Euthydemus

​SOCRATES: “’What then?’ he said. ‘Are there accounts for each of the things that are?’ ‘Certainly.’ ‘Is it as each thing is, or as it is not?’ ’As it is.’ ‘For if you remember, Ctesippus,’ he said, ‘we also demonstrated just now that no one speaks as it is not; for no one was shown to speak that which is not.’ ‘What of this then?’ said Ctesippus. ‘Do you and I contradict each other any the less?’ ‘Would we then,’ he said, ‘contradict if we both spoke the account of the same thing? Or in that case would we surely say the same things?’ —He agreed.— ‘But when neither of us,’ he said, ‘speaks the account of the thing, would we then contradict? Or in that case would neither of us have mentioned the thing at all?’ —To this also he agreed.— ‘But then, when I speak the account of the thing, and you speak another account of something else, do we then contradict? Or do I speak the thing, while you do not even speak at all? And how could he who does not speak contradict him who speaks?’ And Ctesippus fell silent. But I, wondering at the argument, said, ‘Dionysodorus, how do you mean? For indeed I always wonder at this very argument, having heard it from many people and many times—for the followers of Protagoras used it a great deal, and those even older; and to me it always seems to be something wonderful, both overturning others and itself as well—and I think I shall learn the truth of it best from you. Is it not that to speak falsely does not exist? For this is what the argument can do, is it not? And that he who speaks must either speak the truth or not speak?’ He agreed. ’Is it then that to speak falsely is not possible, but to have a false opinion is possible?’ ‘Not even to have a false opinion,’ he said. ‘Then there is no false opinion at all,’ I said. ‘No,’ he said. ‘Nor then is there ignorance or ignorant men? Or would not this be ignorance, if indeed there were such, to be deceived about things?’ ‘Certainly,’ he said. ‘But this does not exist,’ I said. ‘No,’ he said. ‘Do you say this argument for the sake of argument, Dionysodorus, so that you may say something strange, or does it really seem to you that no one among human beings is ignorant?’ ‘But you,’ he said, ‘refute it.’ ‘Is it indeed possible, according to your argument, to refute, if no one speaks falsely?’ ‘It is not,’ said Euthydemus. ‘Then Dionysodorus just now was not bidding me to refute?’ I said. ‘For how could anyone bid that which is not? But do you bid me?’ ‘Because, Euthydemus,’ I said, ‘I do not quite understand these wise and fine things, but I grasp them in a rather dull way. Perhaps then I shall ask something rather vulgar, but forgive me.’”