Phaedrus

PHAEDRUS: Speak then. SOCRATES: Do you know, then, how I shall do it? PHAEDRUS: About what? SOCRATES: I shall speak with my head covered, so that I may run through the speech as quickly as possible and not, by looking at you, be embarrassed out of shame. PHAEDRUS: Only speak, and as for the rest, do as you wish. SOCRATES: Come then, O Muses, whether you got this name from the clear quality of your song, or whether from the musical race of the Ligurians, take part with me in the myth which this excellent fellow here forces me to tell, so that his companion, who even before seemed wise to him, may now seem even more so. There was once a boy, or rather a youth, exceedingly beautiful; and he had very many lovers. And one of them was a wily man, who, though loving him no less than anyone else, had persuaded the boy that he did not love him. And once, in wooing him, he tried to persuade him of this very thing, that one ought to gratify a non-lover rather than a lover, and he spoke as follows: “In everything, my boy, there is one starting point for those who are going to deliberate well: they must know what the deliberation is about, or they must fail in everything. But it escapes the notice of the majority that they do not know the real essence of each thing. Therefore, as if they knew it, they do not come to an agreement at the beginning of their inquiry, and as they proceed they pay the natural penalty; for they agree neither with themselves nor with one another. Let you and me, then, not suffer what we find fault with in others; but since the question proposed for you and me is whether one should enter into friendship with a lover rather than a non-lover, let us establish a definition of love by agreement as to what sort of thing it is and what power it has, and looking to this and referring our inquiry to it, let us examine whether it offers benefit or harm. Now, that love is a certain desire is clear to everyone; and on the other hand, we know that even non-lovers desire beautiful things. By what, then, shall we distinguish the lover and the non-lover? We must further understand that in each of us there are two ruling and leading principles, which we follow wherever they lead: one is an innate desire for pleasures, the other an acquired opinion that aims at the best. These two in us sometimes agree, but at other times they are in conflict; and sometimes one, and at other times the other, rules.”

​SOCRATES: “Now, when opinion leads by reason toward the best and has the upper hand, its rule is called temperance; but when desire drags us irrationally toward pleasures and rules in us, its rule is named wantonness. Now wantonness has many names—for it has many limbs and many parts—and whichever of these forms happens to become prominent gives its own name as a designation to the person who possesses it, a name that is neither beautiful nor worth acquiring. For example, the desire for food that rules over the best reason and the other desires will be called gluttony, and will cause the person who has it to be called by this very same name; and again, that which plays the tyrant over drinking, and leads the one who possesses it in this direction, it is clear what title it will obtain. And it is obvious what the other similar names of these brother desires should be called, according to whichever one happens to be always dominant. But that for the sake of which all the preceding things have been said is already almost manifest, though if spoken it will be altogether clearer than if unspoken. For the desire without reason, which has conquered the opinion that points toward the right, and is led toward the pleasure of beauty, and is again vigorously strengthened by its own kindred desires toward physical beauty, conquering in its leadership, has received its name from this very ‘strength’ (rhōmē) and is called ‘love’ (erōs).” But, my dear Phaedrus, do I seem to you, as I do to myself, to have experienced a divine state? PHAEDRUS: Very much so, Socrates; contrary to your custom, a certain fluency has seized you. SOCRATES: Listen to me, then, in silence. For in truth this place seems to be divine, so that if I should often become possessed by the nymphs as the speech proceeds, do not wonder; for even now my speech is not far from dithyrambs. PHAEDRUS: You speak most truly. SOCRATES: You indeed are the cause of these things. But hear the rest; for perhaps the impending thing might be averted. However, these things will be the concern of God, but we must return to the boy in our speech. “Well then, most excellent boy: what the thing is about which we must deliberate has been spoken and defined; and looking to this, let us speak of what remains, namely, what benefit or harm is likely to result to the one who gratifies a lover and a non-lover respectively. Now, for him who is ruled by desire and enslaved to pleasure, it is necessary, I suppose, to make his beloved as pleasant as possible to himself; but to a diseased person, anything that does not resist is pleasant, whereas what is superior and equal is an enemy.”