Euthydemus

​SOCRATES: “But,” I said, “we already refuted this earlier, namely, that there would be no advantage, not even if all the gold should become ours without any trouble and without digging the earth; so that not even if we knew how to make stones into gold, would that knowledge be of any value. For if we do not also know how to use the gold, it appeared to be of no benefit; or do you not remember?” I said. “Quite so,” he said, “I remember.” “And indeed, as it seems, no benefit comes from any other knowledge, whether of money-making or medicine or any other that knows how to make something, but not how to use what it has made; is it not so?” He agreed. “And indeed, even if there is some knowledge so as to make people immortal, without knowing how to use immortality, it seems there is no benefit from this either, if we are to judge by our previous agreements.” All these things were agreed upon by us. “Then, my beautiful boy,” I said, “we need some such knowledge in which there coincides both the making and the knowing how to use that which one makes.” “It seems so,” he said. “We are far indeed then, as it seems, from needing to be lyre-makers and from needing to possess some such knowledge. For there, the art that makes and the art that uses are divided separately concerning the same thing; for lyre-making and cithara-playing differ greatly from each other. Is it not so?” He agreed. “Nor indeed, clearly, do we need flute-making; for this too is another of the same kind.” It was agreed. “But by the gods,” I said, “if we should learn the art of speech-making, is this the one we ought to possess to be happy?” “I do not think so,” said Cleinias, breaking in. “What evidence,” I said, “do you use?” “I see,” he said, “some speech-makers who do not know how to use their own speeches, which they themselves make, just as lyre-makers do not know how to use lyres; but there too, others are able to use what those men have produced, though they themselves are unable to make speeches. It is clear then that also concerning speeches, the art of making is separate from that of using.” “You seem to me,” I said, “to state sufficient evidence that this art of speech-makers is not the one which someone, by acquiring it, would be happy. And yet I thought that somewhere here would appear the knowledge which we have indeed been seeking for a long time. For to me, the speech-makers themselves, when I associate with them, seem to be super-wise, Cleinias, and their art itself seems to be something divine and sublime. And indeed, it is no wonder; for it is a part of the art of sorcerers and is only slightly inferior to that one.”