ἐπιδικάζονται means 'to claim for oneself.' Because the middle position (μέση χώρα) has no distinct name, the extremes (οἱ ἄκροι) lay claim to this intermediate space as if it belonged to them or aligned with their respective characters.

Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-22)urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg010.humanitext-grc2:2.7#1