Gorgias

​SOCRATES: These things, which appeared to us there above in the previous arguments as I say, are held down and bound—and, if it is permitted to say something rather rustic, by iron and adamantine arguments, so at least it would seem in this way; and unless you or someone more vigorous than you breaks them, it is not possible for anyone speaking otherwise than as I now speak to speak well. Since for my part my argument is always the same, that I do not know how these things are, but indeed of those whom I have met, just as now, no one is able to speak otherwise without being ridiculous. I, then, on my part, set down these things to be so. But if this is so, and committing injustice is the greatest of evils for the one who commits it, and an even greater evil than this greatest one, if possible, is for the one committing injustice not to pay the penalty, what kind of help is a person unable to provide to himself so that he would in truth be ridiculous? Is it not that which will turn away our greatest harm? Rather, it is of great necessity that this is the basest inability to help—not to be able to help either oneself or one’s own friends and relatives—and second is that which regards the second evil, and third that which regards the third, and the others in this way; as the magnitude of each evil is by nature, so too is the beauty of being able to help against each, and the baseness of not being able to. Is it otherwise, or is it thus, Callicles? CALLICLES: Not otherwise. SOCRATES: Since there are these two, committing injustice and suffering it, we say that committing injustice is the greater evil, and suffering it the lesser. What then should a person prepare for himself so that he can help himself, so as to have both of these benefits—the one from not committing injustice and the one from not suffering it? Power or will? I mean it in this way: is it that if he does not wish to suffer injustice, he will not suffer it, or if he prepares a power of not suffering injustice, he will not suffer it? CALLICLES: It is clear indeed, at least this, that it is if he prepares a power. SOCRATES: What about committing injustice? Is it enough if he does not wish to commit injustice—for he will not commit it—or indeed, for this as well, is it necessary to prepare a certain power and art, so that unless he learns and practices them, he will commit injustice? Why do you not answer me this very thing, Callicles: do we, Polus and I, seem to you to have been rightly forced to agree in the previous arguments, or not, when we agreed that no one wishes to commit injustice, but all who commit injustice do so involuntarily?