- Source
- Platonis Opera Tomus IV: Tetralogia VIII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg030.humanitext-grc2:10.607-10.608
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-10-29
Socrates argues that imitative poetry must be excluded from the well-governed city unless a rational defense of its utility is provided, and then transitions the discussion to the immortality of the soul and the ultimate rewards of virtue.
εἰ δὲ τὴν ἡδυσμένην Μοῦσαν παραδέξῃ ἐν μέλεσιν ἢ ἔπεσιν, ἡδονή σοι καὶ λύπη ἐν τῇ πόλει βασιλεύσετον ἀντὶ νόμου τε καὶ τοῦ κοινῇ ἀεὶ δόξαντος εἶναι βελτίστου λόγου. ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη. ταῦτα δή, ἔφην, ἀπολελογήσθω ἡμῖν ἀναμνησθεῖσιν1 περὶ ποιήσεως, ὅτι εἰκότως ἄρα τότε αὐτὴν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἀπεστέλλομεν τοιαύτην οὖσαν· ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἡμᾶς ᾕρει. προσείπωμεν δὲ αὐτῇ, μὴ καί τινα σκληρότητα ἡμῶν καὶ ἀγροικίαν καταγνῷ, ὅτι παλαιὰ μέν τις διαφορὰ φιλοσοφίᾳ τε καὶ ποιητικῇ· καὶ γὰρ ἡ "λακέρυζα πρὸς δεσπόταν κύων" ἐκείνη "κραυγάζουσα" καὶ "μέγας ἐν ἀφρόνων κενεαγορίαισι" καὶ ὁ "τῶν διασόφων ὄχλος κρατῶν" καὶ οἱ "λεπτῶς μεριμνῶντες", ὅτι ἄρα "πένονται", καὶ ἄλλα μυρία σημεῖα παλαιᾶς ἐναντιώσεως τούτων. ὅμως δὲ εἰρήσθω ὅτι ἡμεῖς γε, εἴ τινα ἔχοι λόγον εἰπεῖν ἡ πρὸς ἡδονὴν ποιητικὴ καὶ ἡ μίμησις, ὡς χρὴ αὐτὴν εἶναι ἐν πόλει εὐνομουμένῃ, ἅσμενοι ἂν καταδεχοίμεθα, ὡς σύνισμέν γε ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς κηλουμένοις ὑπʼ αὐτῆς· ἀλλὰ γὰρ τὸ δοκοῦν ἀληθὲς οὐχ ὅσιον προδιδόναι. ἦ γάρ, ὦ φίλε, οὐ κηλῇ ὑπʼ αὐτῆς καὶ σύ, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν διʼ Ὁμήρου θεωρῇς αὐτήν; πολύ γε. οὐκοῦν δικαία ἐστὶν οὕτω κατιέναι, ἀπολογησαμένη ἐν μέλει ἤ τινι ἄλλῳ μέτρῳ; πάνυ μὲν οὖν. δοῖμεν δέ γέ που ἂν καὶ τοῖς προστάταις αὐτῆς, ὅσοι μὴ ποιητικοί, φιλοποιηταὶ δέ, ἄνευ μέτρου λόγον ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς εἰπεῖν, ὡς οὐ μόνον ἡδεῖα ἀλλὰ καὶ ὠφελίμη πρὸς τὰς πολιτείας καὶ τὸν βίον τὸν ἀνθρώπινόν ἐστιν· καὶ εὐμενῶς ἀκουσόμεθα. κερδανοῦμεν γάρ που ἐὰν μὴ μόνον ἡδεῖα φανῇ ἀλλὰ καὶ ὠφελίμη. πῶς δʼ οὐ μέλλομεν, ἔφη, κερδαίνειν;
But if you receive the sweetened Muse in lyric songs or epic verses, pleasure and pain will reign as kings in your city instead of law and that which has always been judged in common to be the best reason. Most true, he said. ”Let these things,” I said, “be our defense, now that we have reminded ourselves concerning poetry, that we were then reasonable in banishing her from the city, she being such as she is; for the argument directed us. But let us tell her, lest she should condemn us for a certain harshness and rusticity, that there is an ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry. For indeed, there is that ‘yelping hound baying at her master,’ and ‘great in the empty babbles of fools,’ and the ‘crowd of over-wise heads dominating,’ and the ‘subtle thinkers’ who are after all ‘impoverished,’ and ten thousand other signs of this ancient opposition between them. All the same, let it be said that if the poetry directed toward pleasure and imitation can state some argument showing that she ought to exist in a well-governed city, we would gladly receive her back, since we are conscious of being charmed by her ourselves; but indeed, it is not pious to betray what seems to be the truth. For are you not yourself, my friend, charmed by her, and especially when you contemplate her through Homer? Very much so. Is she not, then, just to return in this way, after having made her defense in song or in some other meter? Quite so. And we would surely also allow her patrons—those who are not poets themselves but lovers of poetry—to speak a prose defense on her behalf, showing that she is not only pleasant but also beneficial to constitutions and human life; and we shall listen benevolently. For we shall surely gain if she is shown to be not only pleasant but also beneficial. How could we not gain? he said.
εἰ δέ γε μή, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε, ὥσπερ οἱ ποτέ του ἐρασθέντες, ἐὰν ἡγήσωνται μὴ ὠφέλιμον εἶναι τὸν ἔρωτα, βίᾳ μέν, ὅμως δὲ ἀπέχονται, καὶ ἡμεῖς οὕτως, διὰ τὸν ἐγγεγονότα μὲν ἔρωτα τῆς τοιαύτης ποιήσεως ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν καλῶν πολιτειῶν τροφῆς, εὖνοι μὲν ἐσόμεθα φανῆναι αὐτὴν2 ὡς βελτίστην καὶ ἀληθεστάτην, ἕως δʼ ἂν μὴ οἵα τʼ ᾖ ἀπολογήσασθαι, ἀκροασόμεθʼ αὐτῆς ἐπᾴδοντες ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, ὃν λέγομεν, καὶ ταύτην τὴν ἐπῳδήν, εὐλαβούμενοι πάλιν ἐμπεσεῖν εἰς τὸν παιδικόν τε καὶ τὸν τῶν πολλῶν ἔρωτα. ᾀσόμεθα δʼ οὖν ὡς οὐ σπουδαστέον3 ἐπὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ποιήσει ὡς ἀληθείας τε ἁπτομένῃ καὶ σπουδαίᾳ, ἀλλʼ εὐλαβητέον αὐτὴν ὂν τῷ ἀκροωμένῳ, περὶ τῆς ἐν αὑτῷ πολιτείας δεδιότι, καὶ νομιστέα ἅπερ εἰρήκαμεν περὶ ποιήσεως. παντάπασιν, ἦ δʼ ὅς, σύμφημι. μέγας γάρ, ἔφην, ὁ ἀγών, ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων, μέγας, οὐχ ὅσος δοκεῖ, τὸ χρηστὸν ἢ κακὸν γενέσθαι, ὥστε οὔτε τιμῇ ἐπαρθέντα οὔτε χρήμασιν οὔτε ἀρχῇ οὐδεμιᾷ οὐδέ γε ποιητικῇ ἄξιον ἀμελῆσαι δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης ἀρετῆς. σύμφημί σοι, ἔφη, ἐξ ὧν διεληλύθαμεν· οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ἄλλον ὁντινοῦν. καὶ μήν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τά γε μέγιστα ἐπίχειρα ἀρετῆς καὶ προκείμενα ἆθλα οὐ διεληλύθαμεν. ἀμήχανόν τι, ἔφη, λέγεις μέγεθος, εἰ τῶν εἰρημένων μείζω ἐστὶν ἄλλα. τί δʼ ἄν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἔν γε ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ μέγα γένοιτο; πᾶς γὰρ οὗτός γε ὁ ἐκ παιδὸς μέχρι πρεσβύτου χρόνος πρὸς πάντα ὀλίγος πού τις ἂν εἴη. οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. τί οὖν; οἴει ἀθανάτῳ πράγματι ὑπὲρ τοσούτου δεῖν χρόνου ἐσπουδακέναι, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ὑπὲρ τοῦ παντός; οἶμαι ἔγωγʼ, ἔφη· ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο λέγεις; οὐκ ᾔσθησαι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὅτι ἀθάνατος ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ οὐδέποτε ἀπόλλυται; καὶ ὃς ἐμβλέψας μοι καὶ θαυμάσας εἶπε· μὰ Δίʼ, οὐκ ἔγωγε· σὺ δὲ τοῦτʼ ἔχεις λέγειν; εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ γʼ, ἔφην. οἶμαι δὲ καὶ σύ· οὐδὲν γὰρ χαλεπόν. ἔμοιγʼ, ἔφη· σοῦ δʼ ἂν ἡδέως ἀκούσαιμι τὸ οὐ χαλεπὸν τοῦτο. ἀκούοις ἄν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ. λέγε μόνον, ἔφη. ἀγαθόν τι, εἶπον, καὶ κακὸν καλεῖς; ἔγωγε. ἆρʼ οὖν ὥσπερ ἐγὼ περὶ αὐτῶν διανοῇ; τὸ ποῖον; τὸ μὲν ἀπολλύον καὶ διαφθεῖρον πᾶν τὸ κακὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ σῷζον καὶ ὠφελοῦν τὸ ἀγαθόν. ἔγωγʼ, ἔφη.
But if not, my dear companion, just as those who have once fallen in love with someone, if they judge that their love is not beneficial, hold themselves back, even by force but all the same holding back, so we too, because of the love for such poetry that has been implanted in us by the nurture of our fine constitutions, will be well-disposed to have her appear as excellent and most true; but as long as she is unable to make her defense, we shall listen to her while chanting to ourselves this argument which we speak and this incantation, being careful not to fall back again into that childish love, which is the love of the many. We shall chant, then, that one must not take such poetry seriously, as if it were touching upon truth and were a serious matter, but that the listener must be careful, fearing for the constitution within himself, and must hold to what we have said about poetry. By all means, he said, I agree. For great is the struggle, my dear Glaucon, great, not as it seems, to become a good or a bad man, so that it is not right to neglect justice and the rest of virtue, either under the influence of honor, or money, or any office, or indeed, poetry. I agree with you, he said, from what we have gone through; and I think anyone else whomsoever would too. ”And yet,” I said, “we have not gone through the greatest rewards of virtue and the prizes laid up for her.” You speak of an inconceivable magnitude, he said, if there are other things greater than those already mentioned. For what, I said, could become great in a short time? For indeed, this whole time from childhood to old age would surely be some small thing compared to the whole. Nothing at all, indeed, he said. What then? Do you think that an immortal thing ought to have been serious for the sake of so short a time, and not for the sake of the whole? I certainly think so, he said; but why do you say this? Have you not perceived, I said, that our soul is immortal and never perishes? And he, looking at me and wondering, said: ‘By Zeus, not I! Are you really able to declare this?’ If I am not mistaken, I said. And I think you can too; for it is not at all difficult. It is to me, he said; but I would gladly hear from you this ‘not difficult’ matter. You shall hear it, I said. Only speak, he said. Do you call something good, I said, and something bad? I do. ”Do you, then, think about them in the same way as I do? What sort of way? That which destroys and corrupts everything is the bad, and that which preserves and benefits is the good. Yes, he said.”
- 607bἀπολελογήσθω ἡμῖν ἀναμνησθεῖσιν
The third-person singular perfect passive imperative ἀπολελογήσθω takes the dative ἡμῖν ἀναμνησθεῖσιν as the dative of agent ('let it have been defended by us who have reminded ourselves'). The ὅτι clause functions as the subject of this passive verb.
- 608aεὖνοι μὲν ἐσόμεθα φανῆναι αὐτὴν
The infinitive φανῆναι depends on the predicate adjective εὖνοι (well-disposed), expressing the object of their goodwill ('we shall be well-disposed for her to appear...'). The accusative αὐτὴν functions as the subject of this infinitive.
- 608aὡς οὐ σπουδαστέον
The ὡς clause is the object of the preceding verb ᾀσόμεθα (we shall chant/assert). Within it, σπουδαστέον is an impersonal verbal adjective in -τέος expressing necessity or obligation ('one must not take seriously').
Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-23) · Revision history (1, latest 2026-09-21)
- 2026-09-21 AI review — translation 1
