- Source
- Platonis Opera Tomus IV: Tetralogia VIII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg030.humanitext-grc2:4.438
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-10-28
Socrates anticipates the objection that all desires are for "good" things, and uses the logic of relative terms to explain that thirst itself is simply for drink itself.
μήτοι τις, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἀσκέπτους ἡμᾶς ὄντας θορυβήσῃ,1 ὡς οὐδεὶς ποτοῦ ἐπιθυμεῖ ἀλλὰ χρηστοῦ ποτοῦ, καὶ οὐ σίτου ἀλλὰ χρηστοῦ σίτου. πάντες γὰρ ἄρα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν· εἰ οὖν ἡ δίψα ἐπιθυμία ἐστί, χρηστοῦ ἂν εἴη εἴτε πώματος εἴτε ἄλλου ὅτου ἐστὶν ἐπιθυμία, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι οὕτω. ἴσως γὰρ ἄν, ἔφη, δοκοῖ τι λέγειν ὁ ταῦτα λέγων. ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὅσα γʼ ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα οἷα εἶναί του,2 τὰ μὲν ποιὰ ἄττα ποιοῦ τινός ἐστιν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, τὰ δʼ αὐτὰ ἕκαστα αὐτοῦ ἑκάστου μόνον. οὐκ ἔμαθον, ἔφη. οὐκ ἔμαθες, ἔφην, ὅτι τὸ μεῖζον τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν οἷον τινὸς εἶναι μεῖζον; πάνυ γε. οὐκοῦν τοῦ ἐλάττονος; ναί. τὸ δέ γε πολὺ μεῖζον πολὺ ἐλάττονος. ἦ γάρ; ναί. ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ τὸ ποτὲ μεῖζον ποτὲ ἐλάττονος, καὶ τὸ ἐσόμενον μεῖζον ἐσομένου ἐλάττονος; ἀλλὰ τί μήν; ἦ δʼ ὅς. καὶ τὰ πλείω δὴ πρὸς τὰ ἐλάττω καὶ τὰ διπλάσια πρὸς τὰ ἡμίσεα καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ αὖ βαρύτερα πρὸς κουφότερα καὶ θάττω πρὸς τὰ βραδύτερα, καὶ ἔτι γε τὰ θερμὰ πρὸς τὰ ψυχρὰ καὶ πάντα τὰ τούτοις ὅμοια ἆρʼ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει; πάνυ μὲν οὖν. τί δὲ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας; οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος; ἐπιστήμη μὲν αὐτὴ μαθήματος αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν3 ἢ ὅτου δὴ δεῖ θεῖναι τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἐπιστήμη δέ τις καὶ ποιά τις ποιοῦ τινος καὶ τινός. λέγω δὲ τὸ τοιόνδε· οὐκ ἐπειδὴ οἰκίας ἐργασίας ἐπιστήμη ἐγένετο, διήνεγκε τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν, ὥστε οἰκοδομικὴ κληθῆναι; τί μήν; ἆρʼ οὐ τῷ ποιά τις εἶναι, οἵα ἑτέρα οὐδεμία τῶν ἄλλων; ναί. οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ ποιοῦ τινος, καὶ αὐτὴ ποιά τις ἐγένετο; καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι οὕτω τέχναι τε καὶ ἐπιστῆμαι; ἔστιν οὕτω. τοῦτο τοίνυν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, φάθι με τότε βούλεσθαι λέγειν, εἰ ἄρα νῦν ἔμαθες, ὅτι ὅσα ἐστὶν οἷα εἶναί του, αὐτὰ μὲν μόνα αὐτῶν μόνων ἐστίν, τῶν δὲ ποιῶν τινων ποιὰ ἄττα. καὶ οὔ τι λέγω, ὡς, οἵων ἂν ᾖ, τοιαῦτα καὶ ἔστιν,4 ὡς ἄρα καὶ τῶν ὑγιεινῶν καὶ νοσωδῶν ἡ ἐπιστήμη ὑγιεινὴ καὶ νοσώδης καὶ τῶν κακῶν καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν κακὴ καὶ ἀγαθή· ἀλλʼ ἐπειδὴ οὐκ αὐτοῦ οὗπερ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἐγένετο ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλὰ ποιοῦ τινος, τοῦτο δʼ ἦν ὑγιεινὸν καὶ νοσῶδες, ποιὰ δή τις συνέβη καὶ αὐτὴ γενέσθαι, καὶ τοῦτο αὐτὴν ἐποίησεν μηκέτι ἐπιστήμην ἁπλῶς καλεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ποιοῦ τινος προσγενομένου ἰατρικήν. ἔμαθον, ἔφη, καί μοι δοκεῖ οὕτως ἔχειν.
” Let no one,” I said, “disturb us, because we are off our guard, by arguing that no one desires drink, but rather good drink, and not food, but good food. For everyone, they say, desires good things; if then thirst is a desire, it would be for a good drink or for whatever else it is a desire for, and likewise with the other desires.” “Indeed,” he said, “the person who says this might seem to have a point.” “But nevertheless,” I said, “in my opinion, in the case of all things that are of such a nature as to be related to something, those which are of a particular quality are related to a particular quality, while each of them by itself is related only to each thing by itself.” “I do not understand,” he said. “Do you not understand,” I said, “that the greater is of such a nature as to be greater than something?” “Certainly.” “Is it not than the less?” “Yes.” “And the much greater than the much less. Is that not so?” “Yes.” “And the once greater than the once less, and the future greater than the future less?” “Of course,” he said. ”And the more, too, is related to the fewer, and the double to the half, and all such things; and again, the heavier to the lighter, and the swifter to the slower; and further, the hot to the cold, and all things similar to these. Is this not how they are?” “Most certainly.” “And what about the sciences? Is it not the same way? Science itself is science of learning itself, or of whatever else science ought to be set over, but a particular science of a particular quality is of a particular thing of a particular quality.” ”What I mean is something like this: when a science of making a house arose, did it not differ from the other sciences, so that it was called architecture?” “Of course.” “Was it not because it was of a particular quality, such as no other of the remaining sciences was?” “Yes.” “Therefore, because it was of a particular quality of thing, did it not also itself become of a particular quality? And is this not the case with the other arts and sciences?” “It is so.” “This then,” I said, “you must say I wanted to mean earlier, if indeed you now understand, that all things that are of such a nature as to be related to something, themselves by themselves are related to themselves by themselves, but those of a particular quality are related to things of a particular quality.” ”And I do not mean that they are of the same quality as the things they are related to, as if the science of the healthy and the diseased were itself healthy and diseased, and that of the bad and the good were itself bad and good. But because it did not become a science of that itself of which science is, but of a particular quality of thing—and this was the healthy and the diseased—it happened that it itself became of a particular quality, and this caused it to be called no longer simply science, but medicine, by the addition of the particular quality.” “I understand,” he said, “and I think it is so.”
- 438aμήτοι τις ... θορυβήσῃ
An independent subjunctive with the negative particle μή, expressing a strong prohibition or warning in the third person ("let no one disturb us").
- 438aὅσα γʼ ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα οἷα εἶναί του
An expression referring to relative terms. The indefinite pronoun του is in the genitive, with εἶναι expressing the relation "to be of/related to something." It literally means "as many things as are of such a nature as to belong to/be of something."
- 438cἐπιστήμη μὲν αὐτὴ μαθήματος αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν
The genitive μαθήματος αὐτοῦ ("of learning itself") functions as an objective genitive dependent on the subject ἐπιστήμη αὐτή ("science itself"), illustrating the relationship between two entities at their highest level of abstraction.
- 438eκαὶ οὔ τι λέγω, ὡς, οἵων ἂν ᾖ, τοιαῦτα καὶ ἔστιν
A correlative structure within the ὡς clause, where the relative clause οἵων ἂν ᾖ (with general ἄν and the subjunctive) corresponds to the demonstrative τοιαῦτα. Socrates clarifies that the science does not acquire the exact same qualities as its objects (e.g., the science of the diseased is not itself diseased).