- Source
- Platonis Opera, Tomus I: Tetralogia I-II. Burnet, John, 1863-1928, editor. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905.
- Translation
- AI-generated (gemini-3.5-flash) — machine translation; may contain errors
- Languages
- 日本語 · English · 简体中文 · 한국어
- CTS URN
- urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg006.humanitext-grc2:203
- Generated
- Humanitext Reader · reader.humanitext.ai · 2026-10-28
Socrates and Theaetetus test the 'dream' theory of knowledge using the example of letters and syllables, demonstrating a contradiction in the claim that syllables are knowable while elements are not, which leads them to reconsider the syllable as a unified form distinct from its elements.
ΣΩ. βασανίζωμεν δὴ αὐτὰ ἀναλαμβάνοντες, μᾶλλον δὲ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς,1 οὕτως ἢ οὐχ οὕτως γράμματα ἐμάθομεν. φέρε πρῶτον· ἆρʼ αἱ μὲν συλλαβαὶ λόγον ἔχουσι, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα ἄλογα; ΘΕΑΙ. ἴσως. ΣΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται. Σωκράτους γοῦν εἴ τις ἔροιτο τὴν πρώτην συλλαβὴν οὑτωσί· ὦ Θεαίτητε, λέγε τί ἐστι ΣΩ; τί ἀποκρινῇ; ΘΕΑΙ. ὅτι σῖγμα καὶ ὦ. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοῦτον ἔχεις λόγον τῆς συλλαβῆς; ΘΕΑΙ. ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. ἴθι δή, οὕτως εἰπὲ καὶ τὸν τοῦ σῖγμα λόγον. ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ πῶς τοῦ στοιχείου τις ἐρεῖ στοιχεῖα; καὶ γὰρ δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, τό τε σῖγμα τῶν ἀφώνων ἐστί, ψόφος τις μόνον, οἷον συριττούσης τῆς γλώττης· τοῦ δʼ αὖ βῆτα οὔτε φωνὴ οὔτε ψόφος, οὐδὲ τῶν πλείστων στοιχείων. ὥστε πάνυ εὖ ἔχει τὸ λέγεσθαι αὐτὰ ἄλογα, ὧν γε τὰ ἐναργέστατα αὐτὰ τὰ ἑπτὰ2 φωνὴν μόνον ἔχει, λόγον δὲ οὐδʼ ὁντινοῦν. ΣΩ. τουτὶ μὲν ἄρα, ὦ ἑταῖρε, κατωρθώκαμεν περὶ ἐπιστήμης. ΘΕΑΙ. φαινόμεθα. ΣΩ. τί δέ; τὸ μὴ γνωστὸν εἶναι τὸ στοιχεῖον ἀλλὰ τὴν συλλαβὴν ἆρʼ ὀρθῶς ἀποδεδείγμεθα; ΘΕΑΙ. εἰκός γε. ΣΩ. φέρε δή, τὴν συλλαβὴν πότερον λέγομεν τὰ ἀμφότερα στοιχεῖα, καὶ ἐὰν πλείω ᾖ ἢ δύο, τὰ πάντα, ἢ μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν γεγονυῖαν συντεθέντων αὐτῶν; ΘΕΑΙ. τὰ ἅπαντα ἔμοιγε δοκοῦμεν. ΣΩ. ὅρα δὴ ἐπὶ δυοῖν, σῖγμα καὶ ὦ. ἀμφότερά ἐστιν ἡ πρώτη συλλαβὴ τοῦ ἐμοῦ ὀνόματος. ἄλλο τι ὁ γιγνώσκων αὐτὴν τὰ ἀμφότερα γιγνώσκει; ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν; ΣΩ. τὸ σῖγμα καὶ τὸ ὦ ἄρα γιγνώσκει. ΘΕΑΙ. ναί. ΣΩ. τί δʼ; ἑκάτερον ἄρʼ ἀγνοεῖ καὶ οὐδέτερον εἰδὼς ἀμφότερα γιγνώσκει; ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλὰ δεινὸν καὶ ἄλογον, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μέντοι εἴ γε ἀνάγκη ἑκάτερον γιγνώσκειν, εἴπερ ἀμφότερά τις γνώσεται, προγιγνώσκειν τὰ στοιχεῖα ἅπασα ἀνάγκη τῷ μέλλοντί3 ποτε γνώσεσθαι συλλαβήν, καὶ οὕτως ἡμῖν ὁ καλὸς λόγος ἀποδεδρακὼς οἰχήσεται. ΘΕΑΙ. καὶ μάλα γε ἐξαίφνης. ΣΩ. οὐ γὰρ καλῶς αὐτὸν φυλάττομεν. χρῆν γὰρ ἴσως τὴν συλλαβὴν τίθεσθαι μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἀλλʼ ἐξ ἐκείνων ἕν τι γεγονὸς εἶδος, ἰδέαν μίαν αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ ἔχον, ἕτερον δὲ τῶν στοιχείων. ΘΕΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν· καὶ τάχα γʼ ἂν μᾶλλον οὕτως ἢ ʼκείνως ἔχοι. ΣΩ. σκεπτέον καὶ οὐ προδοτέον οὕτως ἀνάνδρως μέγαν τε καὶ σεμνὸν λόγον. ΘΕΑΙ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
SOCRATES: Let us indeed examine these things by taking them up again, or rather ourselves, to see whether we learned letters in this way or not. Come first: do syllables indeed have an account, but elements have no account? THEAETETUS: Perhaps. SOCRATES: Indeed it seems so to me as well. At any rate, if someone were to ask about the first syllable of ‘Socrates’ in this way: “O Theaetetus, tell me, what is SO?” what would you reply? THEAETETUS: That it is sigma and omega. SOCRATES: Therefore you have this as the account of the syllable? THEAETETUS: I do. SOCRATES: Come now, in the same way, tell me also the account of sigma. THEAETETUS: And how will anyone say the elements of an element? For indeed, Socrates, sigma is one of the voiceless letters, merely a certain noise, like the tongue hissing; and as for beta, on the other hand, there is neither voice nor noise, nor is there in most of the elements. So that it is very well said that they themselves are without account, of which indeed the most distinct seven have voice only, but no account whatsoever. SOCRATES: This point then, my friend, we have established correctly concerning knowledge. THEAETETUS: So we seem. SOCRATES: What then? Have we demonstrated rightly that the element is not knowable, but the syllable is? THEAETETUS: It is likely, indeed. SOCRATES: Come now, do we say that the syllable is both elements (or all of them, if there are more than two), or some single form that has come to be when they are put together? THEAETETUS: To me at least, we seem to mean all of them. SOCRATES: Look then in the case of the two, sigma and omega. Both are the first syllable of my name. Does the one who knows it know anything else than both? THEAETETUS: Of course. SOCRATES: He knows, then, sigma and omega. THEAETETUS: Yes. SOCRATES: What then? Is he ignorant of each of them, and knowing neither of them, does he know both? THEAETETUS: But that is strange and irrational, Socrates. SOCRATES: Yet surely, if it is necessary to know each of them if one is to know both, it is absolutely necessary for the one who is ever to know a syllable to know the elements beforehand, and thus our beautiful argument will have run away and vanished. THEAETETUS: And very suddenly, too. SOCRATES: For we are not guarding it well. For perhaps we ought to have posited that the syllable is not the elements, but some single form that has arisen from them, having a single idea of its own, and being different from the elements. THEAETETUS: Absolutely so; and perhaps it would be better this way than that. SOCRATES: We must examine this and not betray so unmanfully a great and solemn argument. THEAETETUS: Certainly not.
- 203aμᾶλλον δὲ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς
A corrective addition parallel to the accusative object 'αὐτά' (these things) of the hortatory subjunctive 'βασανίζωμεν' (let us examine). The verb 'βασανίζωμεν' is to be supplied: 'or rather [let us examine] ourselves'.
- 203bὧν γε τὰ ἐναργέστατα αὐτὰ τὰ ἑπτὰ
The genitive of the relative pronoun 'ὧν' is a partitive genitive ('of which'). 'The most distinct seven of them' refers to the seven vowels of the Greek alphabet (α, ε, η, ι, ο, υ, ω).
- 203dπρογιγνώσκειν τὰ στοιχεῖα ἅπασα ἀνάγκη τῷ μέλλοντί
The infinitive phrase 'προγιγνώσκειν τὰ στοιχεῖα' acts as the subject of the impersonal expression 'ἅπασα ἀνάγκη [ἐστί]' (it is an absolute necessity), while the logical subject of the infinitive is expressed in the dative 'τῷ μέλλοντι...'. The overall syntax is 'it is absolutely necessary for the one who intends [to...] to know the elements beforehand'.
