- Source
- Aristotle. Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea. Bywater, Ingram, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0086.tlg010.humanitext-grc2:1.9
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-10-27
The author examines whether happiness is a god-given gift or acquired through learning and practice, arguing that it requires both complete virtue and a complete life. Consequently, animals and children cannot be deemed happy, as illustrated by the tragic fate of Priam in his old age.
ὅθεν καὶ ἀπορεῖται πότερόν ἐστι μαθητὸν ἢ ἐθιστὸν ἢ καὶ ἄλλως πως ἀσκητόν, ἢ κατά τινα θείαν μοῖραν ἢ καὶ διὰ τύχην παραγίνεται. εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλλο τί ἐστι θεῶν δώρημα ἀνθρώποις, εὔλογον καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν θεόσδοτον εἶναι, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὅσῳ βέλτιστον.1 ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ἴσως ἄλλης ἂν εἴη σκέψεως οἰκειότερον, φαίνεται δὲ κἂν εἰ2 μὴ θεόπεμπτός ἐστιν ἀλλὰ διʼ ἀρετὴν καί τινα μάθησιν ἢ ἄσκησιν παραγίνεται, τῶν θειοτάτων εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἆθλον καὶ τέλος ἄριστον εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ θεῖόν τι καὶ μακάριον. εἴη δʼ ἂν καὶ πολύκοινον· δυνατὸν γὰρ ὑπάρξαι πᾶσι τοῖς μὴ πεπηρωμένοις πρὸς ἀρετὴν διά τινος μαθήσεως καὶ ἐπιμελείας. εἰ δʼ ἐστὶν οὕτω βέλτιον ἢ τὸ διὰ τύχην εὐδαιμονεῖν, εὔλογον ἔχειν οὕτως,3 εἴπερ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ὡς οἷόν τε κάλλιστα ἔχειν, οὕτω πέφυκεν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ κατὰ τέχνην καὶ πᾶσαν αἰτίαν, καὶ μάλιστα τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην. τὸ δὲ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον ἐπιτρέψαι τύχῃ λίαν πλημμελὲς ἂν εἴη. συμφανὲς δʼ ἐστὶ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τὸ ζητούμενον· εἴρηται γὰρ ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατʼ ἀρετὴν ποιά τις. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν ἀναγκαῖον, τὰ δὲ συνεργὰ καὶ χρήσιμα πέφυκεν ὀργανικῶς. ὁμολογούμενα δὲ ταῦτʼ ἂν εἴη καὶ τοῖς ἐν ἀρχῇ· τὸ γὰρ τῆς πολιτικῆς τέλος ἄριστον ἐτίθεμεν, αὕτη δὲ πλείστην ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖται τοῦ ποιούς τινας καὶ ἀγαθοὺς τοὺς πολίτας ποιῆσαι καὶ πρακτικοὺς τῶν καλῶν. εἰκότως οὖν οὔτε βοῦν οὔτε ἵππον οὔτε ἄλλο τῶν ζῴων οὐδὲν εὔδαιμον λέγομεν· οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν οἷόν τε κοινωνῆσαι τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας. διὰ ταύτην δὲ τὴν αἰτίαν οὐδὲ παῖς εὐδαίμων ἐστίν· οὔπω γὰρ πρακτικὸς τῶν τοιούτων διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν· οἱ δὲ λεγόμενοι διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα μακαρίζονται. δεῖ γάρ, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, καὶ ἀρετῆς τελείας καὶ βίου τελείου. πολλαὶ γὰρ μεταβολαὶ γίνονται καὶ παντοῖαι τύχαι κατὰ τὸν βίον, καὶ ἐνδέχεται τὸν μάλιστʼ εὐθηνοῦντα μεγάλαις συμφοραῖς περιπεσεῖν ἐπὶ γήρως, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς Τρωικοῖς περὶ Πριάμου μυθεύεται· τὸν δὲ τοιαύταις χρησάμενον τύχαις καὶ τελευτήσαντα ἀθλίως οὐδεὶς εὐδαιμονίζει.
Hence the question is also raised whether happiness is something that can be learned, or acquired by habituation, or cultivated by some other practice, or whether it comes to us by some divine dispensation or even by chance. Now, if there is any other gift of the gods to human beings, it is reasonable that happiness also should be god-given, and most of all human things in as much as it is the best. But this indeed would perhaps be more appropriate for another inquiry; yet it appears that even if it is not sent by the gods but comes to us through virtue and some learning or training, it is among the most divine things. For the prize and end of virtue appears to be the best thing, something divine and blessed. And it would also be widely shared; for it is possible, through some learning and care, for it to belong to all who have not been incapacitated for virtue. And if it is better to be happy in this way than by chance, it is reasonable that it should be so, since things in accordance with nature are by nature in the finest possible state, and similarly things in accordance with art and every cause, and especially the best cause. But to entrust the greatest and finest thing to chance would be exceedingly incongruous. What we are seeking is also clear from our definition; for happiness has been said to be a certain activity of the soul in accordance with virtue. And of the remaining goods, some must be present as necessary conditions, while others are by nature cooperative and useful as instruments. And these views would also agree with what we said at the start; for we posited the end of political science as the best end, and this science takes the greatest care to make the citizens of a certain character, namely, good and capable of performing noble actions. Naturally, then, we do not call either an ox or a horse or any other animal happy; for none of them is able to share in such activity. And for this same reason, a child is not happy either; for he is not yet capable of performing such actions because of his age, and those who are called so are congratulated on account of their hope. For there is need, as we said, of both complete virtue and a complete life. For many changes and all kinds of fortune occur during life, and it is possible for the most prosperous person to fall into great misfortunes in old age, as is told in the Trojan stories about Priam; and no one calls happy a person who has met with such fortunes and died wretchedly.
- 1099b10ὅσῳ βέλτιστον
The dative of degree of difference ὅσῳ used to express a correlation ('by as much as'). It establishes a proportional relationship: since happiness is the best of human goods, it is most likely to be god-given. The corresponding demonstrative (τοσούτῳ) is omitted.
- 1099b10κἂν εἰ
A contraction of καὶ ἂν εἰ, or simply καὶ εἰ ('even if') combined with the particle ἄν anticipating the potential optative of the main clause (ἂν εἴη). Here it takes the present indicative ἐστιν to express a factual concession ('even if it is not sent by the gods').
- 1099b20εὔλογον ἔχειν οὕτως
The impersonal adjective εὔλογον ('it is reasonable') governing an accusative with infinitive construction, in which the subject accusative (such as τὸ πρᾶγμα) is omitted. The idiom ἔχειν οὕτως is used intransitively to mean 'to be so', referring to the state where happiness is acquired by learning and care rather than by chance.