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Clitophon

§406-407

Cleitophon Praises Socrates for Urging Virtue

The opening of the dialogue between Cleitophon and Socrates. Cleitophon seeks to clear up a misunderstanding regarding his assessment of Socrates, recalling his profound admiration for Socrates' speeches that reproached human folly and urged the care of the soul over wealth.

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§406

ΣΩ. Κλειτοφῶντα τὸν Ἀριστωνύμου τις ἡμῖν διηγεῖτο ἔναγχος, ὅτι Λυσίᾳ διαλεγόμενος τὰς μὲν μετὰ Σωκράτους διατριβὰς ψέγοι,1 τὴν Θρασυμάχου δὲ συνουσίαν ὑπερεπαινοῖ. ΚΛΕΙ. ὅστις, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀπεμνημόνευέ σοι τοὺς ἐμοὶ περὶ σοῦ γενομένους λόγους πρὸς Λυσίαν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔγωγε οὐκ ἐπῄνουν σε, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐπῄνουν. ἐπεὶ δὲ δῆλος εἶ μεμφόμενος μέν μοι, προσποιούμενος δὲ μηδὲν φροντίζειν, ἥδιστʼ ἄν σοι διεξέλθοιμι αὐτοὺς αὐτός, ἐπειδὴ καὶ μόνω τυγχάνομεν ὄντε, ἵνα ἧττόν με ἡγῇ πρὸς σὲ φαύλως ἔχειν. νῦν γὰρ ἴσως οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀκήκοας, ὥστε φαίνῃ πρὸς ἐμὲ ἔχειν τραχυτέρως τοῦ δέοντος· εἰ δέ μοι δίδως παρρησίαν, ἥδιστα ἂν δεξαίμην καὶ ἐθέλω λέγειν.

Socrates: Someone was reporting to us recently about Cleitophon, the son of Aristonymus, saying that in a conversation with Lysias he criticized the pastimes spent with Socrates, while praising Thrasymachus’ company to the skies. Cleitophon: Whoever it was, Socrates, did not report to you correctly the words I spoke to Lysias about you. For in some respects I did not praise you, but in others I did. Since you are clearly blaming me, while pretending not to care at all, I would most gladly go through them with you myself, since we happen to be alone, so that you may think less poorly of me. For now, perhaps, you have not heard correctly, and so you appear to be more harshly disposed toward me than you ought to be. But if you grant me free speech, I would most gladly accept and wish to speak.

§407

ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ αἰσχρὸν μὴν σοῦ γε ὠφελεῖν με προθυμουμένου μὴ ὑπομένειν· δῆλον γὰρ ὡς γνοὺς ὅπῃ χείρων εἰμὶ καὶ βελτίων, τὰ μὲν ἀσκήσω καὶ διώξομαι, τὰ δὲ φεύξομαι κατὰ κράτος. ΚΛΕΙ. ἀκούοις ἄν. ἐγὼ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, σοὶ συγγιγνόμενος πολλάκις ἐξεπληττόμην ἀκούων, καί μοι ἐδόκεις παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους κάλλιστα λέγειν, ὁπότε ἐπιτιμῶν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ μηχανῆς τραγικῆς θεός, ὕμνεις λέγων· ποῖ φέρεσθε, ὤνθρωποι; καὶ ἀγνοεῖτε οὐδὲν τῶν δεόντων πράττοντες, οἵτινες χρημάτων μὲν πέρι τὴν πᾶσαν σπουδὴν ἔχετε ὅπως ὑμῖν ἔσται, τῶν δʼ ὑέων οἷς ταῦτα παραδώσετε ὅπως ἐπιστήσονται χρῆσθαι δικαίως τούτοις, οὔτε διδασκάλους αὐτοῖς εὑρίσκετε τῆς δικαιοσύνης, εἴπερ μαθητόν2—εἰ δὲ μελετητόν τε καὶ ἀσκητόν, οἵτινες ἐξασκήσουσιν καὶ ἐκμελετήσουσιν ἱκανῶς—οὐδέ γʼ ἔτι πρότερον ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς οὕτως ἐθεραπεύσατε. ἀλλʼ ὁρῶντες γράμματα καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ γυμναστικὴν ὑμᾶς τε αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς παῖδας ὑμῶν ἱκανῶς μεμαθηκότας—ἃ3 δὴ παιδείαν ἀρετῆς εἶναι τελέαν ἡγεῖσθε—κἄπειτα οὐδὲν ἧττον κακοὺς γιγνομένους περὶ τὰ χρήματα, πῶς οὐ καταφρονεῖτε τῆς νῦν παιδεύσεως οὐδὲ ζητεῖτε οἵτινες ὑμᾶς παύσουσι ταύτης τῆς ἀμουσίας; καίτοι διά γε ταύτην τὴν πλημμέλειαν καὶ ῥᾳθυμίαν, ἀλλʼ οὐ διὰ τὴν ἐν τῷ ποδὶ πρὸς τὴν λύραν ἀμετρίαν, καὶ ἀδελφὸς ἀδελφῷ καὶ πόλεις πόλεσιν ἀμέτρως καὶ ἀναρμόστως προσφερόμεναι στασιάζουσι καὶ πολεμοῦντες τὰ ἔσχατα δρῶσιν καὶ πάσχουσιν. ὑμεῖς δέ φατε οὐ διʼ ἀπαιδευσίαν οὐδὲ διʼ ἄγνοιαν ἀλλʼ ἑκόντας τοὺς ἀδίκους ἀδίκους εἶναι, πάλιν δʼ αὖ τολμᾶτε λέγειν ὡς αἰσχρὸν καὶ θεομισὲς ἡ ἀδικία· πῶς οὖν δή τις τό γε τοιοῦτον κακὸν ἑκὼν αἱροῖτʼ ἄν; Ἥττων ὃς ἂν ᾖ, φατέ, τῶν ἡδονῶν. οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῦτο ἀκούσιον, εἴπερ τὸ νικᾶν ἑκούσιον;4 ὥστε ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου τό γε ἀδικεῖν ἀκούσιον ὁ λόγος αἱρεῖ, καὶ δεῖν ἐπιμέλειαν τῆς νῦν πλείω ποιεῖσθαι πάντʼ ἄνδρα ἰδίᾳ θʼ ἅμα καὶ δημοσίᾳ συμπάσας τὰς πόλεις. ταῦτʼ οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐγὼ ὅταν ἀκούω σοῦ θαμὰ λέγοντος, καὶ μάλα ἄγαμαι καὶ θαυμαστῶς ὡς ἐπαινῶ. καὶ ὁπόταν αὖ φῇς τὸ ἐφεξῆς τούτῳ, τοὺς ἀσκοῦντας μὲν τὰ σώματα, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς ἠμεληκότας ἕτερόν τι πράττειν τοιοῦτον, τοῦ μὲν ἄρξοντος ἀμελεῖν, περὶ δὲ τὸ ἀρξόμενον ἐσπουδακέναι. καὶ ὅταν λέγῃς ὡς ὅτῳ τις μὴ ἐπίσταται χρῆσθαι, κρεῖττον ἐᾶν τὴν τούτου χρῆσιν· εἰ δή τις μὴ ἐπίσταται ὀφθαλμοῖς χρῆσθαι μηδὲ ὠσὶν μηδὲ σύμπαντι τῷ σώματι, τούτῳ μήτε ἀκούειν μήθʼ ὁρᾶν μήτʼ ἄλλην χρείαν μηδεμίαν χρῆσθαι τῷ σώματι κρεῖττον ἢ ὁπῃοῦν χρῆσθαι.

Socrates: Well, indeed, it would be shameful for me not to tolerate your willingness to benefit me. For it is clear that once I realize in what respects I am worse and in what respects better, I shall practice and pursue the latter, while fleeing from the former with all my strength. Cleitophon: Listen, then. For when I associated with you, Socrates, I was often struck with amazement upon hearing you, and you seemed to me to speak more beautifully than anyone else when you rebuked mankind, like a god from a tragic machine, chanting and saying: “Whither are you drifting, O men? And do you not know that you are doing none of the things you ought to do, you who devote all your zeal to wealth, ensuring that it will be yours, but as for your sons to whom you will hand it down, you neither find teachers of justice for them so that they will know how to use it justly—if indeed it can be taught, and if it is a matter of practice and training, those who will train and practice them sufficiently—nor even before this did you care for yourselves in this way? But seeing that you and your children have sufficiently learned letters, music, and gymnastics—which you indeed believe to be a complete education in virtue—and then nevertheless turn out no less wicked regarding wealth, how is it that you do not despise your current education, nor seek those who will put an end to this uncultured state of yours? And yet, because of this discord and negligence, and not because of lack of rhythm between foot and lyre, brother fights with brother, and cities with cities in discord and disharmony, and waging war they do and suffer the ultimate evils. But you say that the unjust are unjust not through lack of education or ignorance, but voluntarily, and then again you dare to say that injustice is shameful and hateful to the gods. How then could anyone voluntarily choose such an evil? ‘He who is overcome by pleasures,’ you say. Is this not also involuntary, if indeed conquering is voluntary? So that by every argument, committing injustice is shown to be involuntary, and every man individually, and all cities together in public, must take more care than they do now.” When I hear you saying these things often, Socrates, I marvel at them and praise them wonderfully. And again, when you say what follows this: that those who train their bodies but neglect their souls do something of this sort—neglecting that which will rule, while being zealous about that which will be ruled. And when you say that for anyone who does not know how to use a thing, it is better to leave its use alone; if indeed someone does not know how to use his eyes, or ears, or his whole body, it is better for him neither to hear nor to see, nor to make any other use of his body, than to use it in any way whatsoever.

Syntax notes4 items
  1. 406aψέγοι

    In the indirect discourse introduced by ὅτι, since the main verb is in the past tense (διηγεῖτο), the subordinate verbs (ψέγοι and ὑπερεπαινοῖ) are in the optative mood (optative of indirect discourse).

  2. 407bεἴπερ μαθητόν

    Meaning "if [justice] is indeed teachable," where the subject (ἡ δικαιοσύνη) and the copula (ἐστίν) are omitted, understood from the preceding genitive τῆς δικαιοσύνης.

  3. 407cἃ

    The antecedent is γράμματα καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ γυμναστικὴν (neuter plural) from the preceding clause. It functions as the direct object of ἡγεῖσθε (which takes a double accusative), with παιδείαν serving as the predicate accusative.

  4. 407dοὐκοῦν καὶ τοῦτο ἀκούσιον, εἴπερ τὸ νικᾶν ἑκούσιον;

    'Being defeated by pleasures' (ἥττων εἶναι τῶν ἡδονῶν) is presented in contrast to 'conquering them' (νικᾶν). The implication is that while victory is desired voluntarily, defeat (being overcome) must be involuntary.

Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-22) · Revision history (1, latest 2026-09-21)
  • 2026-09-21 AI review — note 1
urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg029.humanitext-grc2:406-407