Theaetetus

SOCRATES: I will tell you, if I am able. If I have a correct opinion about you, and if I add your account to it, then indeed I know you, but if not, I only opine. THEAETETUS: Yes. SOCRATES: And the “account” was the exposition of your difference. THEAETETUS: It was. SOCRATES: When, therefore, I was only opining, did I not grasp in my thought any of the things by which you differ from others? THEAETETUS: It seems not. SOCRATES: Then I was thinking of some of the common things, none of which you possess any more than anyone else. THEAETETUS: Necessarily. SOCRATES: Come then, by Zeus! How in such a case did I opine you more than any other person? For suppose me thinking that “this is Theaetetus, whoever is a man and has a nose, eyes, mouth, and each of the limbs in this way.” Will this thought make me think of Theaetetus any more than of Theodorus, or of the lowest of the so-called Mysians? THEAETETUS: How could it? SOCRATES: But if indeed I think not only of one having a nose and eyes, but also of one who is snub-nosed and has prominent eyes, shall I any more opine you than myself or whoever are like this? THEAETETUS: Not at all. SOCRATES: But, I think, Theaetetus will not be opined in me until this snub-nosedness has stamped and deposited within me a distinctive memory different from the other snub-nosednesses I have seen—and similarly with the other things from which you are made—which, even if I meet you tomorrow, will remind me and make me hold a correct opinion about you. THEAETETUS: Most true. SOCRATES: Correct opinion, then, would also be about the difference of each thing. THEAETETUS: So it appears. SOCRATES: Then what would “adding an account” to correct opinion still mean? For if it means to opine in addition how something differs from other things, the command becomes utterly ridiculous. THEAETETUS: How so? SOCRATES: Of things of which we have a correct opinion as to how they differ from other things, it commands us to add a correct opinion as to how they differ from other things. And so, the turning around of a pestle or a mortar or whatever they say would be nothing compared to this command; it would more justly be called the advice of a blind man. For to command us to add what we already have, in order to learn what we opine, seems thoroughly like one in the dark. THEAETETUS: Tell me then, what was it you were asking just now, as if you were going to say something?

​SOCRATES: If, my boy, commanding us to “add an account” means to “know” the difference, and not to “opine” it, it would be a delightful thing in the most beautiful discussion about knowledge. For to “know” is surely to “acquire knowledge”, is it not? THEAETETUS: Yes. SOCRATES: Therefore, when asked, it seems, what knowledge is, one will answer that it is correct opinion with knowledge of difference. For according to that view, this would be the addition of an account. THEAETETUS: It seems so. SOCRATES: And it is completely foolish, when we are seeking knowledge, to say that it is correct opinion with knowledge, whether of difference or of anything else. Therefore, neither perception, Theaetetus, nor true opinion, nor an account added to true opinion, would be knowledge. THEAETETUS: It seems not. SOCRATES: Are we, then, still pregnant and in labor, my friend, concerning knowledge, or have we brought everything to birth? THEAETETUS: Yes, by Zeus, I indeed have said through you more than I had in myself. SOCRATES: Does our art of midwifery, then, say that all these things have turned out to be wind-eggs and not worth rearing? THEAETETUS: Absolutely so. SOCRATES: If, then, after this you should attempt to become pregnant with other things, Theaetetus, and if you do, you will be full of better things because of the present examination; and if you remain empty, you will be less heavy to your companions and gentler, soberly not thinking you know what you do not know. For my art can do only this much, and nothing more; nor do I know any of the things that others know, who are and have been great and wonderful men. But this art of midwifery, both I and my mother received from God—she for women, and I for the young and noble and all who are beautiful. Now, indeed, I must go to the King’s Porch to meet the indictment of Meletus which he has drawn up against me; but tomorrow morning, Theodorus, let us meet here again.