- Source
- Aristotle. Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea. Bywater, Ingram, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
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- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg010.humanitext-grc2:10.4#1
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-10-30
The author argues that whereas seeing and pleasure are complete at any time, motion is incomplete until it reaches its end, and differs in form depending on the time and parts, using building and locomotion (walking) as examples. Thus, pleasure is shown to be neither a motion nor a generation.
τί δʼ ἐστὶν ἢ ποῖόν τι, καταφανέστερον γένοιτʼ ἂν ἀπʼ ἀρχῆς ἀναλαβοῦσιν.1 δοκεῖ γὰρ ἡ μὲν ὅρασις καθʼ ὁντινοῦν χρόνον τελεία εἶναι· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐνδεὴς οὐδενὸς ὃ εἰς ὕστερον γινόμενον τελειώσει αὐτῆς τὸ εἶδος· τοιούτῳ δʼ ἔοικε καὶ ἡ ἡδονή. ὅλον γάρ τι ἐστί, καὶ κατʼ οὐδένα χρόνον λάβοι τις ἂν ἡδονὴν ἧς ἐπὶ πλείω χρόνον γινομένης τελειωθήσεται τὸ εἶδος.2 διόπερ οὐδὲ κίνησίς ἐστιν. ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ πᾶσα κίνησις καὶ τέλους τινός, οἷον ἡ οἰκοδομική, καὶ τελεία ὅταν ποιήσῃ οὗ ἐφίεται. ἢ ἐν ἅπαντι δὴ τῷ χρόνῳ ἢ τούτῳ. ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέρεσι καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ πᾶσαι ἀτελεῖς, καὶ ἕτεραι τῷ εἴδει τῆς ὅλης καὶ ἀλλήλων. ἡ γὰρ τῶν λίθων σύνθεσις ἑτέρα τῆς τοῦ κίονος ῥαβδώσεως, καὶ αὗται τῆς τοῦ ναοῦ ποιήσεως· καὶ ἡ μὲν τοῦ ναοῦ τελεία (οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἐνδεὴς πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον), ἡ δὲ τῆς κρηπῖδος καὶ τοῦ τριγλύφου ἀτελής· μέρους γὰρ ἑκατέρα. τῷ εἴδει οὖν διαφέρουσι, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ὁτῳοῦν χρόνῳ λαβεῖν κίνησιν τελείαν τῷ εἴδει, ἀλλʼ εἴπερ, ἐν τῷ ἅπαντι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ βαδίσεως καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν. εἰ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ φορὰ κίνησις πόθεν ποῖ,3 καὶ ταύτης διαφοραὶ κατʼ εἴδη, πτῆσις βάδισις ἅλσις καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. οὐ μόνον δʼ οὕτως, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ βαδίσει· τὸ γὰρ πόθεν ποῖ οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ καὶ ἐν τῷ μέρει, καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ μέρει καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ, οὐδὲ τὸ διεξιέναι τὴν γραμμὴν τήνδε κἀκείνην· οὐ μόνον γὰρ γραμμὴν διαπορεύεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τόπῳ οὖσαν, ἐν ἑτέρῳ δʼ αὕτη ἐκείνης. διʼ ἀκριβείας μὲν οὖν περὶ κινήσεως ἐν ἄλλοις εἴρηται, ἔοικε δʼ οὐκ ἐν ἅπαντι χρόνῳ τελεία εἶναι, ἀλλʼ αἱ πολλαὶ ἀτελεῖς καὶ διαφέρουσαι τῷ εἴδει, εἴπερ τὸ πόθεν ποῖ εἰδοποιόν. τῆς ἡδονῆς δʼ ἐν ὁτῳοῦν χρόνῳ τέλειον τὸ εἶδος. δῆλον οὖν ὡς ἕτεραί τʼ ἂν εἶεν ἀλλήλων, καὶ τῶν ὅλων τι καὶ τελείων ἡ ἡδονή. δόξειε δʼ ἂν τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι κινεῖσθαι μὴ ἐν χρόνῳ, ἥδεσθαι δέ· τὸ γὰρ ἐν τῷ νῦν4 ὅλον τι. ἐκ τούτων δὲ δῆλον καὶ ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγουσι κίνησιν ἢ γένεσιν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν. οὐ γὰρ πάντων ταῦτα λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τῶν μεριστῶν καὶ μὴ ὅλων· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁράσεώς ἐστι γένεσις οὐδὲ στιγμῆς οὐδὲ μονάδος, οὐδὲ τούτων οὐθὲν κίνησις οὐδὲ γένεσις· οὐδὲ δὴ ἡδονῆς· ὅλον γάρ τι.
What it is or what kind of thing it is would become clearer if we take it up from the beginning. For seeing seems to be complete at any time whatsoever; for it is not lacking in anything which, coming into being later, will complete its form. And pleasure seems to be like this. For it is a sort of whole, and at no time could one take a pleasure of which the form will be completed if it occurs over a longer time. Therefore, it is not a motion either. For every motion is in time and is directed toward some end—as is the art of building, for instance—and is complete when it has made what it aims at. It is complete either in the whole of the time, or in this specific time. But in the parts of the time, all motions are incomplete, and different in form from the whole motion and from one another. For the putting together of stones is different from the fluting of the column, and these are different from the making of the temple; and while the making of the temple is complete (for it lacks nothing in relation to the proposed end), that of the foundation and of the triglyph is incomplete (for each is of a part). So they differ in form, and it is not possible in any random time to find a motion complete in form, but, if at all, in the whole time. And similarly also in the case of walking and the rest. For if locomotion is motion from somewhere to somewhere, and there are specific differences of this, such as flying, walking, leaping, and the like. And not only is it so in this way, but also in walking itself; for the “from where to where” is not the same in the stadium and in a part of it, and in one part and in another, nor is traversing this line and that line the same; for one does not only traverse a line, but one which is in a place, and this line is in a different place from that one. Now, precise things about motion have been said in other works, but it seems not to be complete in any random time, but the many motions are incomplete and different in form, if indeed the “from where to where” is form-determining. But the form of pleasure is complete in any time whatsoever. Therefore it is clear that they would be different from one another, and that pleasure is one of the things that are whole and complete. And this would seem to be so also from the fact that it is not possible to move without time, but to feel pleasure is possible; for what is in the “now” is a sort of whole. And from these things it is also clear that they do not speak correctly when they say that pleasure is a motion or a generation. For these are not predicated of all things, but of things that are divisible and are not wholes; for neither is there a generation of seeing, nor of a point, nor of a monad, nor is any of these a motion or a generation; nor indeed of pleasure; for it is a sort of whole.
- 1174a13ἀπʼ ἀρχῆς ἀναλαβοῦσιν
The dative plural participle ἀναλαβοῦσιν agrees with an implied dative of interest/reference (such as "for us") which functions as the logical subject of the action in a potential optative clause (γένοιτ’ ἄν). It should be understood as: "it would become clearer [to us] if we take it up from the beginning."
- 1174a18ἧς ἐπὶ πλείω χρόνον γινομένης τελειωθήσεται τὸ εἶδος
The relative pronoun ἧς refers to the antecedent ἡδονήν and is a possessive genitive modifying τὸ εἶδος ("its form"). The participle γινομένης is a circumstantial/conditional participle agreeing with ἧς. Thus, the whole clause means "a pleasure, the form of which will be completed if it occurs over a longer time." Although it could theoretically be taken as a genitive absolute ("when it occurs..."), it is more naturally construed as a relative pronoun with an agreeing participle.
- 1174a29εἰ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ φορὰ κίνησις πόθεν ποῖ
An instance of anacoluthon (grammatical inconsistency). The conditional clause starting with εἰ γάρ ἐστιν... lacks an explicit apodosis (main clause), and the text moves directly to the next statement, οὐ μόνον δ’ οὕτως.... In context, one must supply an implicit conclusion such as "(then it must be incomplete in a part of the time)."
- 1174b9τὸ γὰρ ἐν τῷ νῦν
This expression refers to what is in the "now" (instant). Unlike time (χρόνος), which has duration and is divisible, the "now" (νῦν) has no duration and is indivisible. Based on Aristotelian physics, where an instant is not a part of time but is complete in itself, this serves as the ground for asserting that pleasure is complete at any instant (ὅλον τι) without requiring temporal accumulation.