- Source
- Platonis Opera, Tomus III: Tetralogia V-VII. Burnet, John, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1903.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg023.humanitext-grc2:477-478
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-10-28
Socrates argues that since the shameful is defined by pain or harm, the badness of the soul (injustice), which causes no physical pain but immense harm, must be the greatest of all evils. He then demonstrates that undergoing punishment is like medical treatment that frees the soul from this worst of evils, concluding that the wrongdoer who escapes punishment is the most wretched of all.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἴπερ καλά, ἀγαθά; ἢ γὰρ ἡδέα ἢ ὠφέλιμα. ΠΩΛ. ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ. ἀγαθὰ ἄρα πάσχει ὁ δίκην διδούς; ΠΩΛ. ἔοικεν. ΣΩ. ὠφελεῖται ἄρα; ΠΩΛ. ναί. ΣΩ. ἆρα ἥνπερ ἐγὼ ὑπολαμβάνω τὴν ὠφελίαν;1 βελτίων τὴν ψυχὴν γίγνεται, εἴπερ δικαίως κολάζεται; ΠΩΛ. εἰκός γε. ΣΩ. κακίας ἄρα ψυχῆς ἀπαλλάττεται ὁ δίκην διδούς; ΠΩΛ. ναί. ΣΩ. ἆρα οὖν τοῦ μεγίστου ἀπαλλάττεται κακοῦ; ὧδε δὲ σκόπει· ἐν χρημάτων κατασκευῇ ἀνθρώπου κακίαν ἄλλην τινὰ ἐνορᾷς ἢ πενίαν; ΠΩΛ. οὔκ, ἀλλὰ πενίαν. ΣΩ. τί δʼ ἐν σώματος κατασκευῇ; κακίαν ἂν φήσαις ἀσθένειαν εἶναι καὶ νόσον καὶ αἶσχος καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα; ΠΩΛ. ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ πονηρίαν ἡγῇ τινα εἶναι; ΠΩΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ΣΩ. ταύτην οὖν οὐκ ἀδικίαν καλεῖς καὶ ἀμαθίαν καὶ δειλίαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα; ΠΩΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν χρημάτων καὶ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς, τριῶν ὄντων, τριττὰς εἴρηκας πονηρίας, πενίαν, νόσον, ἀδικίαν; ΠΩΛ. ναί. ΣΩ. τίς οὖν τούτων τῶν πονηριῶν αἰσχίστη; οὐχ ἡ ἀδικία καὶ συλλήβδην ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρία; ΠΩΛ. πολύ γε. ΣΩ. εἰ δὴ αἰσχίστη, καὶ κακίστη; ΠΩΛ. πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγεις; ΣΩ. ὡδί· ἀεὶ τὸ αἴσχιστον ἤτοι λύπην μεγίστην παρέχον ἢ βλάβην ἢ ἀμφότερα αἴσχιστόν ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων ἐν τῷ ἔμπροσθεν. ΠΩΛ. μάλιστα. ΣΩ. αἴσχιστον δὲ ἀδικία καὶ σύμπασα ψυχῆς πονηρία νυνδὴ ὡμολόγηται ἡμῖν; ΠΩΛ. ὡμολόγηται γάρ. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἢ ἀνιαρότατόν ἐστι καὶ ἀνίᾳ ὑπερβάλλον αἴσχιστον τούτων ἐστὶν ἢ βλάβῃ ἢ ἀμφότερα; ΠΩΛ. ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἀλγεινότερόν ἐστιν τοῦ πένεσθαι καὶ κάμνειν τὸ ἄδικον εἶναι καὶ ἀκόλαστον καὶ δειλὸν καὶ ἀμαθῆ;2 ΠΩΛ. οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπὸ τούτων γε. ΣΩ. ὑπερφυεῖ τινι ἄρα ὡς μεγάλῃ βλάβῃ καὶ κακῷ θαυμασίῳ ὑπερβάλλουσα3 τἆλλα ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρία αἴσχιστόν ἐστι πάντων, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀλγηδόνι γε, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος. ΠΩΛ. φαίνεται. ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μήν που τό γε μεγίστῃ βλάβῃ ὑπερβάλλον μέγιστον ἂν κακὸν εἴη τῶν ὄντων. ΠΩΛ. ναί. ΣΩ. ἡ ἀδικία ἄρα καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ψυχῆς πονηρία μέγιστον τῶν ὄντων κακόν ἐστιν; ΠΩΛ. φαίνεται. ΣΩ. τίς οὖν τέχνη πενίας ἀπαλλάττει; οὐ χρηματιστική; ΠΩΛ. ναί. ΣΩ. τίς δὲ νόσου; οὐκ ἰατρική;
SOCRATES: If, then, they are beautiful, are they not also good? For they are either pleasant or beneficial. POLUS: Necessarily. SOCRATES: Therefore, does the one who pays the penalty experience good things? POLUS: It seems so. SOCRATES: Then he is benefited? POLUS: Yes. SOCRATES: Is it indeed the benefit that I suppose? Does he become better in his soul, if indeed he is justly disciplined? POLUS: It is likely. SOCRATES: Therefore, does the one paying the penalty get rid of the badness of the soul? POLUS: Yes. SOCRATES: Is he then getting rid of the greatest evil? Consider it in this way: in the acquisition of wealth, do you see any other badness in a human being than poverty? POLUS: No, only poverty. SOCRATES: And what about in the constitution of the body? Would you say the badness is weakness, disease, ugliness, and things of that sort? POLUS: I would. SOCRATES: And do you believe there is also some badness in the soul? POLUS: How could I not? SOCRATES: And do you not call this injustice, ignorance, cowardice, and things of that sort? POLUS: Certainly. SOCRATES: Therefore, of wealth, body, and soul, these being three, you have named three badnesses: poverty, disease, and injustice? POLUS: Yes. SOCRATES: Which of these badnesses is the most shameful? Is it not injustice, and in a word, the badness of the soul? POLUS: By far. SOCRATES: If indeed it is the most shameful, is it also the worst? POLUS: What do you mean by that, Socrates? SOCRATES: This: that the most shameful is always so either because it causes the greatest pain, or harm, or both, based on what we agreed before. POLUS: Very much so. SOCRATES: And have injustice and the entire badness of the soul just been agreed by us to be the most shameful? POLUS: They have indeed. SOCRATES: Therefore, is it either the most painful, surpassing in pain, that makes it the most shameful of these, or is it because of harm, or both? POLUS: Necessarily. SOCRATES: Is being unjust, undisciplined, cowardly, and ignorant more painful than being poor and sick? POLUS: It does not seem so to me, Socrates, at least not from these. SOCRATES: Therefore, by surpassing the others in some extraordinary, immense harm and wonderful evil, the badness of the soul is the most shameful of all, since it is not by pain, according to your argument. POLUS: It seems so. SOCRATES: But surely, that which surpasses in the greatest harm would be the greatest evil among existing things. POLUS: Yes. SOCRATES: Therefore, are injustice, lack of discipline, and the other badness of the soul the greatest evil among existing things? POLUS: It seems so. SOCRATES: Now, what art rids us of poverty? Is it not that of money-making? POLUS: Yes. SOCRATES: And what rids us of disease? Is it not medicine?
ΠΩΛ. ἀνάγκη. ΣΩ. τίς δὲ πονηρίας καὶ ἀδικίας; εἰ μὴ οὕτως εὐπορεῖς, ὧδε σκόπει· ποῖ ἄγομεν καὶ παρὰ τίνας τοὺς κάμνοντας τὰ σώματα; ΠΩΛ. παρὰ τοὺς ἰατρούς, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. ποῖ δὲ τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας καὶ τοὺς ἀκολασταίνοντας; ΠΩΛ. παρὰ τοὺς δικαστὰς λέγεις; ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν δίκην δώσοντας; ΠΩΛ. φημί. ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ δικαιοσύνῃ τινὶ χρώμενοι κολάζουσιν οἱ ὀρθῶς κολάζοντες; ΠΩΛ. δῆλον δή. ΣΩ. χρηματιστικὴ μὲν ἄρα πενίας ἀπαλλάττει, ἰατρικὴ δὲ νόσου, δίκη δὲ ἀκολασίας καὶ ἀδικίας. ΠΩΛ. φαίνεται. ΣΩ. τί οὖν τούτων κάλλιστόν ἐστιν; ΠΩΛ. τίνων λέγεις; ΣΩ. χρηματιστικῆς, ἰατρικῆς, δίκης. ΠΩΛ. πολὺ διαφέρει, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡ δίκη. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν αὖ ἤτοι ἡδονὴν πλείστην ποιεῖ ἢ ὠφελίαν ἢ ἀμφότερα, εἴπερ κάλλιστόν ἐστιν; ΠΩΛ. ναί. ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν τὸ ἰατρεύεσθαι ἡδύ ἐστιν, καὶ χαίρουσιν οἱ ἰατρευόμενοι; ΠΩΛ. οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ὠφέλιμόν γε. ἦ γάρ; ΠΩΛ. ναί. ΣΩ. μεγάλου γὰρ κακοῦ ἀπαλλάττεται, ὥστε λυσιτελεῖ ὑπομεῖναι τὴν ἀλγηδόνα καὶ ὑγιῆ εἶναι. ΠΩΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὕτως ἂν περὶ σῶμα εὐδαιμονέστατος ἄνθρωπος εἴη, ἰατρευόμενος, ἢ μηδὲ κάμνων ἀρχήν; ΠΩΛ. δῆλον ὅτι μηδὲ κάμνων. ΣΩ. οὐ γὰρ τοῦτʼ ἦν εὐδαιμονία, ὡς ἔοικε, κακοῦ ἀπαλλαγή, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν μηδὲ κτῆσις. ΠΩΛ. ἔστι ταῦτα. ΣΩ. τί δέ; ἀθλιώτερος πότερος δυοῖν ἐχόντοιν κακὸν εἴτʼ ἐν σώματι εἴτʼ ἐν ψυχῇ, ὁ ἰατρευόμενος καὶ ἀπαλλαττόμενος τοῦ κακοῦ, ἢ ὁ μὴ ἰατρευόμενος, ἔχων δέ; ΠΩΛ. φαίνεταί μοι ὁ μὴ ἰατρευόμενος. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὸ δίκην διδόναι μεγίστου κακοῦ ἀπαλλαγὴ ἦν, πονηρίας; ΠΩΛ. ἦν γάρ. ΣΩ. σωφρονίζει γάρ που καὶ δικαιοτέρους ποιεῖ καὶ ἰατρικὴ γίγνεται πονηρίας ἡ δίκη. ΠΩΛ. ναί. ΣΩ. εὐδαιμονέστατος μὲν ἄρα ὁ μὴ ἔχων κακίαν ἐν ψυχῇ, ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἐφάνη. ΠΩΛ. δῆλον δή. ΣΩ. δεύτερος δέ που ὁ ἀπαλλαττόμενος. ΠΩΛ. ἔοικεν. ΣΩ. οὗτος δʼ ἦν ὁ νουθετούμενός τε καὶ ἐπιπληττόμενος καὶ δίκην διδούς. ΠΩΛ. ναί. ΣΩ. κάκιστα ἄρα ζῇ ὁ ἔχων καὶ μὴ ἀπαλλαττόμενος. ΠΩΛ. φαίνεται.
POLUS: Necessarily. SOCRATES: And what rids us of badness and injustice? If you are not so ready with an answer, consider it this way: where and to whom do we take those who are sick in their bodies? POLUS: To the physicians, Socrates. SOCRATES: And where do we take those who commit injustice and act without discipline? POLUS: Do you mean to the judges? SOCRATES: Is it not to pay the penalty? POLUS: I agree. SOCRATES: Do they not discipline using some form of justice, those who discipline correctly? POLUS: Clearly. SOCRATES: Therefore, money-making rids us of poverty, while medicine rids us of disease, and justice rids us of lack of discipline and injustice. POLUS: It seems so. SOCRATES: Which, then, of these is the most beautiful? POLUS: Which do you mean? SOCRATES: Of money-making, medicine, and justice. POLUS: Justice, Socrates, is far superior. SOCRATES: Therefore, again, does it produce either the greatest pleasure, or benefit, or both, if indeed it is the most beautiful? POLUS: Yes. SOCRATES: Now, is undergoing medical treatment pleasant, and do those undergoing it rejoice? POLUS: It does not seem so to me. SOCRATES: But it is at least beneficial, is it not? POLUS: Yes. SOCRATES: For one is rid of a great evil, so that it is profitable to endure the pain and be healthy. POLUS: How could it not be? SOCRATES: Would a man, then, be happiest regarding his body in this way, by undergoing treatment, or by not being sick at all from the beginning? POLUS: Clearly, by not being sick at all. SOCRATES: For happiness, it seems, was not this—the riddance of evil—but rather not possessing it at all from the beginning. POLUS: That is so. SOCRATES: What about this? Which of two people possessing evil, whether in body or in soul, is more wretched: the one who undergoes treatment and is rid of the evil, or the one who does not undergo treatment but keeps it? POLUS: It seems to me, the one who does not undergo treatment. SOCRATES: And was paying the penalty a riddance of the greatest evil, namely, badness? POLUS: It was indeed. SOCRATES: For it disciplines, I believe, and makes people more just, and justice becomes a medicine for badness. POLUS: Yes. SOCRATES: Therefore, the happiest is the one who does not have badness in his soul, since this was shown to be the greatest of evils. POLUS: Clearly. SOCRATES: And second, I suppose, is the one who is rid of it. POLUS: It seems so. SOCRATES: And this was the one who is admonished, rebuked, and pays the penalty. POLUS: Yes. SOCRATES: Therefore, the one who lives worst is the one who possesses it and is not rid of it. POLUS: It seems so.
- 477aἆρα ἥνπερ ἐγὼ ὑπολαμβάνω τὴν ὠφελίαν;
The antecedent ὠφελίαν is attracted into the relative clause governed by the relative pronoun ἥνπερ (assimilation of the antecedent). The entire phrase acts as a verbless nominal question ('Is it indeed the benefit that I suppose?'), with the following clause βελτίων... γίγνεται standing in apposition to explain the specific nature of this benefit.
- 477dἆρʼ οὖν ἀλγεινότερόν ἐστιν τοῦ πένεσθαι καὶ κάμνειν τὸ ἄδικον εἶναι καὶ ἀκόλαστον καὶ δειλὸν καὶ ἀμαθῆ;
The core grammatical structure consists of the infinitive phrase τὸ ἄδικον εἶναι... as the subject, with ἀλγεινότερόν ἐστιν as the predicate. The genitive phrase τοῦ πένεσθαι καὶ κάμνειν is a genitive of comparison dependent on the comparative adjective ἀλγεινότερον. The adjectives in the predicate of the infinitive (ἄδικον, ἀκόλαστον, δειλόν, ἀμαθῆ) are in the accusative because they agree with the implied general subject of the infinitive.
- 477dὑπερφυεῖ τινι ἄρα ὡς μεγάλῃ βλάβῃ καὶ κακῷ θαυμασίῳ ὑπερβάλλουσα
The present participle ὑπερβάλλουσα (nominative feminine singular, agreeing with the subject ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρία) governs the dative objects ὑπερφυεῖ τινι... βλάβῃ καὶ κακῷ, meaning 'surpassing in...' The adverbial ὡς intensifies the adjective μεγάλῃ, meaning 'extraordinarily' or 'marvelously.'
