- Source
- Platonis Opera Tomus IV: Tetralogia VIII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg030.humanitext-grc2:1.345-1.346
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-10-29
Socrates opposes Thrasymachus' claim that injustice is more profitable than justice, arguing through analogies with medicine, shepherding, and the art of wages that every art and rule aims at the benefit of the ruled (the weaker) rather than the ruler.
ἀλλʼ, ὠγαθέ, προθυμοῦ καὶ ἡμῖν ἐνδείξασθαι—οὔτοι κακῶς σοι κείσεται ὅτι ἂν1 ἡμᾶς τοσούσδε ὄντας εὐεργετήσῃς—ἐγὼ γὰρ δή σοι λέγω τό γʼ ἐμόν, ὅτι οὐ πείθομαι οὐδʼ οἶμαι ἀδικίαν δικαιοσύνης κερδαλεώτερον εἶναι, οὐδʼ ἐὰν ἐᾷ τις αὐτὴν καὶ μὴ διακωλύῃ πράττειν ἃ βούλεται. ἀλλʼ, ὠγαθέ, ἔστω μὲν ἄδικος, δυνάσθω δὲ ἀδικεῖν ἢ τῷ λανθάνειν ἢ τῷ διαμάχεσθαι, ὅμως ἐμέ γε οὐ πείθει ὡς ἔστι τῆς δικαιοσύνης κερδαλεώτερον. ταῦτʼ οὖν καὶ ἕτερος ἴσως τις ἡμῶν πέπονθεν, οὐ μόνος ἐγώ· πεῖσον οὖν, ὦ μακάριε, ἱκανῶς ἡμᾶς ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς βουλευόμεθα δικαιοσύνην ἀδικίας περὶ πλείονος ποιούμενοι. καὶ πῶς, ἔφη, σὲ πείσω; εἰ γὰρ οἷς νυνδὴ ἔλεγον μὴ πέπεισαι, τί σοι ἔτι ποιήσω; ἢ εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν φέρων ἐνθῶ τὸν λόγον; μὰ Δίʼ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, μὴ σύ γε· ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μέν, ἃ ἂν εἴπῃς, ἔμμενε τούτοις, ἢ ἐὰν μετατιθῇ, φανερῶς μετατίθεσο καὶ ἡμᾶς μὴ ἐξαπάτα. νῦν δὲ ὁρᾷς, ὦ Θρασύμαχε—ἔτι γὰρ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ἐπισκεψώμεθα—ὅτι τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἰατρὸν τὸ πρῶτον ὁριζόμενος τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ποιμένα οὐκέτι ᾤου δεῖν ὕστερον ἀκριβῶς φυλάξαι,2 ἀλλὰ πιαίνειν οἴει αὐτὸν τὰ πρόβατα, καθʼ ὅσον ποιμήν ἐστιν, οὐ πρὸς τὸ τῶν προβάτων βέλτιστον βλέποντα ἀλλʼ, ὥσπερ δαιτυμόνα τινὰ καὶ μέλλοντα ἑστιάσεσθαι, πρὸς τὴν εὐωχίαν, ἢ αὖ πρὸς τὸ ἀποδόσθαι, ὥσπερ χρηματιστὴν ἀλλʼ οὐ ποιμένα. τῇ δὲ ποιμενικῇ οὐ δήπου ἄλλου του μέλει ἢ ἐφʼ ᾧ τέτακται, ὅπως τούτῳ τὸ βέλτιστον ἐκποριεῖ—ἐπεὶ τά γε αὑτῆς ὥστʼ εἶναι βελτίστη ἱκανῶς δήπου ἐκπεπόρισται, ἕως γʼ ἂν μηδὲν ἐνδέῃ τοῦ ποιμενικὴ εἶναι—οὕτω δὲ ᾤμην ἔγωγε νυνδὴ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἡμῖν ὁμολογεῖν πᾶσαν ἀρχήν, καθʼ ὅσον ἀρχή, μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ τὸ βέλτιστον σκοπεῖσθαι ἢ ἐκείνῳ, τῷ ἀρχομένῳ τε καὶ θεραπευομένῳ, ἔν τε πολιτικῇ καὶ ἰδιωτικῇ ἀρχῇ. σὺ δὲ τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, τοὺς ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρχοντας, ἑκόντας οἴει ἄρχειν; μὰ Δίʼ οὔκ, ἔφη, ἀλλʼ εὖ οἶδα.
But, my good friend, make an effort to show us too—it will certainly not be laid up badly for you if you benefit so many of us as we are—for indeed, speaking for myself, I tell you that I am not persuaded, nor do I think that injustice is more profitable than justice, not even if one lets it be and does not prevent it from doing what it wishes. But, my good friend, let there be an unjust man, and let him have the power to do injustice, either by going undetected or by fighting it out, nevertheless it does not persuade me, at least, that it is more profitable than justice. This, then, is perhaps what someone else among us also feels, not only I. Persuade us, then, my happy friend, sufficiently that we are not deliberating correctly in valuing justice above injustice. “And how,” he said, “shall I persuade you? For if you are not persuaded by what I was just saying, what more can I do for you? Or shall I take the argument and stuff it into your soul?” “By Zeus, no,” I said, “don’t you do that! But first of all, whatever you say, stand by it, or if you change your mind, do so openly and do not deceive us. But as it is, you see, Thrasymachus—for let us still examine the previous points—that though you first defined the doctor who is truly so, you did not think it necessary afterward to keep strictly to the shepherd who is truly so; instead, you think that he, insofar as he is a shepherd, fattens the sheep, looking not to what is best for the sheep, but, like some guest who is going to feast, to the banquet, or again, to selling them, like a money-maker and not a shepherd. But surely the shepherd’s art is not concerned with anything else than that over which it is set, how it will provide what is best for it—since its own affairs, so that it may be the best, have surely been sufficiently provided for, so long as it lacks nothing of being the shepherd’s art—and in this way I, for my part, thought just now that it is necessary for us to agree that every rule, insofar as it is a rule, considers what is best for nothing other than that, the ruled and the cared-for, both in public and in private rule. But do you think that the rulers in cities, those who truly rule, rule willingly?” “By Zeus, I do not think so,” he said, “but I know it well.”
τί δέ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ Θρασύμαχε; τὰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς οὐκ ἐννοεῖς ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἐθέλει ἄρχειν ἑκών, ἀλλὰ μισθὸν αἰτοῦσιν, ὡς οὐχὶ αὐτοῖσιν ὠφελίαν ἐσομένην ἐκ τοῦ ἄρχειν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀρχομένοις; ἐπεὶ τοσόνδε εἰπέ· οὐχὶ ἑκάστην μέντοι φαμὲν ἑκάστοτε τῶν τεχνῶν τούτῳ ἑτέραν εἶναι, τῷ ἑτέραν τὴν δύναμιν ἔχειν; καί, ὦ μακάριε, μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ἀποκρίνου, ἵνα τι καὶ περαίνωμεν. ἀλλὰ τούτῳ, ἔφη, ἑτέρα. οὐκοῦν καὶ ὠφελίαν ἑκάστη τούτων ἰδίαν τινὰ ἡμῖν παρέχεται ἀλλʼ οὐ κοινήν, οἷον ἰατρικὴ μὲν ὑγίειαν, κυβερνητικὴ δὲ σωτηρίαν ἐν τῷ πλεῖν, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι οὕτω; πάνυ γε. οὐκοῦν καὶ μισθωτικὴ μισθόν; αὕτη γὰρ αὐτῆς ἡ δύναμις· ἢ τὴν ἰατρικὴν σὺ καὶ τὴν κυβερνητικὴν τὴν αὐτὴν καλεῖς; ἢ ἐάνπερ βούλῃ ἀκριβῶς διορίζειν, ὥσπερ ὑπέθου, οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον, ἐάν τις κυβερνῶν ὑγιὴς γίγνηται διὰ τὸ συμφέρον αὐτῷ πλεῖν ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ, ἕνεκα τούτου καλεῖς μᾶλλον αὐτὴν ἰατρικήν; οὐ δῆτα, ἔφη. οὐδέ γʼ, οἶμαι, τὴν μισθωτικήν, ἐὰν ὑγιαίνῃ τις μισθαρνῶν. οὐ δῆτα. τί δέ; τὴν ἰατρικὴν μισθαρνητικήν, ἐὰν ἰώμενός τις μισθαρνῇ; οὐκ ἔφη. οὐκοῦν τήν γε ὠφελίαν ἑκάστης τῆς τέχνης ἰδίαν ὡμολογήσαμεν εἶναι; ἔστω, ἔφη. ἥντινα ἄρα ὠφελίαν κοινῇ ὠφελοῦνται πάντες οἱ δημιουργοί, δῆλον ὅτι κοινῇ τινι τῷ αὐτῷ προσχρώμενοι ἀπʼ ἐκείνου ὠφελοῦνται. ἔοικεν, ἔφη. φαμὲν δέ γε τὸ μισθὸν ἀρνυμένους ὠφελεῖσθαι τοὺς δημιουργοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ προσχρῆσθαι3 τῇ μισθωτικῇ τέχνῃ γίγνεσθαι αὐτοῖς. συνέφη μόγις. οὐκ ἄρα ἀπὸ τῆς αὑτοῦ τέχνης ἑκάστῳ αὕτη ἡ ὠφελία ἐστίν, ἡ τοῦ μισθοῦ λῆψις, ἀλλʼ, εἰ δεῖ ἀκριβῶς σκοπεῖσθαι, ἡ μὲν ἰατρικὴ ὑγίειαν ποιεῖ, ἡ δὲ μισθαρνητικὴ μισθόν, καὶ ἡ μὲν οἰκοδομικὴ οἰκίαν, ἡ δὲ μισθαρνητικὴ αὐτῇ ἑπομένη μισθόν, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι πᾶσαι οὕτως τὸ αὑτῆς ἑκάστη ἔργον ἐργάζεται καὶ ὠφελεῖ ἐκεῖνο ἐφʼ ᾧ τέτακται. ἐὰν δὲ μὴ μισθὸς αὐτῇ προσγίγνηται, ἔσθʼ ὅτι ὠφελεῖται ὁ δημιουργὸς ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης; οὐ φαίνεται, ἔφη. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐδʼ ὠφελεῖ τότε, ὅταν προῖκα ἐργάζηται; οἶμαι ἔγωγε. οὐκοῦν, ὦ Θρασύμαχε, τοῦτο ἤδη δῆλον, ὅτι οὐδεμία τέχνη οὐδὲ ἀρχὴ τὸ αὑτῇ ὠφέλιμον παρασκευάζει, ἀλλʼ, ὅπερ πάλαι ἐλέγομεν, τὸ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ καὶ παρασκευάζει καὶ ἐπιτάττει, τὸ ἐκείνου συμφέρον ἥττονος ὄντος σκοποῦσα, ἀλλʼ οὐ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος.
”Why is that?” I said, “Thrasymachus. Do you not realize concerning the other offices that no one is willing to rule voluntarily, but they demand pay, on the ground that benefit from ruling will come not to themselves but to the ruled? Since tell me this much: do we not say that each of the arts is always different from another in this, in having a different power? And, my happy friend, do not answer contrary to your opinion, so that we may get somewhere.” “Yes, it is different in this,” he said. “Does not, then, each of them also provide us with some private benefit and not a common one, as for example medicine provides health, navigation safety in sailing, and the others in the same way?” “Certainly.” ”And does not the art of wages provide wages? For this is its power. Or do you call medicine and navigation the same? Or, if you wish to define strictly, as you proposed, if someone acting as a navigator becomes healthy because sailing on the sea is advantageous to him, would you on that account call it medicine any the more?” “Surely not,” he said. “Nor, I think, do you call the art of wages medicine, if someone is healthy while earning wages.” “Surely not.” “And what of this? Do you call medicine the art of wages, if someone earns wages while healing?” ”No,” he said. “Did we not, then, agree that the benefit of each art is private?” “Let it be so,” he said. “Then whatever benefit all the craftsmen benefit from in common, it is clear that they benefit from it by using some same thing in addition in common.” “It seems so,” he said. “And we say indeed that the benefit that comes to the craftsmen by earning wages comes to them from their additional use of the art of wages.” He agreed with difficulty. ”Therefore, this benefit, the receiving of wages, is not for each from his own art; but, if one must examine strictly, medicine produces health, and the art of earning wages produces wages, and housebuilding produces a house, and the art of earning wages, following upon it, produces wages, and all the other arts in the same way, each works its own work and benefits that over which it is set. And if pay is not added to it, is there any way in which the craftsman benefits from the art?” “It does not appear so,” he said. ”Does he then benefit no one even when he works for nothing?” “I think he does.” “Then, Thrasymachus, this is already clear, that no art or rule provides what is beneficial to itself, but, as we were saying long ago, it both provides and commands what is for the ruled, looking to the advantage of that which is weaker, and not to that of the stronger.”
- 345aκακῶς σοι κείσεται ὅτι ἂν
In the phrase "it will not be laid up badly for you," the verb κείσεται functions passively, referring to an investment or favor stored up. The subsequent ὅτι ἂν (often read as ὅ τι ἂν, "whatever") introduces a relative conditional clause, meaning "whatever benefit you confer on us will not turn out to be a bad investment for you."
- 345cἀκριβῶς φυλάξαι
The object of "to keep strictly" (ἀκριβῶς φυλάξαι) is omitted but understood from the context of "defining" (ὁριζόμενος) in the preceding clause. It means to strictly maintain or preserve the precise definition of the true shepherd.
- 346cπροσχρήσθαι
The verb προσχράομαι means "to use in addition" or "to employ auxiliary to" the primary art. It highlights the dual structure of the argument: craftsmen derive profit not from their own primary expertise (e.g., medicine or building) but by employing the "art of wages" (μισθωτική) as an auxiliary tool alongside it.
