- Source
- Platonis Opera, Tomus III: Tetralogia V-VII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1903.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg023.humanitext-grc2:489
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-10-28
Socrates points out that the consensus of the majority aligns with natural justice, exposing the contradiction in Callicles' position, while Callicles refines his definition of 'the superior' to mean 'the wiser' rather than the physically stronger.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οἱ πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν οὕτως, ὡς ἄρτι αὖ σὺ ἔλεγες, δίκαιον εἶναι τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν καὶ αἴσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι; ἔστιν ταῦτα ἢ οὔ; καὶ ὅπως μὴ ἁλώσῃ1 ἐνταῦθα σὺ αὖ αἰσχυνόμενος. νομίζουσιν, ἢ οὔ, οἱ πολλοὶ τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν ἀλλʼ οὐ τὸ πλέον δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ αἴσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι; μὴ φθόνει μοι ἀποκρίνασθαι τοῦτο, Καλλίκλεις, ἵνʼ, ἐάν μοι ὁμολογήσῃς, βεβαιώσωμαι ἤδη παρὰ σοῦ, ἅτε ἱκανοῦ ἀνδρὸς διαγνῶναι ὡμολογηκότος.2 ΚΑΛ. ἀλλʼ οἵ γε πολλοὶ νομίζουσιν οὕτως. ΣΩ. οὐ νόμῳ ἄρα μόνον ἐστὶν αἴσχιον τὸ ἀδικεῖν τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι, οὐδὲ δίκαιον τὸ ἴσον ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ φύσει· ὥστε κινδυνεύεις οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγειν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐδὲ ὀρθῶς ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖν λέγων ὅτι ἐναντίον ἐστὶν ὁ νόμος καὶ ἡ φύσις, ἃ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ γνοὺς κακουργῶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ἐὰν μέν τις κατὰ φύσιν λέγῃ, ἐπὶ τὸν νόμον ἄγων, ἐὰν δέ τις κατὰ νόμον, ἐπὶ τὴν φύσιν. ΚΑΛ. οὑτοσὶ ἀνὴρ οὐ παύσεται φλυαρῶν. εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ τηλικοῦτος ὢν ὀνόματα θηρεύων, καὶ ἐάν τις ῥήματι ἁμάρτῃ, ἕρμαιον τοῦτο ποιούμενος; ἐμὲ γὰρ οἴει ἄλλο τι λέγειν τὸ κρείττους εἶναι ἢ τὸ βελτίους; οὐ πάλαι σοι λέγω ὅτι ταὐτόν φημι εἶναι τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ κρεῖττον; ἢ οἴει με λέγειν, ἐὰν συρφετὸς συλλεγῇ δούλων καὶ παντοδαπῶν ἀνθρώπων μηδενὸς ἀξίων πλὴν ἴσως τῷ σώματι ἰσχυρίσασθαι, καὶ οὗτοι φῶσιν, αὐτὰ ταῦτα εἶναι νόμιμα; ΣΩ. εἶεν, ὦ σοφώτατε Καλλίκλεις· οὕτω λέγεις; ΚΑΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ μέν, ὦ δαιμόνιε, καὶ αὐτὸς πάλαι τοπάζω τοιοῦτόν τί σε λέγειν τὸ κρεῖττον, καὶ ἀνερωτῶ γλιχόμενος σαφῶς εἰδέναι ὅτι λέγεις. οὐ γὰρ δήπου σύ γε τοὺς δύο βελτίους ἡγῇ τοῦ ἑνός, οὐδὲ τοὺς σοὺς δούλους βελτίους σοῦ, ὅτι ἰσχυρότεροί εἰσιν ἢ σύ. ἀλλὰ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰπὲ τί ποτε λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους, ἐπειδὴ οὐ τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους; καὶ ὦ θαυμάσιε πρᾳότερόν με προδίδασκε, ἵνα μὴ ἀποφοιτήσω παρὰ σοῦ. ΚΑΛ. εἰρωνεύῃ, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. μὰ τὸν Ζῆθον,3 ὦ Καλλίκλεις, ᾧ σὺ χρώμενος πολλὰ νυνδὴ εἰρωνεύου πρός με· ἀλλʼ ἴθι εἰπέ, τίνας λέγεις τοὺς βελτίους εἶναι; ΚΑΛ. τοὺς ἀμείνους ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. ὁρᾷς ἄρα ὅτι σὺ αὐτὸς ὀνόματα λέγεις, δηλοῖς δὲ οὐδέν; οὐκ ἐρεῖς, τοὺς βελτίους καὶ κρείττους πότερον τοὺς φρονιμωτέρους λέγεις ἢ ἄλλους τινάς; ΚΑΛ. ἀλλὰ ναὶ μὰ Δία τούτους λέγω, καὶ σφόδρα γε.
SOCRATES: Well, then, do the many think this way, as you were saying just now, that to have an equal share is just, and to do injustice is more shameful than to suffer it? Is this so or not? And mind you don’t get caught here by being ashamed again. Do the many think, or not, that to have an equal share and not to have more is just, and to do injustice is more shameful than to suffer it? Do not grudge me answering this, Callicles, so that if you agree with me, I may already have this confirmed by you, seeing that a competent man to judge has agreed. CALLICLES: Well, the many indeed think so. SOCRATES: Then it is not only by law that to do injustice is more shameful than to suffer it, nor that to have an equal share is just, but also by nature. So you seem to be speaking falsely in what you said before, and not rightly accusing me when you said that law and nature are opposed, and that I, knowing this, play tricks in my arguments, if someone speaks according to nature, leading them to the law, and if someone speaks according to law, to nature. CALLICLES: This fellow will not stop talking nonsense. Tell me, Socrates, are you not ashamed at your age to hunt after words, and if someone makes a slip in a word, to make a godsend of it? For do you think I mean by ‘being superior’ anything else than ‘being better’? Have I not been telling you for a long time that I say the better and the superior are the same? Or do you think I say that if a rabble of slaves and all sorts of men, worth nothing except perhaps in physical strength, is gathered together, and they say things, these very things are regulations? SOCRATES: Very well, most wise Callicles; is this what you mean? CALLICLES: Exactly. SOCRATES: But, my dear sir, I myself have long suspected you meant something of this sort by ‘superior’, and I keep questioning you because I am eager to know clearly what you mean. For surely you do not think two are better than one, nor your slaves better than you because they are stronger than you. But tell me again from the beginning: what on earth do you mean by ‘better’, since you do not mean ‘stronger’? And, my admirable friend, instruct me more gently, so that I may not run away from your school. CALLICLES: You are playing the ironist, Socrates. SOCRATES: No, by Zethus, Callicles, whom you used just now to play the ironist plenty at me! But come, tell me: who do you say are the better? CALLICLES: The superior ones, I say. SOCRATES: You see then that you yourself are speaking words, but you make nothing clear? Will you not say whether you mean by ‘better’ and ‘superior’ the wiser ones, or some others? CALLICLES: Why, yes, by Zeus, I mean these, and very much so.
- 489aὅπως μὴ ἁλώσῃ
The construction ὅπως μή + second-person singular subjunctive (ἁλώσῃ). It is an elliptical usage functioning as a warning or caution, where a governing verb of seeing or taking care (such as ὅρα) is omitted. Here it means 'take care lest you get caught'.
- 489aἅτε ἱκανοῦ ἀνδρὸς διαγνῶναι ὡμολογηκότος
The conjunction ἅτε with a genitive absolute construction. The logical subject of the perfect active participle ὡμολογηκότος is ἱκανοῦ ἀνδρὸς. The adjective ἱκανός is followed by the explanatory infinitive of direction or ability, διαγνῶναι ('to judge/distinguish'). It functions in apposition to the preceding genitive pronoun σοῦ (governed by παρὰ), expressing an objective ground: 'since you, as a competent man to judge, have agreed'.
- 489eμὰ τὸν Ζῆθον
The particle of oath μὰ followed by the accusative (Ζῆθον). This is a conversational oath common in drama. It is a highly ironic response by Socrates, swearing by Zethus because Callicles had previously (at 485e–486c) compared Socrates to Amphion (the inactive philosopher) and himself to Zethus (the active practical man) from Euripides' play.
Translated by Gemini 3.5 Flash (published 2026-05-22) · Revision history (1, latest 2026-09-21)
- 2026-09-21 AI review — translation 1
