Nicomachean Ethics

​The idea that the fortunes of descendants and of all friends contribute nothing at all seems excessively unfriendly and contrary to common beliefs. But since what happens is numerous and exhibits all kinds of differences, some affecting them more and others less, to distinguish them individually seems long and endless; but a general and outline statement would perhaps be sufficient. If then, just as among the misfortunes concerning oneself, some have a certain weight and influence on life while others seem lighter, so too it is with those concerning all one’s friends in like manner; and if it makes a much greater difference that each of these experiences happens to the living or to the dead, than that the lawless and terrible deeds in tragedies are presupposed or enacted on stage, then we must take this difference also into account, or rather, perhaps, the puzzle concerning the deceased, whether they share in any good or its opposite. For it seems from these considerations that even if anything at all reaches them, whether good or its opposite, it is something faint and small, either absolutely or to them; or if not, at least of such a size and kind as not to make happy those who are not, nor to rob those who are of their blessedness. Therefore, the well-being of friends does seem to contribute something to the deceased, and similarly their ill-being, but of such a nature and degree as neither to make the happy unhappy, nor to cause any other such effect.

These matters having been defined, let us consider whether happiness is one of the things to be praised or rather one of the things to be honored; for it is clear that it is not, at least, one of the capacities. Now, everything praised seems to be praised for being of a certain character and for standing in a certain relation to something. For we praise the just and the courageous person, and generally the good person and virtue itself, because of their actions and works; and we praise the strong person and the runner and each of the others for being naturally of a certain kind and for standing in a certain relation to something good and serious. This is clear also from praises concerning the gods; for they appear ridiculous when referred to us, and this happens because praise occurs through reference, as we said. If praise is of such things, it is clear that there is no praise of the best things, but rather something greater and better, as indeed appears to be the case; for we call the gods blessed and happy, and also the most godlike of men. Similarly too with goods; for no one praises happiness as they do justice, but rather blesses it as something more divine and better. Eudoxus too seems to have advocated well for pleasure’s claim to the first prize; for he thought that the fact that it is not praised, though it is a good, indicates that it is superior to the things praised, and that God and the good are of this character; for it is to these that all other things are referred. For praise belongs to virtue; for it is from this that we are able to perform noble deeds; while encomiums are for works, whether of the body or of the soul. But these matters are perhaps more appropriate to be worked out in detail by those who have labored on the subject of encomiums; but for us, it is clear from what has been said that happiness belongs to the things that are honored and complete. This seems to be so also because it is a starting point; for it is for the sake of this that we all do all other things, and the starting point and cause of goods we posit as something honorable and divine.