Nicomachean Ethics

​or in some way preventive of their contraries, are spoken of because of these, and in another way. It is clear, then, that things good would be spoken of in two ways, and some in themselves, others because of these. Having separated, then, things good in themselves from those that are useful, let us examine whether they are spoken of according to a single Idea. But what kind of things would one place as good in themselves? Or is it all those which are pursued even when isolated, such as thinking, seeing, certain pleasures, and honors? For even if we pursue these also for the sake of something else, one would nevertheless place them among things good in themselves. Or is there nothing else except the Idea? In that case, the Form will be empty. But if these also are among things good in themselves, the definition of the good will have to show itself as the same in all of them, just as the definition of whiteness does in snow and in white lead. But the definitions of honor, wisdom, and pleasure are distinct and different in this very respect, insofar as they are goods. Therefore, the good is not something common according to a single Idea. But how then is it spoken of? For it does not seem like things homonymous by chance. Is it by being from one source, or by all contributing to one end, or rather by analogy? For as sight is in the body, so intellect is in the soul, and indeed other things in other things. But perhaps we should let these things go for now; for to treat them with precision would be more appropriate to another branch of philosophy. And similarly also concerning the Idea; for even if there is some single good predicated in common, or something separate itself in itself, it is clear that it would not be practicable or attainable by man. But as it is, something of this kind is what is being sought. Yet perhaps it might seem to someone that it is better to know it with a view to those goods that are attainable and practicable; for, having this as a pattern, we shall know better the things that are good for us, and if we know them, we shall attain them. Now, this argument has indeed a certain plausibility, but it seems to clash with the sciences; for all of them, while aiming at some good and seeking to supply what is lacking, pass over the knowledge of it. And yet, it is not reasonable that all craftsmen should be ignorant of so great an aid, and not even seek it. It is also hard to see what benefit a weaver or a carpenter will get for his own art from knowing this very good itself, or how one who has contemplated the Idea itself will be a better doctor or general. For the doctor does not seem to examine even health in this way, but rather the health of man, or perhaps even more that of this particular person; for he heals individually. And let so much be said about these things.