Phaedrus

​SOCRATES: And when he can sufficiently state what sort of person is persuaded by what kind of speeches, and is able, on being present, to perceive and show to himself that this is the person and this is the nature about which those discussions then were, now present to him in fact, to which he must apply these speeches in this way for the persuasion of these people—and when he already has all these, having also acquired the proper times of when to speak and when to hold back, and again having discerned the suitability and unsuitability of short speeches, pitiful speeches, exaggerations, and each of all the forms of speeches he may learn—then, and not before, is his art beautifully and completely finished. But if anyone falls short of any of these in speaking or teaching or writing, and says he speaks by art, the one who is not persuaded wins out. What then indeed? The writer will perhaps say, Phaedrus and Socrates, does it seem so? Must we not accept what is called the art of speech in some other way? PHAEDRUS: It is surely impossible, Socrates, in any other way; and yet it seems to be no small task. SOCRATES: You speak the truth. For this very reason, one must examine all the arguments, turning them upside down, to see if an easier and shorter path to it appears anywhere, so that he may not go in vain on a long and rough path, when he might go on a short and smooth one. But if you have any help to offer from having heard Lysias or anyone else, try to speak, recalling it. PHAEDRUS: For the sake of trying, I might have something, but certainly not now in this way. SOCRATES: Do you wish then that I tell some story which I have heard from some of those concerned with these matters? PHAEDRUS: Of course. SOCRATES: It is said, at any rate, Phaedrus, that it is fair to state even the wolf’s case. PHAEDRUS: And you do just so. SOCRATES: They say, then, that there is no need to make these things so solemn, nor to lead them far up by long circuits; for, as we also said at the beginning of this discussion, one who is to be a sufficient rhetorician has no need to share in the truth about just or good matters, or even about men who are of such a character by nature or education. For in the courts, they say, no one cares at all for the truth of these things, but for the persuasive; and this is the probable, to which one who is to speak by art must attend. For sometimes even the actual facts should not be told, if they were not probably done, but rather the probabilities, both in prosecution and defense, and in every way the speaker must pursue the probable, bidding a hearty farewell to the truth. For this, occurring throughout the whole speech, provides the entire art.

​PHAEDRUS: You have run through, Socrates, the very things that those who pretend to be experts in speeches say; for I recalled that we touched briefly on something of this sort before, and this seems to be of great importance to those concerned with these matters. SOCRATES: But indeed, you have trodden Tisias himself with precision. Let Tisias, then, tell us this also, whether he says the probable is anything other than what seems so to the multitude. PHAEDRUS: What else indeed? SOCRATES: Having found this indeed, as it seems, as both wise and artistic, he wrote that if a weak but brave man, having beaten a strong but cowardly man and taken his cloak or something else, is brought to court, neither of them should tell the truth. The coward must say that he was not beaten by the brave man alone, while the latter must prove that they were alone, and make use of that line: “How could a man like me have attacked a man like him?” And the other will certainly not confess his own cowardice, but, attempting to tell some other lie, might perhaps hand over some proof to his opponent. And there are other such things said by art. Is it not so, Phaedrus? PHAEDRUS: Of course. SOCRATES: Alas, Tisias seems to have discovered a terribly hidden art, or whoever indeed he happens to be and from wherever he pleases to be named. But, my friend, shall we say to him or not— PHAEDRUS: What is that? SOCRATES: “O Tisias, long ago, before you even came along, we happened to be saying that this probable actually happens to arise in the multitude through its likeness to the truth; and we recently went through the likenesses, showing that the one who knows the truth always knows best how to find them. So if you say anything else about the art of speech, we would listen; but if not, we shall trust what we have just run through: that unless one enumerates the natures of those who are to hear, and is able to divide existing things by forms and to comprehend each single thing under one idea, he will never be an expert in speeches as far as is possible for a human being. And he will never acquire these things without much diligence; which the wise man must not labor at for the sake of speaking and acting before men, but in order to be able to speak things pleasing to gods, and to act pleasingly in all things as far as possible.”